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To become self-reflexive, Jurisprudence must to establish a dialogue: the human sciences should lose their exotic character in the eyes of Legal Science. It is in the middle between the "order" and the thinking about it, where the "naked experience" happens, that culture and therefore Law builds itself e it is constructed. This paper demonstrates the need to use other human sciences, with emphasis on anthropology, as "methodological strategies" for Jurisprudence self-reflection to become more faithful to the reality of the researched object. Anthropology has the power to show what is "anti-modern". It questions the intellectual space of modernity where the hard definition of antagonisms detached from reality occurs - West/East, “I”/other, civilized/barbarian. Jurisprudence consolidates antagonisms: the diversity and plurality of human societies are rarely seen as a fact but as an aberration, always demanding a justification. It is necessary to create a methodology using what is most extraordinary and human in the analysis of fact: "Anthopological Blues". Anthropology is capable of breaking with the classical conception of scientific methodology that is based on stiffness to produce absolute truths and also support the fulfillment of legal concepts with content and meaning, providing a reinterpretation of science as a human instrument of intervention on reality.
The debates about the interrelations between reason and law have undergone a change after the eighteenth century. References to the recta ratio of jusnaturalistic tradition have not disappeared, but other comprehensions of legal reason have developed. The European debate over legal positivist science has contributed to this in a manifestation of the rationality of law. This transformation may be considered the basis for the development of true “legal technologies” throughout the twentieth century. On the other hand, in the context of theories of positive law which have taken the relation between ethics and legal reason as a problem, the formation of discourses on coercion (Austin and Holmes), on validity (Kelsen and Hart) and on justification (Alexy and Dworkin) has also contributed to the emergence of new models of legal rationality. In this paper, it is highlighted that the construction of these models is linked to the “points of view” which theories have proposed as legitimate for the interpretation of legal phenomenon. And it is suggested that the discussion over points of view (defined as “focuses”, term which is close to the notion of “attitude”, “stance” or “place of speech”) may aid in the debate on the normativity of law.
New technologies generate risks, for the evaluation of which various mechanisms have been developed; the most frequent of these mechanisms consists of advice from committees of experts to the bodies whose role is to decide whether a new technology should be implemented or not. Such committees try to measure the magnitude of the threats that accompany the introduction of a new technology in order that the policy-makers may take their decisions in the light of the reports of the experts. The legitimacy of such reports is not only found in the technical capacity of its authors, but also in the impartiality of their recommendations. On numerous occasions, nevertheless, the effective presence of this evaluation finds itself today under suspicion. There are various methods that can be employed to try to resolve this problem. Firstly by reinforcing the mechanisms on which the technocratic evaluation of the risk are based; for example, through transparency in the selection of the experts. Secondly, by means of the incorporation of democratic mechanisms in the scientific-technological policy. The exposure of the internal conditions to the dynamics of the technological change that make possible the institutionalised involvement of society in the control of risk, as well as of the mechanisms to realise it are the principal subjects of this work.
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term denoting a phenomenon when one acts freely and intentionally contrary to his or her better judgment. Discussion of akrasia originates in the Plato's Protagoras where he states that “No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course”. However, in his influential article from 1970, Donald Davidson argued that akrasia is theoretically possible yet irrational. Some other critics of Plato's stance point out that phenomenon of akrasia is common in our everyday experience, therefore it must be possible.
These two arguments in favor of akrasia existence – theoretical and empirical – will be discussed from both – philosophical and psychological points of view. Especially, George Ainslie's argument that akrasia results from hyperbolic discounting will be taken into consideration to show how it affects traditional thinking about weak-willed actions.
Finally, the paper will discuss how the contemporary notion of akrasia may affect the idea of responsibility and free will. Implications for the philosophy of law will be shown, i.a. whether it is possible to claim that a given example of a weak-willed action was indeed free and intentional and one should be held responsible for its results.
Occasionally, in pursuing their adjudicative duties over the course of a legal hearing, judges are called upon to acquire new concepts – that is, concepts which they did not possess at the commencement of the hearing. In performing their judicial role they are required to learn new things and, as a result, conceptualise the world in a way which differs from the way they conceived of things before the hearing commenced. Some theorists have argued that either as a general matter or as a matter specific to judicial practice and the legal context, judges are, with some degree of necessity, incapacitated from acquiring certain kinds of concepts. Such concepts include those possessed by the members of culturally different minority groups. Drawing on contemporary trends in analytic and naturalistic philosophy of mind, this paper explores the extent to which a judge might be incapacitated from acquiring new concepts over the course of a legal hearing and identifies those factors which condition the success or failure of that process.
The main purpose of my article is to discuss what GMOs are, the controversies about this specific issue and the related regulations that are put forward by the authorities. GMOs are genetically altered organisms which have been widely produced and breeded in certain parts of the world. According to some experts, this special practice of agriculture emerged in order to put an end to famine and prevent food scarcity. As growing GMOs seems to be more convenient than the traditional farming, it is more eligible to produce food in large scale which will be a fine solution for food scarcity. However, there are some oppositions to the GMOs. It is strongly believed that the real causes of famine is not related to production, it is a problem of distribution of food. Moreover, patenting the seeds leads to an unstoppable control and dominance over food by the private enterprises. Therefore, the opponents state that the aims of these companies are solely financial gain and monopolisation in food production. Patenting the seeds is another arguable issue. It poses a great threat for the organic farmers since GMO seeds can contaminate the others through natural ways. This is not the only danger that organic farmers face with; thay can also be sued by the GMO producers for this unintended exposure to GMO seeds. Not only the diminishing of the variety of species but also the possible adverse effects of GMOs on human health create a debate between the two groups. These are not the only topics that are open to discussion. In addition to these, labelling the products creates a huge problem among the poorly educated consumers as they have not been clearly regulated in some countries. Hence, this subject having such a close connection to human health cannot be ignored by the law. In fact, a number of countries have enacted legislation in order to regulate this sensitive field. Turkey, having been dependent on the import of the agricultural goods for a period of time, has to join these countries with a recent legislation. All these contemporary issues for Turkey will be highlighted in my article.
In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and Value-Sensitive Design and their relevance in the context of e-democracy. In part 2, I analyze three different e-democracy tools from a VID-perspective. The paper ends with some conclusions concerning the merits of VID for e-democracy as well as some considerations concerning the dual tasks of philosophers in assessing and promoting value-sensitive technology design.
The aim of this paper is to explore the case of the Spanish ‘indignants’ movement of May 2011 as an example of the structural changes occurring in the public sphere after the emergence of a new type of social movement characterized by the widespread use of the ICTs. First I focus on the ideological dimension of discourse of the ‘indignants’ movement, so as to reconstruct the protesters’ self-image. They thought that ICTs were playing a prominent role in a wider trend towards a regeneration of democracy, but they were rather misguided because they lack an accurate description of what really happened. In the second part of this paper I will challenge some features of my case study, emphasizing three basic elements of a democratic public sphere. I aim to call into question the idea that a ‘truly’ democratic public may be hosted by the emergent communicative environment.
In the debate on how the new information and communication technologies impact on democratic politics the role played by the digital architecture seems to be surprisingly underrated. In particular, while a lot of attention has been paid to the possibilities that new technologies open up to democratic theory, few works have attempted to look at how democracy may help in shaping technologies. By adopting as a starting point the approach known as ‘code as law’, the paper aims at two objectives: to re-affirm the importance of discussing normative principles to guide the process of code writing in order to reinvigorate the debate; to claim the importance of input reasons when deciding which principles should be chosen. After having remarked that code is relevant for establishing democratic norms, the paper briefly tackles with the main attempts by European scholars to deal with this issue. Then, a couple of practical examples of how code impacts on democratic rights are sketched out. In the last section of the paper a shift from an output-based approach to the legitimacy of code to an input-based is openly advocated: an inquiry into the legitimacy of code should focus on its production.
The aim of this contribution is to introduce and outline a third theory of rights. Concentrating on claim-rights, it proposes to approach this aim via the concept of a directed duty. This approach is justified by the widely shared presupposition that an entity has a right if and only if a duty is owed to this entity. Unlike some prominent other proposals, this contribution does not contrast directed duties with undirected ones. It contrasts two ways a duty can be related to an entity. On the one hand, a duty can be owed to an entity. In this case it is directed to this entity. On the other hand, a duty can concern an entity. There is no reason to presuppose that they exclude each other, on the contrary. Theories of rights have to reconstruct the difference between these two ways a duty can be related to an entity. After having introduced the starting point for a theory of rights in that way, the two classic theories of rights will be rejected, the will theory and the interest theory. The main focus lies on the shortcomings of the different versions of the interest theory. This criticism helps to formulate the conditions a convincing theory of rights has to meet. In the last part, the status theory of rights will be outlined.