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2000, 10
Characterised as the mighty capital of the eurozone (Sassen 1999, 83), Frankfurt is said to be a rising world city primarily due to its financial centre. This is reflected in the use of such common catchphrases as Bankfurt and Mainhattan for the city, as well as its reference in scientific publications. As Ronneberger and Keil (1995, 305) state, for instance, a service economy [...] mastered by the finance sector forms the basis for the continuing integration of Frankfurt into the international market. Frankfurt is the most important German as well as European financial centres. Thirteen of the 30 largest German banks and about two thirds of Germany s foreign banks are seated here. Frankfurt s stock exchange (ranked 4th in the world) is by far the biggest in Germany with a turnover-share of more than 80%. Its derivatives exchange (Eurex) aims to become the biggest in the world. As the host city for the European Central Bank, it is also the centre of European monetary policy. As a major node in the global financial network today, Frankfurt s specific functions within this network will be investigated in this paper. Unlike most other predominant national financial centres, Frankfurt has not continuously held this position in Germany s since the middle ages: It re-gained it s position from Berlin only after World War II. In contrast to the static phenomenon financial centre which is well covered in the literature emergence and development of financial centres is not as well understood. The study of the development of the financial centre Frankfurt after World War II gives insights into the dynamics of the self-reinforcing mechanisms within financial centres; the second topic covered in the paper. The paper is organised as follows: the remainder of this chapter looks at the method used in this study and the theory of financial centres with an emphasis on the basic approaches to the emergence of financial centres. After that it is asked whether Frankfurt meets the basic requirements for the concept of path dependence, i.e. that there are self-reinforcing mechanisms. After a positive answer to that, the development of Frankfurt as a financial centre is discussed as well as its role as a node in the world (financial) system today in chapter two. Chapter three provides some more or less speculative remarks about Frankfurt s future; the last chapter briefly summarises the findings of the paper.
2000, 11
Die Südwestpfalz : Umstrukturierung durch erfolgreiche Unternehmen ; Ergebnisse einer Lehrstudie
(2000)
Die Südwestpfalz gehört nicht zu den ökonomisch bevorzugten Regionen Deutschlands. Von vielen wird sie nicht einmal als eine einzige Region gesehen: Zwischen den beiden dominierenden Mittelstädten Pirmasens und Zweibrücken sowie dem sie umgebenden Landkreis Südwestpfalz bestehen zu große Unterschiede in der Geschichte und Wirtschaftsstruktur. Pirmasens hat etwa 48.000 Einwohner, Zweibrücken ca. 38.000, und der Landkreis beherbergt in teils großen Ortschaften insgesamt 105.000 Einwohner. Die gesamte Region, die sich über nahezu 50 km von West nach Ost und 30 km von Nord nach Süd an der Grenze zu Lothringen (Frankreich) und zum Saarland erstreckt, ist relativ dünn besiedelt und befindet sich in peripherer Lage. Sie war daher seit langem als militärischer Standort gut geeignet, vor allem für amerikanische Truppen, die unter anderem in Pirmasens und Zweibrücken bestehende Kasernen übernehmen konnten. Vielfältige Militäranlagen kamen hinzu, wie z.B. der Flugplatz in Zweibrücken, das Militärhospital in Münchweiler oder militärische Depots im südöstlichen Landkreis. Der Abzug der militärischen Einheiten in den frühen 1990er Jahren brachte für die gesamte Südwestpfalz ein neues Problem: die Konversion. Neben den langjährigen Wandel der Industriestrukturen trat der schockartige Abbau des Militärs als Wirtschaftsfaktor in der Region. Die Städte selbst und viele Nachbargemeinden sind durch alte Industrien gekennzeichnet, die seit langem unter einem erheblichen Wettbewerbsdruck aus dem Ausland leiden. Die Stadt Pirmasens ist das Zentrum der alten und im Landkreis noch vorherrschenden Schuhindustrie. Hier besteht ein industrielles Cluster mit vorund nachgelagerten Wirtschaftszweigen, etwa des Schuhmaschinenbaus, der Zulieferindustrien (Klebstoff-Chemie, Kunststoff-Industrie für Vorder- und Hinterkappen, Sohlenfertigung) und der spezialisierten Dienstleistungen (Design-Büros, Speditionen, Druckereien). Insgesamt ist dieses Cluster jedoch durch Erosion in seiner Existenz bedroht ist (vgl. Schamp/Bertram 1998, Bertram/Schamp 1999). Manche Unternehmen haben sich aus der Bindung an dieses Cluster erfolgreich abgenabelt, andere sind längst durch Konkurs und Stillegung verschwunden. Der Landkreis Südwestpfalz, der sich im Osten bis zum Weinbaugebiet der Pfalz und im Westen bis zum metallverarbeitenden Bezirk des Saarlandes erstreckt, gehört in weiten Teilen zum Cluster der Schuhindustrie. Der Strukturwandel hat auch diese seit langem erfasst. Um der ländlichen Region dennoch neue Tätigkeitsfelder zu erschließen, wurde in den vergangenen zehn Jahren der Tourismus teilweise erheblich gefördert - recht erfolgreich, auch wenn die Zielgruppen nicht zu den sehr 2 wohlhabenden gehören: Familien und Jugendgruppen im Sommer, ältere Menschen im Frühjahr und Herbst. Der Tourismus verbindet sich mit einer neuen und zunehmend bedeutenden Attraktion, dem Fabrikverkauf von Schuhen - besonders im nahen Umkreis um das neue Schuhmuseum in Hauenstein. In Zweibrücken herrschen dagegen teils große Zweigwerke der metallverarbeitenden Industrie vor. Daneben wurde die Stadt vor allem durch das Militär geprägt, während die Schuhindustrie nur noch geringe Bedeutung hatte. Damit verfügt die Region in ihren wichtigen Industriezweigen nicht über Wachstumsindustrien. Der Abbau des Militärs brachte zunächst erhebliche Probleme für den regionalen Arbeitsmarkt und die regionale Wirtschaft. Die Chancen der Konversion können erst langsam ergriffen werden. Grundsätzlich reichen überall die Arbeitsplätze nicht aus: Viele Menschen müssen weit pendeln. Im Juni 1999 lag die Arbeitslosigkeit im Landkreis bei 10%, in Zweibrücken bei 11%, in Pirmasens jedoch bei 17%. Etwa 48% der Arbeitslosen sind Frauen, ca. 35% sind Langzeitarbeitslose (alle Angaben nach Arbeitsamt Pirmasens, Presseinformationen) - beides sind Problemgruppen für die Arbeitsvermittlung. So steht die gesamte Region vor drei Problemen: 1. der überalterten Wirtschaftsstruktur mit anscheinend wenigen Ansätzen der Erneuerung, 2. der notwendigen Konversion der militärischen Anlagen und dem erforderlichen Ersatz der fortgefallenen Arbeitsplätze, 3. einer vergleichsweise hohen Arbeitslosigkeit und langen Arbeitswegen.
2000, 02
One of the most important but less understood phenomena in the beginning of the 21st century has been a shift toward knowledge-based economic activity in the comparative advantage of modern industrialized countries. Two broad trends has been observed in the global economy. That is, the output from the world's science and technology system has been growing rapidly and the nature of investment has been changed (MILLER, 1996). The relative proportions of physical and intangible investment have changed considerably with the relative increase of intangible investments since the 1980s. In addition, there has been increased complementarity between physical and intangible investments and more important role of high technology in both kinds of investment (MILLER, 1996). Even in the newly industrialized countries, the growth of technology intensive industries, the increase of R&D activities and the growth of the knowledge intensive producer services have been common feature in recent years. In this change of the structure of productive assets, the role of knowledge is well recognized as the most fundamental resources in recent years (OECD, 1996; WORLD BANK, 1998). The development of information and communication technology (ICT) and globalisation trend have promoted this shift toward knowledge-based economy.
2000, 12
There are few changes in the history of human existence comparable to urbanization in scope and potential to bring about biologic change. The transition in the developed world from an agricultural to an industrial-urban society has already produced substantial changes in human health, morphology and growth (Schell, Smith and Bilsborough, 1993, p.1). By the year 2000, about 50% of the world s total population will be living crowded in urban areas and soon thereafter, by the year 2025 as the global urban population reaches the 5 billion mark more of the world s population will be living in urban areas. This has enormous health consequences. By the close of the twenty-first century, more people will be packed into the urban areas of the developing world than are alive on the planet today (UNCHS (Habitat), 1996, p.xxi). Africa presents a particularly poignant example of the problems involved, as it has the fastest population and urban growth in the world as well as the lowest economic development and growth and many of the poorest countries, especially in Tropical Africa. Thus it exemplifies in stark reality many of the worst difficulties of urban health and ecology (Clarke, 1993, p.260). This essay is therefore concerned to analyse the trends of urbanization in Africa. This is followed by an overview of the environmental conditions of Africa s towns and cities. The subsequent section explores the links between the urban environment and health. Although the focus is with physical hazards it is important to note that the social milieu is also vital in the reproduction of health. The paper concludes by providing some policy recommendations.
1999, 10
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions.
1999, 12
The globalisation of contemporary capitalism is bringing about at least two important implications for the emergence and significance of business services. First, the social division of labour steadily increases (ILLERIS 1996). Within the complex organisation of production and trade new intermediate actors emerge either from the externalisation of existing functions in the course of corporate restructuring policies or from the fragmentation of the production chain into newly defined functions. Second, competitive advantages of firms increasingly rest on their ability to innovate and learn. As global communication erodes knowledge advantages more quickly, product life cycles shorten and permanent organisational learning results to be crucial for the creation and maintenance of competitiveness. Intra- and interorganisational relations of firms now are the key assets for learning and reflexivity (STORPER 1997). These two aspects of globalisation help understand why management consulting - as only one among other knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) - has been experiencing such a boost throughout the last two decades. Throughout the last ten years, the business has grown annually by 10% on average in Europe. Management consulting can be seen first, as a new organisational intermediate and second, as an agent of change and reflexivity to business organisations. Although the KIBS industry may not take a great share of the national GDP its impact on national economies should not be underestimated. Estimations show that today up to 80% of the value added to industrial products stem from business services (ILLERIS 1996). Economic geographers have been paying more attention to KIBS since the late 1970s and focus on the transformation of the spatial economy through the emerging business services. This market survey is conceived as a first step of a research programme on the internationalisation of management consulting and as a contribution to the lively debate in economic geography. The management consulting industry is unlimited in many ways: There are only scarce institutional boundaries, low barriers to entry, a very heterogeneous supply structure and multiple forms of transaction. Official statistics have not yet provided devices of grasping this market and it may be therefore, that research and literature on this business are rather poor. The following survey is an attempt to selectively compile existing material, empirical studies and statistics in order to draw a sketchy picture of the European market, its institutional constraints, agents and dynamics. German examples will be employed to pursue arguments in more depth.