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"Autonomy is the condition under which what one does reflects who one is" (Weinrib, 2019, p.8). This quote encapsulates the core idea of autonomy, namely the correspondence of one’s inner values with one’s actions. This is a beautiful idea. After all, who wants their actions to be determined or controlled from the outside?
The classical definition of autonomy is precisely about this independence from external circumstances, which Murray (1938) primarily coined. Among other things, Murray characterizes autonomy as resistance to influence and defiance of authority. Similarly, Piaget (1983) describes individuals as autonomous, independent of external influences, in their thinking and actions, and foremost, adult authority. Subsequent work criticized this equation of autonomy with separation or independence (Bekker, 1993; Chirkov et al., 2003; Hmel & Pincus, 2002). In lieu thereof, autonomy is defined as an ability (Chirkov, 2011; Rössler, 2017) and as an essential human need (Ryan & Deci, 2006). Focus is now
on self-governing while relying on rationally determined values to pursue a happy life (Chirkov, 2011). According to Social Determination Theory (SDT), autonomy is about a sense of initiative and responsibility for one’s own actions. The experience of interest and appreciation can strengthen autonomy, whereas experiences of external control, e.g., through rewards or punishments, limit autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2020). In the psychological discourse of autonomy, SDT is strongly represented (Chirkov et al., 2003; Koestner & Losier, 1996; Weinstein et al., 2012). Notably, SDT distinguishes between autonomy and independence as follows. While a person can autonomously ask for help or rely on others, a person can also be involuntarily alone and independent. Interestingly, these definitions are again closer to its etymological meaning as self-governing, originating from Greek αυτòνoμζ (autonomous).
The two strands of autonomy as independence and autonomy as self-determination are also reflected in the vital differentiation into reactive and reflective autonomy by Koestner and Losier (1996). Resisting external influence, particularly interpersonal in fluence, is what reactive autonomy entails. This interpretation is closely related to the classical concept of autonomy as separation and independence from others (Murray, 1938). On the other hand, reflective autonomy concerns intrapersonal processes, such as self-governing or self-regulation, as defined in Self-Determination Theory (Ryan et al., 2021). In this dissertation, we investigated the concept in three different approaches while focusing on its assessment and operationalization: To begin, in Article 1, we compared the layperson’s and the scientific perspective to each other to gain insight into the characteristics of autonomy. Then, in Articles 2 and 3, we experimentally tested behavioral autonomy as resistance to external influences. Simultaneously, we investigated the link between various autonomy trait measures and autonomous behavior. As a result, in Article 2, we looked at how people reacted to the effects of message framing and sender authority on social distancing behavior during the early COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, in Article 3 we investigated the resistance to a descriptive norm in answering factual questions, in the context of autonomous personality. In our first article, we used a semi-qualitative bottom-up approach to gain insights into the laypersons’ perspective on autonomy and compare it to the scientific notion. We followed a design proposed by Kraft-Todd and Rand (2019) on the term heroism. We derived five components from philosophical and psychological literature: dignity, independence from others, morality, self-awareness, and unconventionality. In three preregistered online studies, we compared these scientific components to the laypersons’ understanding of autonomy. In Study 1, participants (N = 222) listed at least three and up to ten examples of autonomous (self-determined) behaviors. Here, the participants named 807 meaningful examples, which we systematically categorized into 34 representative items for Study 2. Next, new participants (N = 114) rated these regarding their autonomy. Finally, we transferred the five highest-rated autonomy and the five lowest-rated autonomy items to Study 3 (N = 175). We asked participants to rate how strongly the items represented dignity, independence from others, morality, self-awareness, and unconventionality. We found all components to distinguish between high and low autonomy items but not for unconventionality. Thus, we conclude that laypersons’ view corresponds with the scientific characteristics of dignity, independence from others, self-awareness, and morality. A qualitative analysis of the examples also showed that both reactive and reflective definitions of autonomy are prevalent.
Our mind has the function of representing the physical and social world we are in, so that we can efficiently interact with it. This results in a constant and dynamic interaction between mind and world that produces a balance when representations are at the same time accurate with respect to what the world is communicating to our organism, but also compatible with how our mind works.
A paradigmatic case of this interaction is offered by perception, which is the mental function that represents contingent aspects of the world built from what is captured by our senses. Indeed, the dominant philosophical view in cognitive science is that our perceptual states are representations of the world and not direct access to that world. These representational perceptual states therefor include the aspects of the world they represent and that initiate the perception by stimulating our sensory organs.
Perceptual representations are built using information from the sensory system, i.e., bottom-up information, but are also integrated with information previously acquired, i.e., top-down information, so that perception interacts with memory through language and other mental functions. Such organization is believed to reflect a general mechanism of our mind/brain, which is to acquire and use information to make efficient predictions about the future, continuously updating older information with present information.
This predictive processing works because the world is not random, but shows a regular structure from which reliable expectations can be built. One way that our minds make these predictions is by adapting to the structure of the world in an implicit, automatic and unconscious way, a process that has been called Implicit Statistical Learning (ISL). ISL is a learning process that does not require awareness and happens in an incidental and spontaneous way, with mere exposure to statistical regularities of the world. It is what happens when we learn a language during early childhood, and that allows us to be implicitly sensitive to the phonological structure of speech, or to associate speech patterns with objects and events to learn word meaning.
A specific case of ISL is the learning of spatial configuration in the visual world, which we apply to abstract arrays of items, but most importantly, also to more ecological settings such as the visual scenes we are immersed in during our everyday life. The knowledge we acquire about the structure of visual scenes has been called “Scene Grammar”, because it informs about presence and position of objects in a similar way to what linguistic grammar tells us about the presence and position of words. So, we implicitly acquire the semantics of scenes, learning which objects are consistent with a certain scene, as well as the syntax of scenes, learning where objects are positioned in a consistent way within a certain scene.
More recent developments have proposed that scene grammar knowledge might be organized based on a hierarchical system: objects are arranged in the scene, which offers the more general context, but within a scene we can identify different spatial and functional clusters of objects, called “phrases”, that offer a second level of context; within every phrase, then, objects have different status, with usually one object (“anchor object”) offering strong prediction of where and which are the other objects within the phrase (“local objects”). However, these further aspects of the organization of objects In scenes remain poorly understood.
Another problem relates to the way we measure the structure of scenes to compare the organization of the visual world with the organization in the mind. Typically, to decide if an object appears or not in a certain scene, and whether or not it appears in a certain position within a scene, researchers based their decision on intuition and common-sense, maybe validating those decisions with independent raters. But it has been shown that often these decisions can be limited and more complex information about objects’ arrangement in scenes can be lost.
A potential solution to this problem might be using large set of real-world images, that have annotations and segmentations of objects, to measures statistics about how objects are arranged in the environment. This idea exploits the nowadays larger availability of this kind of datasets due to increasing developments of computer vision algorithms, and also parallels with the established usage of large text corpora in language research.
The goals of the current investigation were to extract object statistics from this image datasets and test if they reliably predict behavioural responses during object processing, as well as to use these statistics to investigate more complex aspects of scene grammar, such as its hierarchical organization, to see if this organization is reflected in the organization of objects in our mind.
Understanding the brain's proactive nature and its ability to anticipate the future has been a longstanding pursuit in philosophy and scientific research. The predictive processing framework explains how the brain generates predictions based on environmental regularities and adapts to both predicted and unpredicted events. Prediction errors (PE) occur when sensory evidence deviates from predictions, triggering cognitive and neural processes that enhance learning and subsequent memory. However, the effects of PE on episodic memory have not been clearly explained. This dissertation aims to address three key questions to advance our understanding of PE and episodic memory. First, how does the degree of PE influence episodic memory, and how do expected and unexpected events interact in this process? Second, what insights can be gained from studying the electrophysiological activity associated with prediction violations, and what role does PE play in subsequent memory benefits? Lastly, how do memory processes change across the lifespan, and how does this impact the brain's ability to remember events? By answering these questions, this dissertation contributes to advancing our understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the relationship PE and episodic memory.
Previous research has demonstrated the efficacy of psychological interventions to foster resilience. However, little is known about whether the cultural context in which resilience interventions are implemented affects their efficacy on mental health. Studies performed in Western (k = 175) and Eastern countries (k = 46) regarding different aspects of interventions (setting, mode of delivery, target population, underlying theoretical approach, duration, control group design) and their efficacy on resilience, anxiety, depressive symptoms, quality of life, perceived stress, and social support were compared. Interventions in Eastern countries were longer in duration and tended to be more often conducted in group settings with a focus on family caregivers. We found evidence for larger effect sizes of resilience interventions in Eastern countries for improving resilience (standardized mean difference [SMD] = 0.48, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.28 to 0.67; p < 0.0001; 43 studies; 6248 participants; I2 = 97.4%). Intercultural differences should receive more attention in resilience intervention research. Future studies could directly compare interventions in different cultural contexts to explain possible underlying causes for differences in their efficacy on mental health outcomes.
Children often perform worse than adults on tasks that require focused attention. While this is commonly regarded as a sign of incomplete cognitive development, a broader attentional focus could also endow children with the ability to find novel solutions to a given task. To test this idea, we investigated children’s ability to discover and use novel aspects of the environment that allowed them to improve their decision-making strategy. Participants were given a simple choice task in which the possibility of strategy improvement was neither mentioned by instructions nor encouraged by explicit error feedback. Among 47 children (8—10 years of age) who were instructed to perform the choice task across two experiments, 27.5% showed a full strategy change. This closely matched the proportion of adults who had the same insight (28.2% of n = 39). The amount of erroneous choices, working memory capacity and inhibitory control, in contrast, indicated substantial disadvantages of children in task execution and cognitive control. A task difficulty manipulation did not affect the results. The stark contrast between age-differences in different aspects of cognitive performance might offer a unique opportunity for educators in fostering learning in children.
Humans accumulate knowledge throughout their entire lives. In what ways does this accumulation of knowledge influence learning of new information? Are there age-related differences in the way prior knowledge is leveraged for remembering new information? We review studies that have investigated these questions, focusing on those that have used the memory congruency effect, which provides a quantitative measure of memory advantage because of prior knowledge. Regarding the first question, evidence suggests that the accumulation of knowledge is a key factor promoting the development of memory across childhood and counteracting some of the decline in older age. Regarding the second question, evidence suggests that, if available knowledge is controlled for, age-related differences in the memory congruency effect largely disappear. These results point to an age-invariance in the way prior knowledge is leveraged for learning new information. Research on neural mechanisms and implications for application are discussed.
Personal values are considered as guiding principles for humans’ attitudes and behavior, what makes them an essential component of mental health. Although these notions are widely recognized, investigations in clinical samples examining the link between values and mental health are lacking. We assessed n = 209 patients with affective disorders, neurotic disorders, reaction to severe stress, and adjustment disorders and personality disorders and compared them to a stratified random sample (n = 209) drawn from the European Social Survey. Personal values were assessed using the Portraits Value Questionnaire. Severity of psychopathology was assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory and the Brief Symptom Inventory. Clinical participants showed a higher preference for the values power, achievement and tradition/conformity and a lower preference for hedonism compared to controls. Patients exhibited more incompatible value patterns than controls. Across diagnostic groups, patients with neurotic disorders reported incompatible values most frequently. Value priorities and value conflicts may have the potential to contribute to a better understanding of current and future actions and experiences in patients with mental disorders.
Background: Hebb repetition learning is a form of long-term serial order learning that can occur when sequences of items in an immediate serial recall task are repeated. Repetition improves performance because of the gradual integration of serial order information from short-term memory into a more stable long-term memory trace.
Aims: The current study assessed whether adolescents with non-specific intellectual disabilities showed Hebb repetition effects, and if their magnitude was equivalent to those of children with typical development, matched for mental age.
Methods: Two immediate serial recall Hebb repetition learning tasks using verbal and visuospatial materials were presented to 47 adolescents with intellectual disabilities (11–15 years) and 47 individually mental age-matched children with typical development (4–10 years).
Results: Both groups showed Hebb repetition learning effects of similar magnitude, albeit with some reservations. Evidence for Hebb repetition learning was found for both verbal and visuospatial materials; for our measure of Hebb learning the effects were larger for verbal than visuospatial materials.
Conclusions: The findings suggested that adolescents with intellectual disabilities may show implicit long-term serial-order learning broadly commensurate with mental age level. The benefits of using repetition in educational contexts for adolescents with intellectual disabilities are considered.
Cross-sectional findings suggest that volumes of specific hippocampal subfields increase in middle childhood and early adolescence. In contrast, a small number of available longitudinal studies reported decreased volumes in most subfields over this age range. Further, it remains unknown whether structural changes in development are associated with corresponding gains in children’s memory. Here we report cross-sectional age differences in children’s hippocampal subfield volumes together with longitudinal developmental trajectories and their relationships with memory performance. In two waves, 109 participants aged 6–10 years (wave 1: MAge=7.25, wave 2: MAge=9.27) underwent high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging to assess hippocampal subfield volumes (imaging data available at both waves for 65 participants) and completed tasks assessing hippocampus dependent memory processes. We found that cross-sectional age-associations and longitudinal developmental trends in hippocampal subfield volumes were discrepant, both by subfields and in direction. Further, volumetric changes were largely unrelated to changes in memory, with the exception that increase in subiculum volume was associated with gains in spatial memory. Longitudinal and cross-sectional patterns of brain-cognition couplings were also discrepant. We discuss potential sources of these discrepancies. This study underscores that children’s structural brain development and its relationship to cognition cannot be inferred from cross-sectional age comparisons.
Based on the stressor-detachment model, previous research has assumed that work-related ICT use in the evening impairs psychological detachment. However, since most of the studies to date have assessed cross-sectional relationships, little is known about the actual direction of effects. In this 5-day diary study, we implemented a day-level longitudinal model to shed light on the causal relationships between work-related ICT use, detachment, and task progress (N = 340 employees, N = 1289 day-level cases). We also investigated the role of unfinished work tasks because we assumed, based on boundary theory, that they are a driving force leading to impaired detachment and work-related ICT use in the evening. Contrary to current research consensus but in line with our expectations, we found that low psychological detachment increased work-related ICT use and task progress. We found no evidence for reversed lagged effects. These results applied both to planned and unplanned ICT use. Furthermore, our results support the notion that unfinished work tasks precede ICT use and detachment. Thus, our findings suggest that work-related ICT use should not be treated as a stressor in its own right in the stressor-detachment model. Instead, it needs to be investigated as a behavioral outcome that employees engage in when they cannot detach from work.