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- Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen (28) (remove)
The concept of the political in Carl Schmitt’s works is not only defined by the distinction between friend and enemy, but also by the criterion of breaching the rules in a normatively unbound act of decision. According to Schmitt, this decision is, however, not arbitrary, but provoked by the necessity of a historical situation. This aspect of necessity calls the freedom of the decision into question and leads to tensions within Schmitt’s theory of the political. More explicitly than in Schmitt’s political and legal writings, this conflict between freedom and necessity is exposed in his theory of tragedy. In a reading of his book Hamlet or Hecuba, published in 1956, I will show, in a first step, how the act of breaching the rules is not external to normativity, but occurs from within normativity itself. It is the act of self-breaching – of breaking the rules of its own genre – by which, according to Schmitt, modern tragedy is defined. This breach, however, is compelled by the necessity of a real, i. e. extraliterary, event. In a second step, I will expound on how this idea of self-breaching, which also characterises Schmitt’s understanding of the political, leads to a loss of decision which not only questions his idea of sovereignty, but also topples his concept of the political.
A decorated pair of trousers excavated from a well-preserved tomb in the Tarim Basin proved to have a highly informative life history, teased out by the authors – with archaeological, historical and art historical dexterity. Probably created under Greek influence in a Bactrian palace, the textile started life in the third/second century BC as an ornamental wall hanging, showing a centaur blowing a war-trumpet and a nearly life-size warrior of the steppe with his spear. The palace was raided by nomads, one of whom worked a piece of the tapestry into a pair of trousers. They brought no great luck to the wearer who ended his days in a massacre by the Xiongnu, probably in the first century BC. The biography of this garment gives a vivid glimpse of the dynamic life of Central Asia at the end of the first millennium.
Säkularisierung und die Souveränität der Moderne. Ein Kommentar zur Agamben-Lektüre Jürgen Mohns
(2014)
According to Benjamin and Foucault, calling something into question is not just a precondition of critical practice but its very realisation. The effect of critique depends on how a question is asked. An inaccurately posed question supports what it aspired to criticise. Critical practice thus involves a critique of allegedly critical questions. In their critique of power and violence, Foucault and Benjamin expose the moment in which a critical question becomes uncritical and subsequently seek its critical transformation. In Foucault, this movement is identical with "desubjugation", and in Benjamin, with "revolution". A revolutionary resoluteness in raising critical questions, however, can turn out to be decisionistic and uncritical itself. In this paper I reconstruct the struggle for an accurate critical question in Benjamin and Foucault and address how the dialectical turn into uncritical action might be avoided.
The «spirit of the laws» is, as a concept, an answer to a problem of the laws. Regarding modern law, this problem is about unity: How can the manyness of the laws be coherent in one legal order? In my paper, I reconstruct three different models which establish unity as relational (Montesquieu), absolute (Kelsen), and interruptive (Schmitt). The interruptive model connects an aspect of the first with an aspect of the second model insofar it conceives unity as heterogeneous (related to something different) and nonetheless immanent (a unity in itself). As such, unity has to be thought of as a process or an activity. Schmitt’s account of this activity, however, leads to problematic consequences because it separates the activity from the norms and denies the political and democratic dimension of the laws; as a result, the difference between law and violence vanishes. Against this background, I argue for a different understanding of the immanent heterogeneity of the unity (and accordingly of what is called «spirit of the laws»). In this perspective, the spirit of the laws does no longer appear as the solution for the problem of the laws, but becomes the starting point of their critical investigation.
Wenn die Bedrohung, wie im Fall des Virus, als natürliche Gegebenheit auftritt, kommen leicht auch die Maßnahmen, um ihn zu beseitigen, als natürliche, d.h. fraglos vorgegebene Maßnahmen in Betracht. Eine Gefahr liegt hier darin, von einer Natürlichkeit des Zwecks auf die Natürlichkeit der Mittel zu schließen. Dass die Maßnahmen aber nicht natürlich gegeben, sondern politisch entschieden sind, muss demgegenüber im Blick bleiben.
Hegels Nützlichkeit
(2021)