Normative orders working paper : Normative Orders, Cluster of Excellence at Goethe University Frankfurt, Main
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2020, 01
Law is force of order. It reacts, usually with a necessary time delay, to technological pro-gress. Only twelve years after Samuel Morse presented the first workable telegraph sys-tem in New York in 1838 and six years after the first completed telegraph line from Wash-ington to Baltimore, central European states agreed on an international framework for tel-egraphs. It has been much more than twelve years since the technologies underlying the internet’s popularity today, such as the ‘World Wide Web’, were invented. No international framework has emerged, even though normative approaches abound. There are norms that are applied to the internet, but the recognition of the existence of an underlying, structuring order is missing. This motivates the present study.
01/2021
The working paper reflects on the status that "sciences" have held at different points in time, and on the normative orders found in scientific works, as well as on the normative orders imposed by the sciences of a particular place and time on their environment. The latter is also suggested by recent developments concerning the influence (or lack thereof) of scientists on daily life and politics. The paper touches on several fundamental issues in the history of science as a discipline that have been or are still being intensely debated.
2015, 01
Challenging voluntary CSR-initiatives – a case study on the effectiveness of the Equator Principles
(2015)
The Equator Principles (EPs) are a voluntary and self-regulatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative in the field of project finance. The EPs provide a number of principles to businesses to reduce the negative impacts of lending practices linked to environment-damaging projects. The paper argues that the actual impact of the EPs even now as revised version is still limited. This is due to their voluntary nature and their lack of adequate governance mechanisms, that is, enforcement, monitoring and sanctioning. With the help of RepRisk, which provides a database capturing third-party criticism as well as a company’s or project’s exposure to controversial socio-environmental issues, the paper evaluates the on-the-ground performances of the two ‘Equator banks’ Barclays and JPMorgan Chase and compares their performance with the one of the two non-Equator banks Deutsche Bank and UBS. The paper shows that the EPs do not have a substantial influence on the broader CSR-performance of multinational banks due to the EPs’ limited scope – focusing mainly on project finance – and the (still) existing various loopholes, grey areas and discretionary leeway. The paper also gives an overview of the main institutional shortcomings of the EPs and their association and discusses some potential reform steps which should be taken to further strengthen and ‘harden’ this ‘soft law’ EP-framework. The paper thus argues in favor of (more) mandatory and legally binding rules and standards at the transnational level to overcome the EPs’ ‘voluntariness bias’.
2014, 02
Expressivist theories of punishment, according to which a penal sanction articulates or expresses a certain meaning to the offender, to the victim and to society, become more and more prominent among the traditional theories of punishment as retribution or deterrence. What these theories have in common is the idea that the conveyance of the meaning is in need of a communicative action, and that the penal sanction is such a communicative act. This article argues that pure communicative theories of punishment face great difficulties in generating any justification for hard treatment. One challenge is that certain types of sanctions – in particularly, hard treatment – restrict the communicative opportunities of the incarcerated individual; which generates a paradox, in that it turns punishment into a communicative action of non-communication. Beyond that, moreover, all practices of hard treatment potentially become unnecessary, if expressing the moral message of censure constitutes a kind of action in itself, and as such, itself a treatment of the offender, embedded in a communicative relationship between offender, victim and society; such that we may be able to think of the history of punishment as a development where hard treatment becomes more and more unnecessary for the conveyance of the message.
2011, 01
Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle; but in another respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere.
2011, 04
The title I have chosen seems to signal a tension, even a contradiction, in a number of respects. Democracy appears to be a form of political organisation and government in which, through general and public participatory procedures, a sufficiently legitimate political will is formed which acquires the force of law. Justice, by contrast, appears to be a value external to this context which is not so much linked to procedures of “input” or “throughput” legitimation but is understood instead as an output- or outcome-oriented concept. At times, justice is even understood as an otherworldly idea which, when transported into the Platonic cave, merely causes trouble and ends up as an undemocratic elite project. In methodological terms, too, this difference is sometimes signalled in terms of a contrast between a form of “worldly” political thought and “abstract” and otherworldly philosophical reflection on justice. In my view, we are bound to talk past the issues to be discussed under the heading “transnational justice and democracy” unless we first root out false dichotomies such as the ones mentioned. My thesis will be that justice must be “secularised” or “grounded” both with regard to how we understand it and to its application to relations beyond the state.
2013, 02
Noumenal Power
(2014)
In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental problems arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination. In the following, I suggest a novel understanding of what power is and what it means to exercise it.
02/2021
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of solidarity and distinguish various conceptions of solidarity that differ depending on social and normative contexts. The analysis helps to clarify both the different meanings of the term “solidarity” (and the different normative conceptions) and to avoid some of its pitfalls. The latter stem from making false connections between these conceptions, such as the assumption that solidarity must always be of an ethical or nationalist nature, that it is categorially different from justice or is always supererogatory. Solidarity as a virtue comes in many forms and with many justifications and grounds, and one must not reduce this plurality, but instead describe it properly. As already indicated, this opens up the possibility of conflicts between these contexts and dimensions of solidarity. The (as argued) “normatively dependent” concept of solidarity does not tell us to which form we ought to accord priority.
2017,02
Very few people doubt that it is a fundamental demand of justice that members of legal-political normative orders ought to have legal rights that define their basic standing as subjects of such an order. But when it comes to the concrete understanding of such rights, debates abound. What is the nature of these rights – are they an expression of the sovereign will of individuals, or are they based on important human interests? How should these rights be justified – do they have a particular moral ground, and if so, only one or many?
2015, 02
Adam Smith formulated a fundamental critique of economic growth in his philosophical oeuvre The Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in the year 1759. What might seem to be irony concerning the history of ideas – irony in the sense of the exclamation “he of all people” – is actually not irony at all. Smith wrote a substantial review of Rousseau’s Second Discourse, referring to Rousseau’s critique of commercial society. Additionally, one of the principal topics of Rousseau’s critique, the deformation of fundamental needs to passions in service of the satisfaction of self-love, is a major subject in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. But whereas Rousseau suggests egalitarian politics, Smith proposes individual stoicism: “In ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings are fighting for.” Nevertheless, both authors and analysts of pre-capitalist society identify the difference between fundamental needs and desires as having been born out of comparison as both a source of unhappiness and of economic development.