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Highlights
• Brain connectivity states identified by cofluctuation strength.
• CMEP as new method to robustly predict human traits from brain imaging data.
• Network-identifying connectivity ‘events’ are not predictive of cognitive ability.
• Sixteen temporally independent fMRI time frames allow for significant prediction.
• Neuroimaging-based assessment of cognitive ability requires sufficient scan lengths.
Abstract
Human functional brain connectivity can be temporally decomposed into states of high and low cofluctuation, defined as coactivation of brain regions over time. Rare states of particularly high cofluctuation have been shown to reflect fundamentals of intrinsic functional network architecture and to be highly subject-specific. However, it is unclear whether such network-defining states also contribute to individual variations in cognitive abilities – which strongly rely on the interactions among distributed brain regions. By introducing CMEP, a new eigenvector-based prediction framework, we show that as few as 16 temporally separated time frames (< 1.5% of 10 min resting-state fMRI) can significantly predict individual differences in intelligence (N = 263, p < .001). Against previous expectations, individual's network-defining time frames of particularly high cofluctuation do not predict intelligence. Multiple functional brain networks contribute to the prediction, and all results replicate in an independent sample (N = 831). Our results suggest that although fundamentals of person-specific functional connectomes can be derived from few time frames of highest connectivity, temporally distributed information is necessary to extract information about cognitive abilities. This information is not restricted to specific connectivity states, like network-defining high-cofluctuation states, but rather reflected across the entire length of the brain connectivity time series.
Human functional brain connectivity can be temporally decomposed into states of high and low cofluctuation, defined as coactivation of brain regions over time. Rare states of particularly high cofluctuation have been shown to reflect fundamentals of intrinsic functional network architecture and to be highly subject-specific. However, it is unclear whether such network-defining states also contribute to individual variations in cognitive abilities – which strongly rely on the interactions among distributed brain regions. By introducing CMEP, a new eigenvector-based prediction framework, we show that as few as 16 temporally separated time frames (< 1.5% of 10min resting-state fMRI) can significantly predict individual differences in intelligence (N = 263, p < .001). Against previous expectations, individual’s network-defining time frames of particularly high cofluctuation do not predict intelligence. Multiple functional brain networks contribute to the prediction, and all results replicate in an independent sample (N = 831). Our results suggest that although fundamentals of person-specific functional connectomes can be derived from few time frames of highest connectivity, temporally distributed information is necessary to extract information about cognitive abilities. This information is not restricted to specific connectivity states, like network-defining high-cofluctuation states, but rather reflected across the entire length of the brain connectivity time series.
The hippocampal-dependent memory system and striatal-dependent memory system modulate reinforcement learning depending on feedback timing in adults, but their contributions during development remain unclear. In a 2-year longitudinal study, 6-to-7-year-old children performed a reinforcement learning task in which they received feedback immediately or with a short delay following their response. Children’s learning was found to be sensitive to feedback timing modulations in their reaction time and inverse temperature parameter, which quantifies value-guided decision-making. They showed longitudinal improvements towards more optimal value-based learning, and their hippocampal volume showed protracted maturation. Better delayed model-derived learning covaried with larger hippocampal volume longitudinally, in line with the adult literature. In contrast, a larger striatal volume in children was associated with both better immediate and delayed model-derived learning longitudinally. These findings show, for the first time, an early hippocampal contribution to the dynamic development of reinforcement learning in middle childhood, with neurally less differentiated and more cooperative memory systems than in adults.
The hippocampal-dependent memory system and striatal-dependent memory system modulate reinforcement learning depending on feedback timing in adults, but their contributions during development remain unclear. In a 2-year longitudinal study, 6-to-7-year-old children performed a reinforcement learning task in which they received feedback immediately or with a short delay following their response. Children’s learning was found to be sensitive to feedback timing modulations in their reaction time and inverse temperature parameter, which quantifies value-guided decision-making. They showed longitudinal improvements towards more optimal value-based learning, and their hippocampal volume showed protracted maturation. Better delayed model-derived learning covaried with larger hippocampal volume longitudinally, in line with the adult literature. In contrast, a larger striatal volume in children was associated with both better immediate and delayed model-derived learning longitudinally. These findings show, for the first time, an early hippocampal contribution to the dynamic development of reinforcement learning in middle childhood, with neurally less differentiated and more cooperative memory systems than in adults.
The hippocampal-dependent memory system and striatal-dependent memory system modulate reinforcement learning depending on feedback timing in adults, but their contributions during development remain unclear. In a 2-year longitudinal study, 6-to-7-year-old children performed a reinforcement learning task in which they received feedback immediately or with a short delay following their response. Children’s learning was found to be sensitive to feedback timing modulations in their reaction time and inverse temperature parameter, which quantifies value-guided decision-making. They showed longitudinal improvements towards more optimal value-based learning, and their hippocampal volume showed protracted maturation. Better delayed model-derived learning covaried with larger hippocampal volume longitudinally, in line with the adult literature. In contrast, a larger striatal volume in children was associated with both better immediate and delayed model-derived learning longitudinally. These findings show, for the first time, an early hippocampal contribution to the dynamic development of reinforcement learning in middle childhood, with neurally less differentiated and more cooperative memory systems than in adults.
The hippocampal-dependent memory system and striatal-dependent memory system modulate reinforcement learning depending on feedback timing in adults, but their contributions during development remain unclear. In a 2-year longitudinal study, 6-to-7-year-old children performed a reinforcement learning task in which they received feedback immediately or with a short delay following their response. Children’s learning was found to be sensitive to feedback timing modulations in their reaction time and inverse temperature parameter, which quantifies value-guided decision-making. They showed longitudinal improvements towards more optimal value-based learning, and their hippocampal volume showed protracted maturation. Better delayed model-derived learning covaried with larger hippocampal volume longitudinally, in line with the adult literature. In contrast, a larger striatal volume in children was associated with both better immediate and delayed model-derived learning longitudinally. These findings show, for the first time, an early hippocampal contribution to the dynamic development of reinforcement learning in middle childhood, with neurally less differentiated and more cooperative memory systems than in adults.
Human functional brain connectivity can be temporally decomposed into states of high and low cofluctuation, defined as coactivation of brain regions over time. Rare states of particularly high cofluctuation have been shown to reflect fundamentals of intrinsic functional network architecture and to be highly subject-specific. However, it is unclear whether such network-defining states also contribute to individual variations in cognitive abilities – which strongly rely on the interactions among distributed brain regions. By introducing CMEP, a new eigenvector-based prediction framework, we show that as few as 16 temporally separated time frames (< 1.5% of 10min resting-state fMRI) can significantly predict individual differences in intelligence (N = 263, p < .001). Against previous expectations, individual’s network-defining time frames of particularly high cofluctuation do not predict intelligence. Multiple functional brain networks contribute to the prediction, and all results replicate in an independent sample (N = 831). Our results suggest that although fundamentals of person-specific functional connectomes can be derived from few time frames of highest connectivity, temporally distributed information is necessary to extract information about cognitive abilities. This information is not restricted to specific connectivity states, like network-defining high-cofluctuation states, but rather reflected across the entire length of the brain connectivity time series.
How much data do we need? Lower bounds of brain activation states to predict human cognitive ability
(2022)
Human functional brain connectivity can be temporally decomposed into states of high and low cofluctuation, defined as coactivation of brain regions over time. Despite their low frequency of occurrence, states of particularly high cofluctuation have been shown to reflect fundamentals of intrinsic functional network architecture (derived from resting-state fMRI) and to be highly subject-specific. However, it is currently unclear whether such network-defining states of high cofluctuation also contribute to individual variations in cognitive abilities – which strongly rely on the interactions among distributed brain regions. By introducing CMEP, an eigenvector-based prediction framework, we show that functional connectivity estimates from as few as 20 temporally separated time frames (< 3% of a 10 min resting-state fMRI scan) are significantly predictive of individual differences in intelligence (N = 281, p < .001). In contrast and against previous expectations, individual’s network-defining time frames of particularly high cofluctuation do not achieve significant prediction of intelligence. Multiple functional brain networks contribute to the prediction, and all results replicate in an independent sample (N = 831). Our results suggest that although fundamentals of person-specific functional connectomes can be derived from few time frames of highest brain connectivity, temporally distributed information is necessary to extract information about cognitive abilities from functional connectivity time series. This information, however, is not restricted to specific connectivity states, like network-defining high-cofluctuation states, but rather reflected across the entire length of the brain connectivity time series.
Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which additional perceptual experiences are elicited by sensory stimuli or cognitive concepts. Synesthetes possess a unique type of phenomenal experiences not directly triggered by sensory stimulation. Therefore, for better understanding of consciousness it is relevant to identify the mental and physiological processes that subserve synesthetic experience. In the present work we suggest several reasons why synesthesia has merit for research on consciousness. We first review the research on the dynamic and rapidly growing field of the studies of synesthesia. We particularly draw attention to the role of semantics in synesthesia, which is important for establishing synesthetic associations in the brain. We then propose that the interplay between semantics and sensory input in synesthesia can be helpful for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, especially when making use of ambiguous stimuli for inducing synesthesia. Finally, synesthesia-related alterations of brain networks and functional connectivity can be of merit for the study of consciousness.
Following a brief review of current efforts to identify the neuronal correlates of conscious processing (NCCP) an attempt is made to bridge the gap between the material neuronal processes and the immaterial dimensions of subjective experience. It is argued that this "hard problem" of consciousness research cannot be solved by only considering the neuronal underpinnings of cognition. The proposal is that the hard problem can be treated within a naturalistic framework if one considers not only the biological but also the socio-cultural dimensions of evolution. The argument is based on the following premises: perceptions are the result of a constructivist process that depends on priors. This applies both for perceptions of the outer world and the perception of oneself. Social interactions between agents endowed with the cognitive abilities of humans generated immaterial realities, addressed as social or cultural realities. This novel class of realities assumed the role of priors for the perception of oneself and the embedding world. A natural consequence of these extended perceptions is a dualist classification of observables into material and immaterial phenomena nurturing the concept of ontological substance dualism. It is argued that perceptions shaped by socio-cultural priors lead to the construction of a self-model that has both a material and an immaterial dimension. As priors are implicit and not amenable to conscious recollection the perceived immaterial dimension is experienced as veridical and not derivable from material processes—which is the hallmark of the hard problem. These considerations let the hard problem appear as the result of cognitive constructs that are amenable to naturalistic explanations in an evolutionary framework.