BDSL-Klassifikation: 03.00.00 Literaturwissenschaft > 03.06.00 Literaturtheorie
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In his book "Fiction and Diction", Gerard Genette bemoans a contradiction between the pretense and the practice of narratological research. Instead of studying all kind of narratives, for Genette, narratological research concentrates de facto on the techniques of fictional narrative. Correspondingly, Genette speaks of a "fictional narratology" in the pejorative sense of a discipline that sets arbitrary limits on its area of study. In his objection, the narratology that literary scholars practice considers fictional narrative to be at least the standard case of any narrative. In other words, what is merely a special case, within a wide field of narratives, is here elevated to narrative par excellence. According to Genette, narratology does not omit the domain of non-fictional narratives from its investigations with any justification, but rather annexes it without addressing its specific elements.
What are possible ways in which this perspective, which Genette criticizes as truncated, can be set right? Can the problem, as outlined, simply be solved by expanding the area of study in narratological research? Or are there not, perhaps, important differences between fictional and nonfictional narratives which seem to encourage narratological research, understood as a fundamental discipline of literary study, under the heading of "fictional narratology"?
In order to come to an answer here, we will first discuss the problem of differentiating between fictional and non-fictional narratives, as well as the possibility of a connection between narrative and fictionality theory. Second, we will expand our considerations to encompass pragmatic and historical aspects of narratives in order to delineate the scope of our proposal.
Figur
(2011)
Wenn literarische Geschichten ('mythoi') gemäß der Bestimmung des Aristoteles "menschliche Handlungen" darstellen ('mimesis praxeōs'; Aristoteles 1982, 1449b), dann sind die Akteure dieser Handlungen zweifellos ein zentrales Element von Erzählungen, genauer gesagt: eine Grundkomponente der erzählten Welt (Diegese). Die Bewohner der fiktiven Welten fiktionaler Erzählungen nennt man 'Figuren' (engl. 'characters'), um den kategorialen Unterschied gegenüber 'Personen' (oder 'Menschen') hervorzuheben. Autoren fiktionaler Texte erfinden Figuren, Autoren faktualer Texte berichten von Personen. Aus diesem Unterschied folgen einige Besonderheiten, die Figuren. Fiktionaler literarischer Welten sowohl von der Darstellung realer Personen in faktualen Texten wie auch von der Wahrnehmung realer Personen in unserer Alltagswelt unterscheiden.
Figuren müssen nicht menschlich oder menschenähnlich sein. Viele literarische Akteure besitzen phantastische Qualitäten, die mit dem Begriff einer Person unvereinbar sind – man denke an die tierischen Handlungsträger in Fabeln. Selbst unbelebte Dinge wie Roboter in der Science Fiction oder die titelgebenden Protagonisten des Grimmschen Märchens "Strohhalm, Kohle und Bohne" können in der Fiktion zu Handlungsträgern und damit zu Figuren werden. Gibt es überhaupt eine notwendige Voraussetzung dafür, dass ein Textelement als eine Figur gelten kann? Das einzige unerlässliche Merkmal für den Status einer Figur ist wohl. dass man ihr Intentionalität, also mentale Zustände (Wahrnehmungen, Gedanken, Gefühle, Wünsche, Absichten) zuschreiben können muss.
Erzählen
(2011)
Was ist Erzählen? Erzählen ist eine sprachliche Handlung: Jemand erzählt jemandem eine Geschichte. An dieser Handlung lassen sich – in Analogie zu der linguistischen Grundeinteilung zwischen der Pragmatik, Semantik und Syntax der Sprache – drei Dimensionen unterscheiden.
(a) Erstens ist das Erzählen eine Sprachhandlung, die in einem bestimmten Kontext zwischen einem Erzähler und einem oder mehreren Rezipienten stattfindet. Diese Kommunikation kann unterschiedlich gestaltet sein, beispielsweise als mündliches Erzählen mit kopräsenten Gesprächsteilnehmern oder zerdehnt als schriftlicher Kontakt zwischen räumlich und zeitlich voneinander entfernten Autoren und Lesern. Die Praxis des Erzählens kann unterschiedlichen Funktionen dienen: Man kann erzählend informieren, unterhalten oder belehren, moralisch unterweisen, geistlich stärken oder politisch indoktrinieren, Erzählgemeinschaften bilden, individuelle oder kollektive Identität en stiften usw. Pragmatische Aspekte des Erzählens stehen insbesondere bei der Untersuchung nicht-literarischer ›Wirklichkeitserzählung en‹ (Klein/Martínez 2010) im Vordergrund, also beim Erzählen in institutionellen, quasi-institutionellen und alltäglichen Situationen, etwa Gerichtserzählungen, Predigten, Krankheitsgeschichten beim Arzt oder Therapeuten, journalistischen Reportagen oder dem Klatsch unter Arbeitskollegen.
(b) Eine zweite Dimension der Erzählhandlung umfasst das, was mitgeteilt wird: den Erzählinhalt, nämlich bestimmte Figuren, Schauplätze und Ereignisse, die sich zu einer Geschichte zusammenfügen.
(c) Drittens schließlich ist das ›Wie‹ des Erzählens von Interesse, die Gestaltungsweise der Erzählung. Dazu gehören rhetorische und stilistische Mittel, aber auch die verschiedenen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten der Erzählstimme, etwa der aus dem Text erschließbare ›Standort‹ des Erzähler s (der sich innerhalb innerhalb oder außerhalb seiner eigenen Geschichte befinden kann), das Verhältnis zwischen dem Zeitpunkt des Erzählens und dem Zeitpunkt der erzählten Handlung oder auch die Perspektive der Darstellung. Während die erste Dimension den pragmatischen Kontext des Erzählens umfasst, betreffen der Erzählinhalt (das ›Was‹) und die Erzählweise (das ›Wie‹) textinterne Aspekte.
These […] stories are chosen from anthologies with texts called 'urban legends' (sometimes they are also referred to as 'contemporary legends', or 'urban myths'). Bearing this name in mind, we tend to read these texts as 'Iegendary' narratives that relate ficticious stories of events which never happened. But what if somebody told you these stories as factual accounts of events that really happened to the friend of a friend: wouldn't you believe them to be true – or at least consider seriously the possibility of their truthfulness? Before entering in a discussion of this question, I want to introduce in more detail the kind of narrative I am seeking to analyze.
Bakhtin and Dostoevsky shared the conviction that human life must be understood in terms of temporality. Both thinkers were obsessed with time’s relation to life as people experience it. For each, a rich sense of humanity demanded a chronotope of open time. In many respects, the views of Bakhtin and Dostoevsky coincide. Theologically speaking, one could fairly call them both heretics, as we shall see. Their differences reflect their different starting points. Bakhtin began with ethics, whereas Dostoevsky thought about life first and foremost in terms of psychology. For Bakhtin, any viable view of the world had first of all to give a rich meaning to moral responsibility. Dostoevsky could accept no view that was false to his sense of how the human mind thought and felt.
The Fugue of Chronotope
(2010)
As the survey by Nele Bemong and Pieter Borghart introducing this volume makes clear, the term chronotope has devolved into a veritable carnival of orismology. For all the good work that has been done by an ever-growing number of intelligent critics, chronotope remains a Gordian knot of ambiguities with no Alexander in sight. The term has metastasized across the whole spectrum of the human and social sciences since the publication of FTC in Russian in 1975, and (especially) after its translation into English in 1981. As others have pointed out, one of the more striking features of the chronotope is the plethora of meanings that have been read into the term: that its popularity is a function of its opacity has become a cliché. In the current state of chronotopic heteroglossia, then, how are we to proceed? The argument of this essay is that many of the difficulties faced by Bakhtin’s critics derive from ambiguities with which Bakhtin never ceased to struggle. That is, instead of advancing yet another definition of my own, I will investigate some of the attempts made by Bakhtin himself to give the term greater precision throughout his long life. In so doing, I will also hope to cast some light on the foundational role of time-space in Bakhtin’s philosophy of dialog as it, too, took on different meanings at various points in his thinking.
In this contribution we try to probe the generic chronotope of realism, which, judging from its astonishing productivity in the nineteenth century and the profound impact it has had on literary evolution and theory ever since, can be designated nothing less than a hallmark in the general history of narrative. Although we are primarily concerned with the description of the principles of construction underlying the realistic, “documentary”, chronotope, we would also like to touch upon some of its rather evident, but still somewhat under-discussed similarities with the genre of historiography. For, despite an abundance of what could be called “touches of realism” in a plethora of literary texts and genres (both narrative and poetic) since the very beginnings of literary history itself, the direct germs of realism as it developed into a particular narrative genre or generic chronotope during the nineteenth century may well be situated in “prescientific” historiographical works such as those of Gibbon or Michelet.
This paper forms part of a larger, ongoing project, to investigate how certain narrative possibilities that seem to have crystallized for the first time in the ancient Greek novel have proved persistent and productive over time, undergoing subtle transformations during formative later periods in the history of the genre, notably the twelfth century (simultaneously in Old French and in Byzantine Greek) and the eighteenth (the time when, according to a narrower definition, the novel is said to originate). For the present, my more limited aim is to revisit the two main essays in which Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope (and of the “historical poetics” of the novel) are developed, and to extrapolate what seem to me to the most significant and productive lines of his approach, both in general, and with specific reference to the ancient Greek novel. I will then attempt simultaneously to apply and to modify Bakhtin’s model, in the light of a reading of Achilles Tatius’ Leucippe and Clitophon and with reference to previous critiques. The final part of the paper examines how this approach can be productive for a reading of a much later text, often regarded as “foundational” for the modern development of the genre, especially in English, Fielding’s Tom Jones (1749).