OPUS 4 | CFS working paper series

2006, 09

Multivariate normal mixture GARCH (2006)

Markus Haas Stefan Mittnik Marc S. Paolella

We present a multivariate generalization of the mixed normal GARCH model proposed in Haas, Mittnik, and Paolella (2004a). Issues of parametrization and estimation are discussed. We derive conditions for covariance stationarity and the existence of the fourth moment, and provide expressions for the dynamic correlation structure of the process. These results are also applicable to the single-component multivariate GARCH(p, q) model and simplify the results existing in the literature. In an application to stock returns, we show that the disaggregation of the conditional (co)variance process generated by our model provides substantial intuition, and we highlight a number of findings with potential significance for portfolio selection and further financial applications, such as regime-dependent correlation structures and leverage effects. Klassifikation: C32, C51, G10, G11

2006, 08

Bank mergers, competition and liquidity (2006)

Elena Carletti Philipp Hartmann Giancarlo Spagnolo

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. Klassifikation: D43, G21, G28, L13

2006, 07

Strategic trading and manipulation with spot market power (2006)

Alexander Muermann Stephen H. Shore

When a spot market monopolist has a position in a corresponding futures market, he has an incentive to deviate from the spot market optimum to make this position more profitable. Rational futures market makers take this into account when setting prices. We show that the monopolist, by randomizing his futures market position, can strategically exploit his market power at the expense of other futures market participants. Furthermore, traders without market power can manipulate futures prices by hiding their orders behind the monopolist's strategic trades. The moral hazard problem stemming from spot market power thus provides a venue for strategic trading and manipulation that parallels the adverse selection problem stemming from inside information. Klassifikation: D82, G13

2006, 06

Investment performance and market share : a study of the German mutual fund industry (2006)

Jan Pieter Krahnen Frank A. Schmid Erik Theissen

We study a set of German open-end mutual funds for a time period during which this industry emerged from its infancy. In those years, the distribution channel for mutual funds was dominated by the brick-and-mortar retail networks of the large universal banks. Using monthly observations from 12/1986 through 12/1998, we investigate if cross-sectional return differences across mutual funds affect their market shares. Although such a causal relation has been established in highly competitive markets, such as the United States, the rigid distribution system in place in Germany at the time may have caused retail performance and investment performance to uncouple. In fact, although we observe stark differences in investment performance across mutual funds (and over time), we find no evidence that cross-sectional performance differences affect the market shares of these funds. Klassifikation: G 23

2006, 05

Die Stabilität von Finanzmärkten : Wie kann die Wirtschaftspolitik Vertrauen schaffen? (2006)

Jan Pieter Krahnen

2006, 04

Risk transfer with CDOs and systemic risk in banking (2006)

Jan Pieter Krahnen Christian Wilde

Large banks often sell part of their loan portfolio in the form of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) to investors. In this paper we raise the question whether credit asset securitization affects the cyclicality (or commonality) of bank equity values. The commonality of bank equity values reflects a major component of systemic risks in the banking market, caused by correlated defaults of loans in the banks' loan books. Our simulations take into account the major stylized fact of CDO transactions, the non-proportional nature of risk sharing that goes along with tranching. We provide a theoretical framework for the risk transfer through securitization that builds on a macro risk factor and an idiosyncratic risk factor, allowing an identification of the types of risk that the individual tranche holders bear. This allows conclusions about the risk positions of issuing banks after risk transfer. Building on the strict subordination of tranches, we first evaluate the correlation properties both within and across risk classes. We then determine the effect of securitization on the systematic risk of all tranches, and derive its effect on the issuing bank's equity beta. The simulation results show that under plausible assumptions concerning bank reinvestment behaviour and capital structure choice, the issuing intermediary's systematic risk tends to rise. We discuss the implications of our findings for financial stability supervision. Klassifikation: G28

2006, 03

Mean variance optimization of non-linear systems and worst-case analysis (2006)

Panos Parpas Berc Rustem Volker Wieland Stan Zakovic

In this paper, we consider expected value, variance and worst-case optimization of nonlinear models. We present algorithms for computing optimal expected values, and variance, based on iterative Taylor expansions. We establish convergence and consider the relative merits of policies beaded on expected value optimization and worst-case robustness. The latter is a minimax strategy and ensures optimal cover in view of the worst-case scenario(s) while the former is optimal expected performance in a stochastic setting. Both approaches are used with a macroeconomic policy model to illustrate relative performances, robustness and trade-offs between the strategies. Klassifikation: C61, E43

2006, 02

Precautionary saving and precautionary wealth (2006)

Christopher D. Carroll Miles S. Kimball

This is an entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Ed. Klassifikation: C61, D11, E21

2001, 04 b

Multiple lenders and corporate distress : evidence on debt restructuring (2006)

Antje Brunner Jan Pieter Krahnen

In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock. Klassifizierung: D74, G21, G33, G34

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