330 Wirtschaft
Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (1834)
- Article (481)
- Part of Periodical (446)
- Report (105)
- Doctoral Thesis (40)
- Book (28)
- Conference Proceeding (14)
- Periodical (11)
- Part of a Book (9)
- Review (7)
- Preprint (3)
- Bachelor Thesis (2)
- Diploma Thesis (1)
- Master's Thesis (1)
Language
- English (2982) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (2982)
Keywords
- Deutschland (117)
- Geldpolitik (55)
- USA (51)
- monetary policy (50)
- Financial Institutions (48)
- Schätzung (48)
- Europäische Union (44)
- Monetary Policy (44)
- ECB (42)
- Bank (39)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1869)
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1483)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (1057)
- House of Finance (HoF) (698)
- E-Finance Lab e.V. (356)
- Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS) (191)
- Rechtswissenschaft (89)
- Foundation of Law and Finance (50)
- Gesellschaftswissenschaften (31)
- Institute for Law and Finance (ILF) (31)
The globalization of markets and companies has increased the demand for internationally comparable high quality accounting information resulting from a common set of accounting rules. Despite remarkable efforts of international harmonization for more than 25 years, accounting regulation is still the domain of national legislators or delegated standard setters. The paper starts by outlining the reasons for this state of affairs and by characterizing the different institutional backgrounds of accounting standard setting in four selected countries as well as on the international level. This is followed by a summary of important international differences in accounting rules and a summary of the empirical evidence of the impact of different rules on the resulting numbers and their relevance to users. It is argued that neither a priori theoretical reasoning nor the evidence from empirical studies provides a convincing basis for choices between accounting regimes and even less so between specific accounting rules. As there is a broad consensus that there is a need for one set of global accounting standards the final sections of the paper discuss currently existing and proposed structures of international accounting standard setting. The evolving new IASC structure is critically evaluated.
This paper discusses the role of the credit rating agencies during the recent financial crises. In particular, it examines whether the agencies can add to the dynamics of emerging market crises. Academics and investors often argue that sovereign credit ratings are responsible for pronounced boom-bust cycles in emerging-markets lending. Using a vector autoregressive system this paper examines how US dollar bond yield spreads and the short-term international liquidity position react to an unexpected sovereign credit rating change. Contrary to common belief and previous studies, the empirical results suggest that an abrupt downgrade does not necessarily intensify a financial crisis.
Bank internal ratings of corporate clients are intended to quantify the expected likelihood of future borrower defaults. This paper develops a comprehensive framework for evaluating the quality of standard rating systems. We suggest a number of principles that ought to be met by 'good rating practice'. These 'generally accepted rating principles' are potentially relevant for the improvement of existing rating systems. They are also relevant for the development of certification standards for internal rating systems, as currently discussed in a consultative paper issued by the Bank for International Settlement in Basle, entitled 'A new capital adequacy framework'. We would very much appreciate any comments by readers that help to develop these rating standards further. Simply send us an E-mail, or give us a call.
This paper measures the economy-wide impact of bank distress on the loss of relationship benefits. We use the near-collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the period 1988 to 1991 to measure the impact of bank distress announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a distressed bank. We find that although banks experience large and permanent downward revisions in their equity value during the event period, firms maintaining relationships with these banks face only small and temporary changes, on average, in stock price. In other words, the aggregate impact of bank distress on the real economy appears small. We analyze the cross-sectional variation in firm abnormal returns and find that firms that maintain international bank relationships suffer more upon announcement of bank distress.
This paper presents evidence that spillovers through shifts in bank lending can help explain the pattern of contagion. To test the role of bank lending in transmitting currency crises we examine a panel of data on capital flows to 30 emerging markets disaggregated by 11 banking centers. In addition we study a cross-section of emerging markets for which we construct a number of measures of competition for bank funds. For the Mexican and Asian crises, we find that the degree to which countries compete for funds from common bank lenders is a fairly robust predictor of both disaggregated bank flows and the incidence of a currency crisis. In the Russian crisis, the common bank lender helps to predict the incidence of contagion but there is also evidence of a generalized outflow from all emerging markets. We test extensively for robustness to sample, specification and definition of the common bank lender effect. Overall our findings suggest that spillovers through banking centers may be more important in explaining contagion than similarities in macro-economic fundamentals and even than trade linkage.
For some time now the buzzword 'transparency' has been bandied about in the media almost daily. For example, calls were made for greater transparency in the financial system in connection with developments in the Asian financial markets. But the call for greater transparency goes far beyond the financial markets. It is now regarded as a necessary part of "good governance" demanded of all economic policy makers. As the World Bank's chief economist Joseph Stiglitz put it: 'No one would dare say that they were against transparency (....): It would be like saying you were against motherhood or apple pie.' This paper focuses on transparency in monetary policy, in particular with respect to the European System of Central Bank.
This study uses Markov-switching models to evaluate the informational content of the term structure as a predictor of recessions in eight OECD countries. The empirical results suggest that for all countries the term spread is sensibly modelled as a two-state regime-switching process. Moreover, our simple univariate model turns out to be a filter that transforms accurately term spread changes into turning point predictions. The term structure is confirmed to be a reliable recession indicator. However, the results of probit estimations show that the markov-switching filter does not significantly improve the forecasting ability of the spread.
Modeling short-term interest rates as following regime-switching processes has become increasingly popular. Theoretically, regime-switching models are able to capture rational expectations of infrequently occurring discrete events. Technically, they allow for potential time-varying stationarity. After discussing both aspects with reference to the recent literature, this paper provides estimations of various univariate regime-switching specifications for the German three-month money market rate and bivariate specifications additionally including the term spread. However, the main contribution is a multi-step out-of-sample forecasting competition. It turns out that forecasts are improved substantially when allowing for state-dependence. Particularly, the informational content of the term spread for future short rate changes can be exploited optimally within a multivariate regime-switching framework.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.