Universitätspublikationen
Refine
Year of publication
- 2010 (25) (remove)
Document Type
- Article (19)
- magisterthesis (3)
- Book (1)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
- Review (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (25)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (25)
Keywords
- Benjamin (3)
- Adorno (2)
- Recognition (2)
- Reconhecimento (2)
- critical theory (2)
- recognition (2)
- reconhecimento (2)
- teoria crítica (2)
- Art autonomous (1)
- Arte autônoma (1)
Institute
- Philosophie (25) (remove)
The central difference between objectivist cognitivist semantics and embodied cognition consists in the fact that the latter is, in contrast to the former, mindful of binding meaning to context-sensitive mental systems. According to Lakoff/Johnson's experientialism, conceptual structures arise from preconceptual kinesthetic image-schematic and basic-level structures. Gallese and Lakoff introduced the notion of exploiting sensorimotor structures for higherlevel cognition. Three different types of X-schemas realise three types of environmentally embedded simulation: Areas that control movements in peri-personal space; canonical neurons of the ventral premotor cortex that fire when a graspable object is represented; the firing of mirror neurons while perceiving certain movements of conspecifics. ...
Vielleicht gibt es irgendwann Wanderungsbewegungen in den Weltraum. Je später die zukünftigen Generationen leben, umso geringer ist unser Wissen um ihre Lebenssituation, ihre Möglichkeiten und ihre daran wohl angepassten Interessen. Die zentrale moralische Rücksicht auf die Interessen der Betroffenen bleibt also mit Bezug auf zukünftige Generationen wenn nicht unbestimmt, so doch unterbestimmt.
In the following Magisterarbeit I am going to develop a Concept Empiricist model of conceptual thought, which is in its technical core primarily inspired and motivated by Larry Barsalou‘ s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory (PSST) (1999, 2008a). But it is not a theory of concepts in the genuine sense only, but it also expands naturally on related topics like the ontology of mind and the problem of intentionality. This is not arbitrarily chosen, but a natural consequence of any contemporary Concept Empiricist theory, for those theories are in kind direct outgrowths of an embodied approach to cognition which yields these consequences – the natural extension to related topics – as will be shown. The roadmap for the Magisterarbeit is going to look like this: First I will delineate the embodied cognition framework. Within embodied cognition there is a plethora of differing attempts at explaining the diverse phenomena of higher and lower cognition which differ in the meanwhile tremendously from each other. Therefore it will be very useful to set clear boundaries between the differing approaches, which range from strong neural embodiment on the one side to a very promiscuous extended mind hypothesis on the other side, in order to make a clear case for Concept Empiricism. It will be also very helpful to set my favoured version of grounded cognition off against classical attempts at the phenomena which are to be explained. Following that I am going to present Larry Barsalou‘s Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory in more detail. I will do that to an extent which allows for an appropriate discussion of concept related phenomena, but which is not too lengthy. I will spare the reader with unnecessary psychological or neurobiological details as long as it is not really necessary for explaining or clarifying the phenomena with which I deal here. Having done this I will discuss at great length conceptual meaning. In doing so I will present a presentational theory of meaning which is anti-realist, internalist and imaginistic. In advertising for this theory I will recur to conceptual methods, intuition as well as to the empirical record. Next and related to this I will develop a resemblance based theory of intentionality which differs also widely from the already established theories of intentionality so far given. Indeed it possess a feature which makes it very distinct and this is, besides its reliance on pattern mapping, the statistical grounding of resemblance which allows a cognitive theory of resemblance which is definite and therefore not open to the counterarguments generally mashalled against related theories, which stress the importance of resemblance. A very distinctive feature of this theory of intentionality is additionally that intentionality is seen as a capacity which emerges naturally form the mental mechanism involved. As we will see, this is a distinctive advantage of it in comparison to other proposal in the field. A discussion of the ontology of mental states follows which is however primarily a discussion of mechanistic explanations and Bechtel‘s and McCauley‘s Heuristic Identity Theory (HIT). Those theories from philosophy of science and philosophy of cognitive science do not only deliver models for the ontology of mental states, but also epistemic criteria for evaluating a theory as superior or inferior. Especially the idea of productive continuity plays a role of pivotal importance in my Magisterarbeit. It might be a bit unfortunate that that an important consideration is discussed nearly at the end of the Magisterarbeit, since I refer to it very often, however, I considered it as equally unfortunate to delay the discussion of meaning and intentionality, which is already protruded by the overview chapter and the more technical parts, even more. Therefore I plead the reader to refer to later parts of the Magisterarbeit when it is necessary in order to understand earlier parts. In the course of writing I have gotten second thoughts regarding the adequacy of an ontology of mental states altogether, especially from the background of the theory of meaning and intentionality delivered here. Therefore I tried to accommodate for ontological concepts by means of a tentative phenomenological interpretation of them. Similar ideas influenced my deliberations regarding meaning too. I hope that this transition towards Phenomenology runs smoothly and that the high level of coherence which is my primary concern and something which I always strive for first is preserved. Further, I have dedicated a main chapter of the Magisterarbeit for possible and actual critics of the ideas brought forth by me. Besides the more classic standard objections there you can find a recent critique of the authors on which I refer most often. Naturally I try to refute any single criticism brought forth and I hope that the reader will approve my objection to the objections. I will round off the Magisterarbeit with some concluding remarks and prospects for future research.
La musique et le rêve
(2010)
Adorno, in his posthumous work Beethoven. Philosophy of music, grasps the deep relationship between music and dream: “we are in music, as well as we are in dream”. Music is the coming of a non-intentional truth, that is never caught by images and words. In the same way, dream follows the logic of a non-giudicatory synthesis and is incompatible with the category of dialectical totality: in dream, truth announces her-self as it fades out. According to Adorno, the dimension of opening typical to dream and music collides with the pretension of philosophical discourse that aims at the total revelation.
Le cadre du programme interdisciplinaire de recherche défini par Max Horkheimer dans les années 1930 doit beaucoup à Erich Fromm, qui a introduit la psychologie sociale dans la Théorie critique de la société. Or, une décennie plus tard, Fromm est la cible privilégiée des attaques et sa théorie apparaît désormais comme incompatible avec les positions défendues par Horkheimer et Adorno. Partant de ces tensions qui ont marqué l’histoire de l’École de Francfort, le présent article vise à éclaircir le déplacement qu’elles traduisent sur le plan épistémologique. Si Horkheimer et Fromm partagent des prémisses communes, le premier, dans son travail avec Adorno, se rapproche de manière croissante de la doctrine freudienne alors que le second s’en éloigne. Nous voudrions montrer que l’accord entre Fromm et Horkheimer fut surtout négatif puisqu’il portait sur la critique de Freud : les divergences entre les deux penseurs apparaissent clairement, dès lors qu’on pose en profondeur la question de l’usage de la psychanalyse pour analyser l’un des problèmes centraux de la théorie de la société, l’antagonisme entre individu et société.
As an exemplum of that kind of “modern” art, in terms of Adorno, Kafka’s work is marked not only by its strictly “realistic” character, but also by the unavoidable critical and testimonial value of that realism. According to this perspective, both in Adorno and in Benjamin the testimonial aspect of Kafkian writing – that is of a writing as “dialectical image”, as memory of the unfullfilled possibility – it’s all the same not with its symbolical or “epiphanical” aspect but instead with its “allegorical” one.
Starting from Warburg, the distinguishing mark of an image, considered as identity-difference of visible and invisible, is its offering itself as an implementation of a temporality, and at the same time of a memory that is immanent in the sensible structure of the image. It’s what we find both in Benjamin and in Adorno: in both cases, it is just because the image is marked by a “internal time” that it is able to have a critical function towards reality, and at the same time an utopian character that is all the same with its non-renounceable testimonial task.
This study points out the methodological centrality assumed by the notion of “physiognomy”, both in Benjamin and in Adorno, namely the idea that the forms of the works of art, and generally those of the visual phenomena, are direct “expression”, in a micro-monadological way, of an historical-social sense, not otherwise attainable. On the one hand Benjamin’s physiognomy shows a particular interpretative “openness” to its objects, on the other that of Adorno remains subjected to an epistemological model of “totality”, from the Hegelian-Marxian tradition, which risks compromising the hermeneutic efficacy of its own original philosophical approach.
Este artigo pretende ser uma exposição da Filosofia do Esclarecimento de Habermas. Nesse sentido, apresentaremos especialmente seu pensamento inicial, com o escopo de estabelecer seus fundamentos, o que implica iniciar com as influências sobre ele (I. Kant, J. L. Austin, o "segundo" Wittgenstein, M. Weber, E. Husserl, K. O. Apel, entre outros), assim como com sua crítica aos primeiros membros da Escola de Frankfurt (especialmente contra o pessimismo de T. Adorno e M. Horkheimer acerca da possibilidade de a razão nos libertar). Finalmente, mostraremos como Habermas é uma extensão do projeto de uma Filosofia do Esclarecimento, o que faz dele um exemplo do pensamento moderno na história contemporânea da Filosofia.
Reconhecimento e trabalho em Axel Honneth: os trabalhadores offshore na Bacia de Campos – Brasil
(2010)
Honneth traz ao debate o Hegel dos tempos de Jena e retoma o tema da luta por reconhecimento. Mais recentemente, relê Durkheim que, oitenta anos depois de Hegel, insiste numa nova forma de economia indissociada da eticidade. Propõe que o capitalismo, além da perseguição de metas de eficiência econômica, haverá de se remodelar a partir de critérios normativos que o assegurem como força de integração social. Honneth elege experiências de sofrimento no trabalho como evidências de que a indignação é capaz de ativar lutas por reconhecimento que podem ou não ser articuladas politicamente. A pesquisa elege os trabalhadores offshore no Brasil e demonstra o quanto um setor econômico de ponta também promove entre seus trabalhadores assimetrias de reconhecimento, sobretudo quando as metas produtivas antagonizam-se às demandas por dignidade.