D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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We prove the existence of an equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection in the sense of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977), and Spence (1978) when the distribution of unobservable risk types is continuous. Our proof leverages the finite-type proof in Spence (1978) and a limiting argument akin to Hellwig (2007)’s study of optimal taxation.
This paper studies insurance demand for individuals with limited financial literacy. We propose uncertainty about insurance payouts, resulting from contract complexity, as a novel channel that affects decision-making of financially illiterate individuals. Then, a trade-off between second-order (risk aversion) and third-order (prudence) risk preferences drives insurance demand. Sufficiently prudent individuals raise insurance demand upon an increase in contract complexity, while the effect is reversed for less prudent individuals. We characterize competitive market equilibria that feature complex contracts since firms face costs to reduce complexity. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we propose a monetary measure for the welfare cost of financial illiteracy and show that it is mainly driven by individuals’ risk aversion. Finally, we discuss implications for regulation and consumer protection.
A tontine provides a mortality driven, age-increasing payout structure through the pooling of mortality. Because a tontine does not entail any guarantees, the payout structure of a tontine is determined by the pooling of individual characteristics of tontinists. Therefore, the surrender decision of single tontinists directly affects the remaining members' payouts. Nevertheless, the opportunity to surrender is crucial to the success of a tontine from a regulatory as well as a policyholder perspective. Therefore, this paper derives the fair surrender value of a tontine, first on the basis of expected values, and then incorporates the increasing payout volatility to determine an equitable surrender value. Results show that the surrender decision requires a discount on the fair surrender value as security for the remaining members. The discount intensifies in decreasing tontine size and increasing risk aversion. However, tontinists are less willing to surrender for decreasing tontine size and increasing risk aversion, creating a natural protection against tontine runs stemming from short-term liquidity shocks. Furthermore we argue that a surrender decision based on private information requires a discount on the fair surrender value as well.
Standard applications of the consumption-based asset pricing model assume that goods and services within the nondurable consumption bundle are substitutes. We estimate substitution elasticities between different consumption bundles and show that households cannot substitute energy consumption by consumption of other nondurables. As a consequence, energy consumption affects the pricing function as a separate factor. Variation in energy consumption betas explains a large part of the premia related to value, investment, and operating profitability. For example, value stocks are typically more energy-intensive than growth stocks and thus riskier, since they suffer more from the oil supply shocks that also affect households.
We find that high macroeconomic uncertainty is associated with greater accumulation of physical capital, despite a reduction in investment and valuations. To reconcile this puzzling evidence, we show that uncertainty predicts lower depreciation and utilization of existing capital, which dominates the investment slowdown. Motivated by these dynamics, we develop a quantitative production-based model in which firms implement precautionary savings through reducing utilization rather than raising invest-ment. Through this novel intensive-margin mechanism, uncertainty shocks command a quarter of the equity premium in general equilibrium, while flexibility in utilization adjustments helps explain uncertainty risk exposures in the cross-section of industry returns.
Using German and US brokerage data we find that investors are more likely to sell speculative stocks trading at a gain. Investors’ gain realizations are monotonically increasing in a stock’s speculativeness. This translates into a high disposition effect for speculative and a much lower disposition effect for non-speculative stocks. Our findings hold across asset classes (stocks, passive, and active funds) and explain cross-sectional differences in investor selling behavior which previous literature attributed primarily to investor demographics. Our results are robust to rank or attention effects and can be linked to realization utility and rolling mental account.