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Insurance guarantee schemes aim to protect policyholders from the costs of insurer insolvencies. However, guarantee schemes can also reduce insurers’ incentives to conduct appropriate risk management. We investigate stock insurers’ risk-shifting behavior for insurance guarantee schemes under the two different financing alternatives: a flat-rate premium assessment versus a risk-based premium assessment. We identify which guarantee scheme maximizes policyholders’ welfare, measured by their expected utility. We find that the risk-based insurance guarantee scheme can only mitigate the insurer’s risk-shifting behavior if a substantial premium loading is present. Furthermore, the risk-based guarantee scheme is superior for improving policyholders’ welfare compared to the flat-rate scheme when the mitigating effect occurs.
[Tagungsbericht] Making finance sustainable: Ten years equator principles – success or letdown?
(2013)
In 2003, a number of banks adopted the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary Code of Conduct based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) performance standards, to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of project finance. These so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI) commit to requiring their borrowers to adopt sustainable management plans of environmental and social risks associated with their projects. The Principles apply to the project finance business segment of the banks and cover projects with a total cost of US $10 million or more. While for long developing countries relied on World Bank and other public assistance to finance infrastructure projects there has occurred a shift in recent years to private funding. The NGOs have been frustrated by this shift of project finance as they had spent their resources to exercise pressure on the public financial institutions to incorporate environmental and social standards in their project finance activities. However, after a shift of NGO pressure to private financial institutions the latter adopted the EPs for fear of reputational risks. NGOs had laid down their own more ambitious ideas about sustainable finance in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability. Legally speaking, the EPs are a self-regulatory soft law instrument. However, it has a hard law dimension as the Equator Banks require their borrowers to comply with the EPs through covenants in the loan contracts that may trigger a default in a case of violation. ...
Die Kompetenzmessung im Hochschulbereich stellt bislang ein weitgehend vernachlässigtes Forschungsgebiet des Bildungssektors dar (vgl. Blömeke et al. 2013). Eine umfassende Analyse des internationalen Forschungsstandes im Bereich der Modellierung und Erfassung von Kompetenzen zeigt insbesondere für Europa ein Forschungsdefizit im Hochschulsektor auf (vgl. Kuhn/Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia 2011). Daher wurde 2010 vom BMBF das Forschungsprogramm "Kompetenzmodellierung und Kompetenzerfassung im Hochschulsektor" (KoKoHs) initiiert, welches die Ziele verfolgt, die Leistungsfähigkeit des tertiären Bildungssystems in Deutschland zu erhalten und Grundlagen für eine Evaluation der Kompetenzentwicklung sowie des Kompetenzerwerbs an Hochschulen zu schaffen (vgl. Blömeke et al. 2013, 3). Im Rahmen des Forschungsprogramms werden u.a. Verbundprojekte aus den Bereichen der Berufs- und Wirtschaftspädagogik (Projekt WiWiKom, siehe Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia/Breuer 2013) sowie der Lehrerbildung gefördert (für eine Übersicht der einzelnen Projekte siehe Blömeke/Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia 2013). Das Verbundprojekt "Modellierung und Erfassung fachwissenschaftlicher und fachdidaktischer Kompetenzen im wirtschaftspädagogischen Studium" (kurz KoMeWP: Kompetenzmessung im wirtschaftspädagogischen Studium; siehe Seifried/Wuttke/Schmitz 2011) verknüpft diese beiden Bereiche. 1 Dabei wird die Zielsetzung verfolgt, die professionelle Kompetenz von angehenden Lehrkräften im kaufmännisch-verwaltenden Bereich zu modellieren und testtheoretisch abprüfbar zu machen. ...
Die berufliche Bildung in Deutschland, vor allem das Duale System der Berufsausbildung, erfährt – nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der sehr hohen Jugendarbeitslosigkeit – in einigen Ländern der EU große Aufmerksamkeit. In empirischen Analysen zur engen Verzahnung von Lernen und Arbeiten sowie in theoretischen Fundierungen des Bildungspotenzials stellt die berufs- und wirtschaftspädagogische Forschung allen Akteuren im Berufsbildungssystem Erkenntnisse, Argumente und Impulse zur Weiterentwicklung zur Verfügung.
Marketers increasingly use word of mouth to promote products or acquire new customers. But is such companystimulated WOM effective? Are customers who are referred by other customers really worth the effort? A recent study clearly says “yes”. In a study of almost 10,000 accounts at a German bank, the referred customers turned out to be 25 % more profi table than customers acquired by other means. Over a 33-month period, they generated higher profi t margins, were more loyal and showed a higher customer lifetime value. The difference in lifetime value between referred and non-referred customers was most pronounced among younger people and among retail (as opposed to private banking) customers. The reward of € 25 per acquired customer clearly paid off. Given the average difference in customer lifetime value of € 40, this amount implied a return on investment (ROI) of roughly 60 % over a six-year period. The encouraging results of this study, however, do not imply that “viral-for-hire” works in each and every case. Referral programs would be most beneficial for products and services that customers might not appreciate immediately. Products and services that imply some kind of risk would also benefit to a more than average degree from referrals because prospects are likely to feel more confi dent when a trusted person has positive experiences. Companies should consider carefully which prospects to target with referral programs and how large a referral fee to provide.
The IMFS Interdisciplinary Study 2/2013 contains speeches of Michael Burda (Humboldt University ), Benoît Coeuré (European Central Bank), Stefan Gerlach (Bank of Ireland and former IMFS Professor), Patrick Honohan (Bank of Ireland), Sabine Lautenschläger (Deutsche Bundesbank), Athanasios Orphanides (MIT) and Helmut Siekmann as well as Volker Wieland.
This study contains articles based on speeches and presentations at the 14th CFS-IMFS Conference "The ECB and its Watchers" on June 15, 2012 by Mario Draghi, John Vickers, Peter Praet, Lucrezia Reichlin, Vitor Gaspar, Lucio Pench and Stefan Gerlach and a post-conference outlook by Helmut Siekmann and Volker Wieland.
In this paper, we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. We study detailed transactional information of more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers shift their efforts towards monitoring poorly-performing borrowers and issue fewer loans. However, these new loans are of above-average quality, which suggests that loan officers have a pecking order and process loans only for the very best clients when they are under time constraints.