G01 Financial Crises (Updated!)
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The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
The lack of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – has been criticized since the inception of the EU Banking Union. The Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance (CMDI) framework needs to rely heavily on banks’ internal loss absorbing capacity and provides little flexibility in terms of industry resolution funding. This design has, among others, led to the rare application of the CMDI, particularly in the case of small and medium sized retail banks. This reluctance of resolution authorities weakens any positive impact the CMDI may have on market discipline and ultimately financial stability. After several national governments pushed back against the establishment of an EDIS, the Commission recently took a different approach and tried to reform the CMDI comprehensively, without seeking to erect a ‘third pillar’. The overarching rationale of the CMDI Proposal is to make resolution funding more flexible. To this end, the proposal seeks to facilitate contributions from (national) deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). At the same time, the CMDI Proposal tries to broaden the scope of resolution to include smaller and medium sized banks. This paper provides an assessment of the CMDI Proposal. It argues that the CMDI Proposal is a step in the right direction but cannot overcome fundamental deficiencies in the design of the Banking Union.
The European low-carbon transition began in the last few decades and is accelerating to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. This paper examines how climate-related transition indicators of a large European corporate firm relate to its CDS-implied credit risk across various time horizons. Findings show that firms with higher GHG emissions have higher CDS spreads at all tenors, including the 30-year horizon, particularly after the 2015 Paris Agreement, and in prominent industries such as Electricity, Gas, and Mining. Results suggest that the European CDS market is currently pricing, to some extent, albeit small, the exposure to transition risk for a firm across different time horizons. However, it fails to account for a company’s efforts to manage transition risks and its exposure to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. CDS market participants seem to find challenging to risk-differentiate ETS-participating firms from other firms.
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
(2023)
This paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amendments to remedy identified shortcomings.
The first applications of the new European CMDI framework, particularly in Italy, have shown that a bail-in of debt holders is especially problematic if they are households or other types of retail investors. Such debt holders may be unable to bear losses, and the social implications of bailing them in may create incentives for decision makers to refrain from involving them in bank resolution. In turn, however, if investors can expect resolution authorities (RAs) to behave inconsistently over time and bail-out bank capital and debt holders despite earlier vows to involve them in bank rescues, the pricing and monitoring incentives that the crisis management framework seeks to invigorate would vanish. As a result, market discipline would be suboptimal and moral hazard would persist. Therefore, the policy objectives of the CMDI framework will only be achieved if critical bail-in capital is not held by retail investors without sufficient loss-bearing capacity. Currently, neither the CMDI framework nor capital market regulation suffice to assure that this precondition is met. Therefore, some amendments are necessary. In particular, debt instruments that are most likely to absorb losses in resolution should have a high minimum denomination and banks should not be allowed to self-place such securities.
The loan impairment rules recently introduced by IFRS 9 require banks to estimate their future credit losses by using forward-looking information. We use supervisory loan-level data from Germany to investigate how banks apply their reporting discretion and adjust their lending upon the announcement of the new rules. Our identification strategy exploits a cut-off for the level of provisions at the investment grade threshold based on banks’ internal rating of a borrower. We find that banks required to adopt the new rules assign better internal ratings to exactly the same borrowers compared to banks that do not apply IFRS 9 around this cut-off. This pattern is consistent with a strategic use of the increased reporting discretion that is inherent to rules requiring forward-looking loss estimation. At the same time, banks also reduce their lending exposure to exactly those borrowers at the highest risk of experiencing a rating downgrade below the cutoff. These loans would be associated with additional provisions in future periods, both in the intensive and extensive margin. The lending change thus mitigates some of the negative effects of increased reporting opportunism on banks’ crisis resilience. However, when these firms with internal ratings around the investment grade cut-off obtain less external funding through banks, the introduction of IFRS 9 will likely also be associated with real economic effects
We employ a proprietary transaction-level dataset in Germany to examine how capital requirements affect the liquidity of corporate bonds. Using the 2011 European Banking Authority capital exercise that mandated certain banks to increase regulatory capital, we find that affected banks reduce their inventory holdings, pre-arrange more trades, and have smaller average trade size. While non-bank affiliated dealers increase their market-making activity, they are unable to bridge this gap - aggregate liquidity declines. Our results are stronger for banks with a higher capital shortfall, for non-investment grade bonds, and for bonds where the affected banks were the dominant market-maker.