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2013, 06
This paper employs stochastic simulations of the New Area-Wide Model—a microfounded open-economy model developed at the ECB—to investigate the consequences of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the evolution of risks to price stability in the euro area during the recent financial crisis. Using a formal measure of the balance of risks, which is derived from policy-makers’ preferences about inflation outcomes, we first show that downside risks to price stability were considerably greater than upside risks during the first half of 2009, followed by a gradual rebalancing of these risks until mid-2011 and a renewed deterioration thereafter. We find that the lower bound has induced a noticeable downward bias in the risk balance throughout our evaluation period because of the implied amplification of deflation risks. We then illustrate that, with nominal interest rates close to zero, forward guidance in the form of a time-based conditional commitment to keep interest rates low for longer can be successful in mitigating downside risks to price stability. However, we find that the provision of time-based forward guidance may give rise to upside risks over the medium term if extended too far into the future. By contrast, time-based forward guidance complemented with a threshold condition concerning tolerable future inflation can provide insurance against the materialisation of such upside risks.
2013, 28
Sovereign bond risk premiums
(2013)
Credit risk has become an important factor driving government bond returns. We therefore introduce an asset pricing model which exploits information contained in both forward interest rates and forward CDS spreads. Our empirical analysis covers euro-zone countries with German government bonds as credit risk-free assets. We construct a market factor from the first three principal components of the German forward curve as well as a common and a country-specific credit factor from the principal components of the forward CDS curves. We find that predictability of risk premiums of sovereign euro-zone bonds improves substantially if the market factor is augmented by a common and an orthogonal country-specific credit factor. While the common credit factor is significant for most countries in the sample, the country-specific factor is significant mainly for peripheral euro-zone countries. Finally, we find that during the current crisis period, market and credit risk premiums of government bonds are negative over long subintervals, a finding that we attribute to the presence of financial repression in euro-zone countries.
2013, 17
The 2011 European short sale ban on financial stocks: a cure or a curse? : [version 31 july 2013]
(2013)
Did the August 2011 European short sale bans on financial stocks accomplish their goals? In order to answer this question, we use stock options’ implied volatility skews to proxy for investors’ risk aversion. We find that on ban announcement day, risk aversion levels rose for all stocks but more so for the banned financial stocks. The banned stocks’ volatility skews remained elevated during the ban but dropped for the other unbanned stocks. We show that it is the imposition of the ban itself that led to the increase in risk aversion rather than other causes such as information flow, options trading volumes, or stock specific factors. Substitution effects were minimal, as banned stocks’ put trading volumes and put-call ratios declined during the ban. We argue that although the ban succeeded in curbing further selling pressure on financial stocks by redirecting trading activity towards index options, this result came at the cost of increased risk aversion and some degree of market failure.
2013, 04
This study presents an empirical analysis of capital and liability management in eight cases of bank restructurings and resolutions from eight different European countries. It can be read as a companion piece to an earlier study by the author covering the specific bank restructuring programs of Greece, Spain and Cyprus during 2012/13.
The study portrays for each case the timelines between the initial credit event and the (last) restructuring. It proceeds to discuss the capital and liability management activity before restructuring and the restructuring itself, launches an attempt to calibrate the extent of creditor participation as well as expected loss by government, and engages in a counterfactual discussion of what could have been a least cost restructuring approach.
Four of the eight cases are resolutions, i.e. the original bank is unwound (Anglo Irish Bank, Amagerbanken, Dexia, Laiki), while the four other banks have de-facto or de-jure become nationalized and are awaiting re-privatization after the restructuring (Deutsche Pfandbriefbank/Hypo Real Estate, Bankia, SNS Reaal, Alpha Bank). The case selection follows considerations of their model character for the European bank restructuring and resolution policy discussion while straddling both the U.S. (2007 - 2010) and the European (2010 - ) legs of the financial crisis, which each saw very different policy responses....
2013, 03
We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk remia paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5,500 issues over the period 2005-2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005-07 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010-12 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms got a discount of 40 basis points.
2013, 08
We investigate the theoretical impact of including two empirically-grounded insights in a dynamic life cycle portfolio choice model. The first is to recognize that, when managing their own financial wealth, investors incur opportunity costs in terms of current and future human capital accumulation, particularly if human capital is acquired via learning by doing. The second is that we incorporate age-varying efficiency patterns in financial decisionmaking. Both enhancements produce inactivity in portfolio adjustment patterns consistent with empirical evidence. We also analyze individuals’ optimal choice between self-managing their wealth versus delegating the task to a financial advisor. Delegation proves most valuable to the young and the old. Our calibrated model quantifies welfare gains from including investment time and money costs, as well as delegation, in a life cycle setting.
2013, 05
Empirical evidence suggests that asset returns correlate more strongly in bear markets than conventional correlation estimates imply. We propose a method for determining complete tail correlation matrices based on Value-at-Risk (VaR) estimates. We demonstrate how to obtain more efficient tail-correlation estimates by use of overidentification strategies and how to guarantee positive semidefiniteness, a property required for valid risk aggregation and Markowitz{type portfolio optimization. An empirical application to a 30-asset universe illustrates the practical applicability and relevance of the approach in portfolio management.
2013, 23
There is mounting evidence that retail investors make predictable, costly investment mistakes, including underinvestment, naïve diversification, and payment of excessive fund fees. Over the past thirty-five years, however, participant-directed 401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed pension plans, requiring unsophisticated retail investors to navigate the financial markets themselves. Policy-makers have struggled with regulatory interventions designed to improve the quality of investment decisions without a clear understanding of the reasons for investor mistakes. Absent such an understanding, it is difficult to design effective regulatory responses. This article offers a first step in understanding the investor decision-making process. We use an internet-based experiment to disentangle possible explanations for inefficient investment decisions. The experiment employs a simplified construct of an employee’s allocation among the options in a retirement plan coupled with technology that enables us to collect data on the specific information that investors choose to view. In addition to collecting general information about the process by which investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an experimental manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the importance of mutual fund fees. Pairing this instruction with simplified fee disclosure allows us to distinguish between motivation-limits and cognition-limits as explanations for the widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their investment decisions. Our results offer partial but limited grounds for optimism. On the one hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects allocated more money, on average, to higher-value funds. Furthermore, subjects who received the fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual fund fees and allocated their investments into funds with lower fees. On the other hand, the effects of even a blunt fees instruction were limited, and investors were unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund options. In addition, our results suggest that excessive, naïve diversification strategies are driving many investment decisions. Although our findings are preliminary, they suggest valuable avenues for future research and important implications for regulation of retail investing.