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2008, 53
This paper analyzes liquidity in an order driven market. We only investigate the best limits in the limit order book, but also take into account the book behind these inside prices. When subsequent prices are close to the best ones and depth at them is substantial, larger orders can be executed without an extensive price impact and without deterring liquidity. We develop and estimate several econometric models, based on depth and prices in the book, as well as on the slopes of the limit order book. The dynamics of different dimensions of liquidity are analyzed: prices, depth at and beyond the best prices, as well as resiliency, i.e. how fast the different liquidity measures recover after a liquidity shock. Our results show a somewhat less favorable image of liquidity than often found in the literature. After a liquidity shock (in the spread or depth or in the book beyond the best limits), several dimension of liquidity deteriorate at the same time. Not only does the inside spread increase, and depth at the best prices decrease, also the difference between subsequent bid and ask prices may become larger and depth provided at them decreases. The impacts are both econometrically and economically significant. Also, our findings point to an interaction between different measures of liquidity, between liquidity at the best prices and beyond in the book, and between ask and bid side of the market.
2009, 09
The recent financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the pros and cons of fair-value accounting (FVA). This debate presents a major challenge for FVA going forward and standard setters’ push to extend FVA into other areas. In this article, we highlight four important issues as an attempt to make sense of the debate. First, much of the controversy results from confusion about what is new and different about FVA. Second, while there are legitimate concerns about marking to market (or pure FVA) in times of financial crisis, it is less clear that these problems apply to FVA as stipulated by the accounting standards, be it IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Third, historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be the remedy. There are a number of concerns about HCA as well and these problems could be larger than those with FVA. Fourth, although it is difficult to fault the FVA standards per se, implementation issues are a potential concern, especially with respect to litigation. Finally, we identify several avenues for future research. JEL Classification: G14, G15, G30, K22, M41, M42
2009, 22
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks’ assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.
No. 695
Venture capital (VC) funds backed by large multi-fund families tend to perform substantially better due to cross-fund cash flows (CFCFs), a liquidity support mechanism provided by matching distributions and capital calls within a VC fund family. The dynamics of this mechanism coincide with the sensitivity of different stage projects owing to market liquidity conditions. We find that the early-stage funds demand relatively more intra-family CFCFs than later-stage funds during liquidity stress periods. We show that the liquidity improvement based on the timing of CFCF allocation reflects how fund families arrange internal liquidity provision and explains a large part of their outperformance.
2010, 14
Price pressures
(2010)
We study price pressures in stock prices—price deviations from fundamental value due to a risk-averse intermediary supplying liquidity to asynchronously arriving investors. Empirically, twelve years of daily New York Stock Exchange intermediary data reveal economically large price pressures. A $100,000 inventory shock causes an average price pressure of 0.28% with a half-life of 0.92 days. Price pressure causes average transitory volatility in daily stock returns of 0.49%. Price pressure effects are substantially larger with longer durations in smaller stocks. Theoretically, in a simple dynamic inventory model the ‘representative’ intermediary uses price pressure to control risk through inventory mean reversion. She trades off the revenue loss due to price pressure against the price risk associated with remaining in a nonzero inventory state. The model’s closed-form solution identifies the intermediary’s relative risk aversion and the distribution of investors’ private values for trading from the observed time series patterns. These allow us to estimate the social costs—deviations from constrained Pareto efficiency—due to price pressure which average 0.35 basis points of the value traded. JEL Classification: G12, G14, D53, D61
2008, 41
Algorithmic trading has sharply increased over the past decade. Equity market liquidity has improved as well. Are the two trends related? For a recent five-year panel of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks, we use a normalized measure of electronic message traffic (order submissions, cancellations, and executions) as a proxy for algorithmic trading, and we trace the associations between liquidity and message traffic. Based on within-stock variation, we find that algorithmic trading and liquidity are positively related. To sort out causality, we use the start of autoquoting on the NYSE as an exogenous instrument for algorithmic trading. Previously, specialists were responsible for manually disseminating the inside quote. As stocks were phased in gradually during early 2003, the manual quote was replaced by a new automated quote whenever there was a change to the NYSE limit order book. This market structure change provides quicker feedback to traders and algorithms and results in more message traffic. For large-cap stocks in particular, quoted and effective spreads narrow under autoquote and adverse selection declines, indicating that algorithmic trading does causally improve liquidity.
2009, 31
We examine intra-day market reactions to news in stock-specific sentiment disclosures. Using pre-processed data from an automated news analytics tool based on linguistic pattern recognition we extract information on the relevance as well as the direction of company-specific news. Information-implied reactions in returns, volatility as well as liquidity demand and supply are quantified by a high-frequency VAR model using 20 second intervals. Analyzing a cross-section of stocks traded at the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we find market-wide robust news-dependent responses in volatility and trading volume. However, this is only true if news items are classified as highly relevant. Liquidity supply reacts less distinctly due to a stronger influence of idiosyncratic noise. Furthermore, evidence for abnormal highfrequency returns after news in sentiments is shown. JEL-Classification: G14, C32
2010, 26
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the “originate to distribute” model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk. Keywords: Credit Risk Transfer , Dual Moral Hazard , Monetary Policy , Liquidity , Welfare JEL Classification: E3, E5, G3 First Draft: December 2009, This Draft: September 2010
2008, 52
Previous evidence suggests that less liquid stocks entail higher average returns. Using NYSE data, we present evidence that both the sensitivity of returns to liquidity and liquidity premia have significantly declined over the past four decades to levels that we cannot statistically distinguish from zero. Furthermore, the profitability of trading strategies based on buying illiquid stocks and selling illiquid stocks has declined over the past four decades, rendering such strategies virtually unprofitable. Our results are robust to several conventional liquidity measures related to volume. When using liquidity measure that is not related to volume, we find just weak evidence of a liquidity premium even in the early periods of our sample. The gradual introduction and proliferation of index funds and exchange traded funds is a possible explanation for these results.