G21 Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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With open banking, consumers take greater control over their own financial data and share it at their discretion. Using a rich set of loan application data from the largest German FinTech lender in consumer credit, this paper studies what characterizes borrowers who share data and assesses its impact on loan application outcomes. I show that riskier borrowers share data more readily, which subsequently leads to an increase in the probability of loan approval and a reduction in interest rates. The effects hold across all credit risk profiles but are the most pronounced for borrowers with lower credit scores (a higher increase in loan approval rate) and higher credit scores (a larger reduction in interest rate). I also find that standard variables used in credit scoring explain substantially less variation in loan application outcomes when customers share data. Overall, these findings suggest that open banking improves financial inclusion, and also provide policy implications for regulators engaged in the adoption or extension of open banking policies.
This paper studies the impact of banks’ dividend restrictions on the behavior of their institutional investors. Using an identification strategy that relies on the within investor variation and a difference in difference setup, I find that funds permanently decrease their ownership shares at treated banks during the 2020 dividend restrictions in the Eurozone and even exit treated banks’ stocks. Using data before the intro- duction of the ban reveals a positive relationship between fund ownership and banks’ dividend yield, highlighting again the importance of dividends for European banks’ fund investors. This reaction also has pricing implications since there is a negative relationship between the dividend restriction announcement day cumulative abnormal returns and the percentage of fund owners per bank.
Who should hold bail-inable debt and how can regulators police holding restrictions effectively?
(2023)
This paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amendments to remedy identified shortcomings.
The first applications of the new European CMDI framework, particularly in Italy, have shown that a bail-in of debt holders is especially problematic if they are households or other types of retail investors. Such debt holders may be unable to bear losses, and the social implications of bailing them in may create incentives for decision makers to refrain from involving them in bank resolution. In turn, however, if investors can expect resolution authorities (RAs) to behave inconsistently over time and bail-out bank capital and debt holders despite earlier vows to involve them in bank rescues, the pricing and monitoring incentives that the crisis management framework seeks to invigorate would vanish. As a result, market discipline would be suboptimal and moral hazard would persist. Therefore, the policy objectives of the CMDI framework will only be achieved if critical bail-in capital is not held by retail investors without sufficient loss-bearing capacity. Currently, neither the CMDI framework nor capital market regulation suffice to assure that this precondition is met. Therefore, some amendments are necessary. In particular, debt instruments that are most likely to absorb losses in resolution should have a high minimum denomination and banks should not be allowed to self-place such securities.
We analyze the performance of marketplace lending using loan cash flow data from the largest platform, Lending Club. We find substantial risk-adjusted performance of about 40 basis points per month for the entire loan portfolio. Other loan portfolios grouped by risk category have similar risk-adjusted performance. We show that characteristics of the local bank sector for each loan, such as concentration of deposits and the presence of national banks, are related to the performance of loans. Thus, marketplace lending has the potential to finance a growing share of the consumer credit market in the absence of a competitive response from the traditional incumbents.
We document the structure of firm-bank relationships across the eleven largest euro area countries and present new stylised facts using novel data from the recent credit registry of the Eurosystem - AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity and interest rates. The granularity of the data allows us to account for cross country differences in firm characteristics. Firms in Southern European countries borrow from a larger number of banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank compared to those in Northern European countries. They also tend to borrow more on short term, more expensive instruments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. This is consistent with the hypothesis that Southern European countries rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with the smaller average size of Southern European firms. Instead, no clear pattern emerges in terms of interest rates, consistent with the idea that banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates.
Supranational supervision
(2022)
We exploit the establishment of a supranational supervisor in Europe (the Single Supervisory Mechanism) to learn how the organizational design of supervisory institutions impacts the enforcement of financial regulation. Banks under supranational supervision are required to increase regulatory capital for exposures to the same firm compared to banks under the local supervisor. Local supervisors provide preferential treatment to larger institutes. The central supervisor removes such biases, which results in an overall standardized behavior. While the central supervisor treats banks more equally, we document a loss in information in banks’ risk models associated with central supervision. The tighter supervision of larger banks results in a shift of particularly risky lending activities to smaller banks. We document lower sales and employment for firms receiving most of their funding from banks that receive a tighter supervisory treatment. Overall, the central supervisor treats banks more equally but has less information about them than the local supervisor.
Using the negotiation process of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), this paper studies the way regulators form their positions on regulatory issues in the process of international standard-setting and the consequences on the resultant harmonized framework. Leveraging on leaked voting records and corroborating them using machine learning techniques on publicly available speeches, we construct a unique dataset containing the positions of banks and national regulators on the regulatory initiatives of Basel II and III. We document that the probability of a regulator opposing a specific initiative increases by 30% if their domestic national champion opposes the new rule, particularly when the proposed rule disproportionately affects them. We find the effect is driven by regulators who had prior experience of working in large banks – lending support to the private-interest theories of regulation. Meanwhile smaller banks, even when they collectively have a higher share in the domestic market, do not have any impact on regulators’ stand – providing little support to public-interest theories of regulation. Finally, we show this decision-making process manifests into significant watering down of proposed rules, thereby limiting the potential gains from harmonization of international financial regulation.
We employ a proprietary transaction-level dataset in Germany to examine how capital requirements affect the liquidity of corporate bonds. Using the 2011 European Banking Authority capital exercise that mandated certain banks to increase regulatory capital, we find that affected banks reduce their inventory holdings, pre-arrange more trades, and have smaller average trade size. While non-bank affiliated dealers increase their market-making activity, they are unable to bridge this gap - aggregate liquidity declines. Our results are stronger for banks with a higher capital shortfall, for non-investment grade bonds, and for bonds where the affected banks were the dominant market-maker.
Trotz der von der EZB eingeleiteten Zinswende in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2022 als späte Reaktion auf die deutlich unterschätzte Persistenz hoher Inflationsraten im Euroraum sind die Realzinsen sowohl in der Ex-post-Betrachtung als auch in der Ex-ante-Betrachtung keineswegs als restriktiv einzuschätzen. Die Banken haben allerdings recht rasch strengere Vergaberichtlinien beschlossen, und die Nachfrage im Wohnungsbau und bei den Hypothekarkrediten ist stark eingebrochen.
Die Autoren thematisieren die Bedeutung von Zahlungsstromeffekten bei Annuitätenkrediten und analysiert hier vor allem den sogenannten Front-Loading-Effekt. Danach führen höhere Nominalzinsen selbst bei vollständig antizipierten Inflationsraten und unveränderten Realzinsen zu starken finanziellen Zusatzbelastungen in den ersten Phasen der typischerweise langen Kreditlaufzeit. Derartige Liquiditätseffekte können die Zahlungsfähigkeit bzw. die Zahlungsbereitschaft der privaten Investoren empfindlich verringern. Dies gilt vor allem bei Darlehen in Form der Prozentannuität, da hier zusätzlich ein Laufzeitenverkürzungseffekt auftritt. Solche Darlehen sind in Deutschland recht populär.
Mit Blick auf die Zukunft sehen die Autoren auch eine reale Gefahr für den Bestand an Wohnungsbaukrediten, wenn es zu einer Refinanzierung des großen Bestands an billigen Wohnungsbaukrediten kommt, ein Risiko, das auch Auswirkungen auf die makroökonomische und finanzielle Stabilität hat.
We study the interplay of capital and liquidity regulation in a general equilibrium setting by focusing on future funding risks. The model consists of a banking sector with long-term illiquid investment opportunities that need to be financed by shortterm debt and by issuing equity. Reliance on refinancing long-term investment in the middle of the life-time is risky, since the next generation of potential short-term debt holders may not be willing to provide funding when the return prospects on the long-term investment turn out to be bad. For moderate return risk, equilibria with and without bank default coexist, and bank default is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Capital and liquidity regulation can prevent bank default and may implement the first-best. Yet the former is more powerful in ruling out undesirable equilibria and thus dominates liquidity regulation. Adding liquidity regulation to optimal capital regulation is redundant.