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We study the implications on compact star properties of a soft nuclear equation of state determined from kaon production at subthreshold energies in heavy-ion collisions. On one hand, we apply these results to study radii and moments of inertia of light neutron stars. Heavy-ion data provides constraints on nuclear matter at densities relevant for those stars and, in particular, to the density dependence of the symmetry energy of nuclear matter. On the other hand, we derive a limit for the highest allowed neutron star mass of three solar masses. For that purpouse, we use the information on the nucleon potential obtained from the analysis of the heavy-ion data combined with causality on the nuclear equation of state.
Making use of United Nations (U.N.) materials and documents, Anja Matwijkiw and Bronik Matwijkiw argue that the organization – in 2004 – converted to a stakeholder jurisprudence for human rights. However, references to “stakeholders” may both be made in the context of narrow stakeholder theory and broad stakeholder theory. Since the U.N. does not specify its commitment by naming the theory it credits for its conversion, the authors of the article embark on a comparative analysis, so as to be able to try the two frameworks for fit. The hypothesis is that it is the philosophy and methodology of broad stakeholder theory that best matches the norms and strategies of the U.N. While this is the case, certain challenges nevertheless present themselves. As a consequence of these, the U.N. has to – as a minimum – take things under renewed consideration.
Human rights and the law: the unbreachable gap between the ethics of justice and the efficacy of law
(2012)
This paper explores the structure of justice as the condition of ethical, inter-subjective responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the interests of the self. From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse. Rights do not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject animated by the universality of the dignity of autonomous, reasoned intentionality. Rather, rights enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.
In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if I take into account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves.
Am 24. und 25. Oktober 2011 veranstalteten Sybille Steinbacher vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Wien und Raphael Gross vom Fritz Bauer Institut, Geschichte und Wirkung des Holocaust Frankfurt/Main in Kooperation mit der Österreichischen HochschülerInnenschaft die Tagung "Der Holocaust und die Geschichte der Völkermorde im 20. Jahrhundert. Zur Bedeutung und Reichweite des Vergleichs". Im Mittelpunkt der Wiener Tagung standen Fragen nach der Entwicklung des Topos "Singularität des Holocaust", der Einordnung des nationalsozialistischen Judenmords in die Reihe der Völkermorde und dessen Vergleichbarkeit, beispielsweise mit den stalinistischen Verbrechen. Weiters wurde diskutiert, ob und wie den Zeitgenossen des "Dritten Reichs" die Gewaltexzesse gegen Zivilisten und ethnische Minderheiten zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkriegs bewusst waren. Ziel war es, die Bezüge der noch relativ jungen Komparativen Genozidforschung und der Holocaustforschung zu beleuchten, ferner den Merkmalen "ethnischer Säuberungen" nachzugehen und die Verbrechensgeschichte des letzten Jahrhunderts an ausgewählten Beispielen, wie dem Völkermord an den Armeniern, zu analysieren. ...
As is well known, the 2nd Spanish Republic (1931-1936) was toppled by a military uprising which, after a cruel Civil War, set up an autocratic regime led by General Franco which lasted until his natural death in 1975. According to the contemporary theory of the legal system, a legal order exists on the sole condition that it is efficient in general terms and this was the case for both the Republic and the Dictatorship. In turn, the validity of the legal norms of all legal orders is based on its respective rules of recognition. Thus, neither the existence of the legal order nor the validity of its respective legal norms depends on moral considerations. In this paper, we call this affirmation into question on the base of the fact that the compensatory methods adopted from the Transition to Democracy show an evident concern to repair the damage of taking away a person’s basic rights (life, health, freedom, expression, association etc) although the Spanish Constitution, with its catalogue of fundamental rights was not in force at that time. But these measures would not have much sense if, as Raz says, there was no shared content which is common to all legal systems. Like Nino, we claim that one must discriminate between a democratic legal order and an autocratic one to establish the level of validity of its respective legal norms. Thus it can be assigned a presumption of justice to democratic norms. Finally, we state that the criteria to weigh up the justice or injustice of legal norms, as that of legal orders, takes root in the level of respect they show towards human rights.