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The lessons from QE and other 'unconventional' monetary policies - evidence from the Bank of England
(2011)
This paper investigates the effectiveness of the ‘quantitative easing’ policy, as implemented by the Bank of England in March 2009. Similar policies had been previously implemented in Japan, the U.S. and the Eurozone. The effectiveness is measured by the impact of Bank of England policies (including, but not limited to QE) on nominal GDP growth – the declared goal of the policy, according to the Bank of England. Unlike the majority of the literature on the topic, the general-to-specific econometric modeling methodology (a.k.a. the ‘Hendry’ or ‘LSE’ methodology) is employed for this purpose. The empirical analysis indicates that QE as defined and announced in March 2009 had no apparent effect on the UK economy. Meanwhile, it is found that a policy of ‘quantitative easing’ defined in the original sense of the term (Werner, 1994) is supported by empirical evidence: a stable relationship between a lending aggregate (disaggregated M4 lending, i.e. bank credit for GDP transactions) and nominal GDP is found. The findings imply that BoE policy should more directly target the growth of bank credit for GDP-transactions.
This paper compares the shareholder-value-maximizing capital structure and pricing policy of insurance groups against that of stand-alone insurers. Groups can utilise intra-group risk diversification by means of capital and risk transfer instruments. We show that using these instruments enables the group to offer insurance with less default risk and at lower premiums than is optimal for standalone insurers. We also take into account that shareholders of groups could find it more difficult to prevent inefficient overinvestment or cross-subsidisation, which we model by higher dead-weight costs of carrying capital. The tradeoff between risk diversification on the one hand and higher dead-weight costs on the other can result in group building being beneficial for shareholders but detrimental for policyholders.
Depending on the point of time and location, insurance companies are subject to different forms of solvency regulation. In modern regulation regimes, such as the future standard Solvency II in the EU, insurance pricing is liberalized and risk-based capital requirements will be introduced. In many economies in Asia and Latin America, on the other hand, supervisors require the prior approval of policy conditions and insurance premiums, but do not conduct risk-based capital regulation. This paper compares the outcome of insurance rate regulation and risk-based capital requirements by deriving stock insurers’ best responses. It turns out that binding price floors affect insurers’ optimal capital structures and induce them to choose higher safety levels. Risk-based capital requirements are a more efficient instrument of solvency regulation and allow for lower insurance premiums, but may come at the cost of investment efforts into adequate risk monitoring systems. The paper derives threshold values for regulator’s investments into risk-based capital regulation and provides starting points for designing a welfare-enhancing insurance regulation scheme.
Depending on the point of time and location, insurance companies are subject to different forms of solvency regulation. In modern regulation regimes, such as the future standard Solvency II in the EU, insurance pricing is liberalized and risk-based capital requirements will be introduced. In many economies in Asia and Latin America, on the other hand, supervisors require the prior approval of policy conditions and insurance premiums, but do not conduct risk-based capital regulation. This paper compares the outcome of insurance rate regulation and riskbased capital requirements by deriving stock insurers’ best responses. It turns out that binding price floors affect insurers’ optimal capital structures and induce them to choose higher safety levels. Risk-based capital requirements are a more efficient instrument of solvency regulation and allow for lower insurance premiums, but may come at the cost of investment efforts into adequate risk monitoring systems. The paper derives threshold values for regulator’s investments into risk-based capital regulation and provides starting points for designing a welfare-enhancing insurance regulation scheme.
In this paper we investigate the comparative properties of empirically-estimated monetary models of the U.S. economy using a new database of models designed for such investigations. We focus on three representative models due to Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007) and Taylor (1993a). Although these models differ in terms of structure, estimation method, sample period, and data vintage, we find surprisingly similar economic impacts of unanticipated changes in the federal funds rate. However, optimized monetary policy rules differ across models and lack robustness. Model averaging offers an effective strategy for improving the robustness of policy rules.
Missachtung rechtlicher Vorgaben des AEUV durch die Mitgliedstaaten und die EZB in der Schuldenkrise
(2012)
Zusammenfassung und Ergebnisse
1. Es gibt gute Argumente für ein generelles Verbot (freiwilliger) Unterstützungsleistungen an Euro-Mitgliedstaaten.
2. Die Vereinbarkeit der Leistungen der EU im Rahmen des EFSM mit Art. 122 Abs. 2 AEUV ist fraglich. Die Beurteilung der Kausalitätsfrage ist maßgebend.
3. Die Vereinbarkeit der Leistungen der Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der speziellen Griechenlandhilfe und im Rahmen der EFSF mit dem AEUV in der damals geltenden Fassung ist nicht sicher.
4. Die Einführung von Art. 136 Abs. 3 AEUV modifiziert das Vertragsrecht und ist wohl noch in Einklang mit Art. 48 Abs. 6 EUV erfolgt.
5. ESM und Fiskalpakt verstoßen nach der Änderung des Primärrechts wohl nicht gegen den AEUV.
6. Unabdingbar für die Schaffung des ESM sind aber das Inkrafttreten von Art. 136 Abs. 3 AEUV und
7. Der Erwerb von Forderungen gegen Mitgliedstaaten über einen längeren Zeitraum und zur Erleichterung von Zinslasten überschreitet die Befugnisse und Zuständigkeiten des ESZB.
8. Der Erwerb von Forderungen gegen Mitgliedstaaten über einen längeren Zeitraum und zur Erleichterung von Zinslasten ist nicht mit dem Verbot der Kreditgewährung durch Zentralbanken an Hoheitsträger nach Art. 123 AEUV zu vereinbaren
9. Die Gewährung von langfristigen Krediten an Banken verstößt ebenfalls gegen die Zuständigkeitsordnung des AEUV und ist bei einer Weiterleitung der Mittel an Hoheitsträger nicht mit Art. 123 AEUV zu vereinbaren.
10. Die Akzeptierung von ausfallgefährdeten Forderungen als Sicherheit für die Gewährung von Krediten durch das ESZB verstößt gegen Art. 18.1., zweiter Spiegelstrich, Satzung ESZB/EZB.
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
I evaluate the effect of inflation targeting on inflation and how it interacts with product market deregulation during the disinflationary process in the 1990s. Using a sample of 21 OECD countries, I show that, after controlling for product market deregulation, the effect of inflation targeting is quantitatively important and statistically significant. Moreover, product market deregulation also matters in particular in countries that adopted an inflation targeting regime. I propose a New Keynesian Phillips curve with an explicit role for market deregulation to rationalize the empirical evidence.
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). Within a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions. Using daily data, we can trace out the spillover effects over time in a set of impulse response functions and find that they reach their peak after 10 to 15 days.