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291
Market fragmentation and technological advances increasing the speed of trading altered the functioning and stability of global equity limit order markets. Taking market resiliency as an indicator of market quality, we investigate how resilient are trading venues in a high-frequency environment with cross-venue fragmented order flow. Employing a Hawkes process methodology on high-frequency data for FTSE 100 stocks on LSE, a traditional exchange, and on Chi-X, an alternative venue, we find that when liquidity becomes scarce Chi-X is a less resilient venue than LSE with variations existing across stocks and time. In comparison with LSE, Chi-X has more, longer, and severer liquidity shocks. Whereas the vast majority of liquidity droughts on both venues disappear within less than one minute, the recovery is not lasting, as liquidity shocks spiral over the time dimension. Over half of the shocks on both venues are caused by spiralling. Liquidity shocks tend to spiral more on Chi-X than on LSE for large stocks suggesting that the liquidity supply on Chi-X is thinner than on LSE. Finally, a significant amount of liquidity shocks spill over cross-venue providing supporting evidence for the competition for order flow between LSE and Chi-X.
259
We uncover a new channel for spillovers of funding dry-ups. The 2016 US money market fund (MMF) reform exogenously reduced unsecured MMF funding for some banks. We use novel data to trace those banks to a platform for corporate deposit funding. We show that intensified competition for corporate deposits spilled the funding squeeze over to other banks with no MMF exposure. These banks paid more for deposits, and their pool of funding providers deteriorated. Moreover, their lending volumes and margins declined, and their stocks underperformed. Our results suggest that banks' competitiveness in funding markets affect their competitiveness in lending markets.
206
We develop a simple theoretical model to motivate testable hypotheses about how peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms compete with banks for loans. The model predicts that (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P lending and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.
127
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
47
This paper explores consequences of consumer education on prices and welfare in retail financial markets when some consumers are naive about shrouded add-on prices and firms try to exploit it. Allowing for different information and pricing strategies we show that education is unlikely to push firms to disclose prices towards all consumers, which would be socially efficient. Instead, price discrimination emerges as a new equilibrium. Further, due to a feedback on prices, education that is good for consumers who become sophisticated may be bad for consumers who stay naive and even for the group of all consumers as a whole
19
This paper empirically examines the role of soft information in the competitive interaction between relationship and transaction banks. Soft information can be interpreted as a private signal about the quality of a firm that is observable to a relationship bank, but not to a transaction bank. We show that borrowers self-select to relationship banks depending on whether their privately observed soft information is positive or negative. Competition affects the investment in learning the private signal from firms by relationship banks and transaction banks asymmetrically. Relationship banks invest more; transaction banks invest less in soft information, exacerbating the selection effect. Finally, we show that firms where soft information was important in the lending decision were no more likely to default compared to firms where only financial information was used.