SAFE working paper
https://safe-frankfurt.de/de/publikationen/working-papers.html
Refine
Year of publication
- 2021 (2) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (2)
Language
- English (2)
Has Fulltext
- yes (2)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (2)
Keywords
- Digitalized Markets (1)
- Obfuscation (1)
- Price Competition (1)
- Rational Inattention (1)
306
This paper studies the behavior of competing firms in a duopoly with rational inattentive consumers. Firms play a sequential game in which they decide to obfuscate their individual prices before competing on price. Probabilistic demand functions are endogenously determined by the consumers’ optimal information strategy, which depends on the firms’ obfuscation choice and the consumers’ unrestricted prior beliefs. We show that the game may result in an obfuscation equilibrium with high prices where both firms obfuscate and a transparency equilibrium with low prices and no obfuscation, providing an argument for market regulation. Lower information costs and asymmetric prior beliefs about prices reduce the probability of an obfuscation equilibrium. Using data on Sweden, we document a decrease in price complexity and corresponding prices in the market for mobile phone subscriptions in the last two decades. Our model rationalizes these changes and explains why complexity and high prices persist in some but not all digitalized markets.
321
We present new statistical indicators of the structure and performance of US banks from 1990 to today, geographically disaggregated at the level of individual counties. The constructed data set (20 indicators for some 3150 counties over 31 years, for a total of about 2 million data points) conveys a detailed picture of how the geography of US banking has evolved in the last three decades. We consider the data as a stepping stone to understand the role banks and banking policies may have played in mitigating, or exacerbating, the rise of poverty and inequality in certain US regions.