G21 Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Economic integration and mature portfolios
- This paper documents and studies sources of international differences in participation and holdings in stocks, private businesses, and homes among households aged 50+ in the US, England, and eleven continental European countries, using new internationally comparable, household-level data. With greater integration of asset and labor markets and policies, households of given characteristics should be holding more similar portfolios for old age. We decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe into those arising from differences: a) in the distribution of characteristics and b) in the influence of given characteristics. We find that US households are generally more likely to own these assets than their European counterparts. However, European asset owners tend to hold smaller real, PPP-adjusted amounts in stocks and larger in private businesses and primary residence than US owners at comparable points in the distribution of holdings, even controlling for differences in configuration of characteristics. Differences in characteristics often play minimal or no role. Differences in market conditions are much more pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting significant potential for further integration.
The economic impact of merger control legislation
- Based on a unique dataset of legislative changes in industrial countries, we identify events that strengthen the competition control of mergers and acquisitions, analyze their impact on banks and non-financial firms and explain the different reactions observed with specific regulatory characteristics of the banking sector. Covering nineteen countries for the period 1987 to 2004, we find that more competition-oriented merger control increases the stock prices of banks and decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms. Bank targets become more profitable and larger, while those of non-financial firms remain mostly unaffected. A major determinant of the positive bank returns is the degree of opaqueness that characterizes the institutional setup for supervisory bank merger reviews. The legal design of the supervisory control of bank mergers may therefore have important implications for real activity.
Stale information, shocks and volatility
- We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information or beliefs on volatility. Using high-frequency intraday data, we estimate the volatility effect of a well identified shock on the volatility of the stock returns of large European banks as a function of the quality of available public information about the banks. We hypothesise that, as the publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence should increase, as the private information (beliefs) of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We argue that the results have implications for debate surrounding the opacity of banks and the transparency requirements that may be imposed on banks under Pillar III of the New Basel Accord.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juni 2006]
Jan Pieter Krahnen
- In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
Kapitalmarktorientierte Risikosteuerung in Banken : Marktwertsteuerung statt Marktzinsmethode
- In diesem Beitrag wird das Konzept der Marktzinsmethode als Grundlage der dualen Risikosteuerung von Kredit- und Marktpreisrisiken in Frage gestellt. Die Kreditrisiken einer Bank implizieren bonitätsinduzierte Marktpreisrisiken und bankspezifische Refinanzierungskosten. Während die bonitätsinduzierten Marktpreisrisiken in der dualen Risikosteuerung keine Berücksichtigung finden, werden die bankspezifischen Refinanzierungskosten zwar erkannt, aber bankintern nicht verursachungsgerecht zugeordnet. Das Grundmodell der Marktzinsmethode bietet keine Lösungsansätze zur Behebung dieser Probleme. Demgegenüber lassen sich die Fehlsteuerungsimpulse von vornherein durch eine konsequente Marktbewertung (Mark to Market) aller Finanzinstrumente vermeiden. Als Ausblick werden erste Überlegungen zur Implementierung einer umfassenden Marktwertsteuerung in Banken entwickelt und exemplarisch ein hierfür geeignetes Bewertungsmodell vorgestellt.
Financial development, economic growth and corporate governance : paper presented at the First Annual Seminar on New Development Finance held at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, September 22 - October 3, 1997
- During the last years the relationship between financial development and economic growth has received widespread attention in the literature on growth and development. This paper summarises in its first part the results of this research, stressing the growth-enhancing effects of an increased interpersonal re-allocation of resources promoted by financial development. The second part of the paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial development based on Diamond's theory of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. The analysis shows that the quality of corporate governance of banks is the key factor in financial system development. Accordingly, financial sector reforms in developing countries will only succeed if they strengthen the corporate governance of financial institutions. In this area, financial institution building has an important contribution to make. Paper presented at the First Annual Seminar on New Development Finance held at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, September 22 - October 3, 1997
Towards a regulatory agenda for banking in Europe
Reinhard H. Schmidt
- Although the world of banking and finance is becoming more integrated every day, in most aspects the world of financial regulation continues to be narrowly defined by national boundaries. The main players here are still national governments and governmental agencies. And until recently, they tended to follow a policy of shielding their activities from scrutiny by their peers and members of the academic community rather than inviting critical assessments and an exchange of ideas. The turbulence in international financial markets in the 1980s, and its impact on U.S. banks, gave rise to the notion that academics working in the field of banking and financial regulation might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation in the United States, and thus ultimately to the stability of the entire financial sector. This provided the impetus for the creation of the “U.S. Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee”. In the meantime, similar shadow committees have been founded in Europe and Japan. The specific problems associated with financial regulation in Europe, as well as the specific features which distinguish the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee from its counterparts in the U.S. and Japan, derive from the fact that while Europe has already made substantial progress towards economic and political integration, it is still primarily a collection of distinct nation-states with differing institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. Therefore, any attempt to work towards a European approach to financial regulation must include an effort to promote the development of a European culture of co-operation in this area, and this is precisely what the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) seeks to do. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, discuss the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.
Complementarity and Financial Systems
Andreas R. Hackethal
- Individual financial systems can be understood as very specific configurations of certain key elements. Often these configurations remain unchanged for decades. We hypothesize that there is a specific relationship between key elements, namely that of complementarity. Thus, complementarity seems to be an essential feature of financial systems. Intuitively speaking, complementarity exists if the elements of a (financial) system reinforce each other in terms of contributing to the functioning of the system. It is the purpose of this paper to provide an analytical clarification of the concept of complementarity. This is done by modeling financial systems as combinations of four elements: firm-specific human capital of an entrepreneur, the ability of a bank to restructure the borrower's firm in the case of distress, the possibility to appropriate private benefits from running the firm, and the bankruptcy law. A specific configuration of these elements constitutes one financial system. The bankruptcy law and the potential private benefits are treated as exogenous. They determine the bargaining power of the contracting parties in the case that recontracting occurs. In a two-stage game, the optimal values for the other elements are determined by the agents individually - by investing in human capital and restructuring skills, respectively - and jointly by writing, executing and possibly renegotiating a financing contract for the firm. The paper discusses the equilibria for different types of bankruptcy law and demonstrates that equilibria exhibit the sought-after feature of complementarity. Three particularly significant equilibria correspond to stylized accounts of the British, German and the US-American financial system, respectively.
Evaluating internal credit rating systems depending on bank size
- Under a new Basel capital accord, bank regulators might use quantitative measures when evaluating the eligibility of internal credit rating systems for the internal ratings based approach. Based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank and using a simulation approach, we find that it is possible to identify strongly inferior rating systems out-of time based on statistics that measure either the quality of ranking borrowers from good to bad, or the quality of individual default probability forecasts. Banks do not significantly improve system quality if they use credit scores instead of ratings, or logistic regression default probability estimates instead of historical data. Banks that are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers increase their average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital requirements function.
Avoiding the rating bounce : why rating agencies are slow to react to new information
- Rating agencies state that they take a rating action only when it is unlikely to be reversed shortly afterwards. Based on a formal representation of the rating process, I show that such a policy provides a good explanation for the empirical evidence: Rating changes occur relatively seldom, exhibit serial dependence, and lag changes in the issuers’ default risk. In terms of informational losses, avoiding rating reversals can be more harmful than monitoring credit quality only twice per year.