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Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa : ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität
(2001)
Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des Pensionssystems eines Landes? Weil dieser Zusammenhang wichtig sein könnte, wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht, ob es Unterschiede zwischen den Finanz- und Pensionssystemen in drei großen europäischen Ländern, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, gibt, ob sich diese Unterschiede in charakteristischer Weise entsprechen und ob sich über diese Entsprechungen hinaus auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Finanzsystem und dem Pensionssystem eines Landes nachweisen lassen.
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in einem ersten Schritt kurz die Unterschiedlichkeit der Finanz- und Pensionssysteme zwischen den drei Ländern skizziert, und es werden parallelen zwischen diesen Unterschieden nachgewiesen. Daran anschließend werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Alterssicherung und der volkswirtschaftlichen Risikoallokation sowie der Ausgestaltung der betrieblichen Alterssicherung für die Unternehmensstrategien, -finanzierung und –verfassung betrachtet. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass es sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Großbritannien eine – wenn auch vollkommen unterschiedlich ausgeprägte – Komplementarität zwischen Finanz- und Pensionssystem gibt, während sich ein solcher Zusammenhang für Frankreich nicht konstatieren lässt. Abschließend werden wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen dieses Zusammenhangs angesprochen
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis: evidence from the CFS survey
(2011)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty CFS working paper series, 2010, 18. Revised Version July 2011
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the “originate to distribute” model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk. Keywords: Credit Risk Transfer , Dual Moral Hazard , Monetary Policy , Liquidity , Welfare JEL Classification: E3, E5, G3 First Draft: December 2009, This Draft: September 2010
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis : evidence from the CFS survey
(2010)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty
This paper investigates the impact of IT standardization on bank performance based on a panel of 457 German savings banks over the period from 1996 to 2006. We measure IT standardization as the fraction of IT expenses for centralized services over banks' total IT expenses. Bank efficiency, in turn, is measured by traditional accounting performance indicators as well as by cost and profit efficiencies that are estimated by a stochastic frontier approach. Our results suggest that IT standardization is conducive to cost efficiency. The relation is positive and robust for small and medium-sized banks but vanishes for very large banks. Furthermore, our study confirms the often cited computer paradox by showing that total IT expenditures negatively impact cost efficiency and have no influence on bank profits. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is first to empirically explore whether IT standardization enhances efficiency by employing genuine data of banks' IT expenditures. JEL Classification: C23, G21 Keywords: IT standardization, cost and profit efficiency, savings banks
During the last years the relationship between financial development and economic growth has received widespread attention in the literature on growth and development. This paper summarises in its first part the results of this research, stressing the growth-enhancing effects of an increased interpersonal re-allocation of resources promoted by financial development. The second part of the paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial development based on Diamond's theory of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. The analysis shows that the quality of corporate governance of banks is the key factor in financial system development. Accordingly, financial sector reforms in developing countries will only succeed if they strengthen the corporate governance of financial institutions. In this area, financial institution building has an important contribution to make. Paper presented at the First Annual Seminar on New Development Finance held at the Goethe University of Frankfurt, September 22 - October 3, 1997
In den 1980er und den frühen 1990er Jahren waren japanische Banken die weltweit größten Finanzinstitute und galten als Inbegriff „globaler“ Banken. Der Crash der japanischen Wertpapier- und Immobilienmärkte Anfang der 1990er Jahre und die nachfolgende Rezession waren Anlass zu tiefgreifenden Reformen im japanischen Finanzsystem. Die japanischen Banken waren gezwungen, ihre internationalen Strategien zu reformulieren. Als Konsequenz zogen sie sich aus vielen Märkten zurück und strukturierten ihre internationalen Netzwerke um. Vor dem Hintergrund theoretischer Überlegungen zu der Bedeutung von „Globalität“ und einer empirischen Untersuchung der Entwicklung der Auslandsstellennetze japanischer Banken in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren stellt der vorliegende Beitrag die Globalität japanischer Banken in Frage.
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate. JEL Classification: G21, G38
An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.