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A number of recent studies regress a "narratively" identified measure of a macroeconomic shock directly on an outcome variable. In this note, we argue that this approach can be viewed as the reduced-form regression of an instrumental variable approach in which the narrative time series is used as an instrument for an endogenous series of interest. This motivates evaluating the validity of narrative measures through the lens of a randomized experiment. We apply our framework to four recently constructed narrative measures of tax shocks by Romer and Romer (2010), Cloyne (2013), and Mertens and Ravn (2012). All of them turn out to be weak instruments for observable measures of taxes. After correcting for weak instruments, we find that using any of the considered narrative tax measures as an instrument for cyclically adjusted tax revenues yields tax multiplier estimates that are indistinguishable from zero. We conclude that the literature currently understates the uncertainty associated with quantifying the tax multiplier.
No. And not only for the reason you think. In a world with multiple inefficiencies the single policy tool the central bank has control over will not undo all inefficiencies; this is well understood. We argue that the world is better characterized by multiple inefficiencies and multiple policy makers with various objectives. Asking the policy question only in terms of optimal monetary policy effectively turns the central bank into the residual claimant of all policy and gives the other policymakers a free hand in pursuing their own goals. This further worsens the tradeoffs faced by the central bank. The optimal monetary policy literature and the optimal simple rules often labeled flexible inflation targeting assign all of the cyclical policymaking duties to central banks. This distorts the policy discussion and narrows the policy choices to a suboptimal set. We highlight this issue and call for a broader thinking of optimal policies.
Savings accounts are owned by most households, but little is known about the performance of households’ investments. We create a unique dataset by matching information on individual savings accounts from the DNB Household Survey with market data on account-specific interest rates and characteristics. We document considerable heterogeneity in returns across households, which can be partly explained by financial sophistication. A one-standard deviation increase in financial literacy is associated with a 13% increase compared to the median interest rate. We isolate the usage of modern technology (online accounts) as one channel through which financial literacy has a positive association with returns.
This paper investigates whether a fiscal stimulus implies a different impact for flexible and rigid labour markets. The analysis is done for 11 advanced OECD economies. Using quarterly data from 1999 to 2013, I estimate a panel threshold structural VAR model in which regime switches are determined by OECD’s employment protection legislation index. My empirical results indicate significant differences between rigid and flexible labour markets regarding the impact of the fiscal stimulus on output and unemployment. While the impulse response of real GDP to a government spending shock is positive and more effective in flexible labour markets, it has less impact in the rigid ones. Moreover, it is found that a fiscal stimulus leads to higher overall unemployment in highly regulated countries.
Increasing bike traffic in many European countries is a sign of a shift in planning paradigms towards more sustainable mobility cultures. It is also the result of 20 to 30 years of evolution and refinement in the training of urban and transport planners. Capacity development is therefore key when it comes to changing mobility cultures. Nevertheless, the day-to-day work of transport planners still focuses mostly on motorised traffic and the tasks of creating a smooth traffic flow, improving accessibility, and maintaining infrastructure. Cycling plays only a minor role, with efforts often still concentrated on the building of cycle lanes. The broader strategic goal of how to make urban mobility culture more sustainable – and within this the need to focus on cycling as an everyday mode of transport – is often neglected. Direct regulation is not possible when it comes to mobility cultures. Instead they represent a community-wide (communication) process that calls for a new planning paradigm: Besides the political will to establish a sustainable urban mobility culture, emphasis must also be placed on skills and training for urban and transport planners.
In this paper we assemble an annual data set on broad and narrow money, prices, real economic activity and interest rates in Ireland from a variety of sources for the period 1933-2012. We discuss in detail how the data set is constructed and what assumptions we have made to do so. Furthermore, we estimate a simple SVAR model to provide some empirical evidence on the behaviour of these time series. Money supply shocks appear to be the most important drivers of both money and prices. Interest rate shocks, which capture monetary policy, play an important role driving output and, of course, interest rates. The GDP shocks, which raise prices, seem of less importance.
Since the 1970s, the overarching view in the literature has been that a Phillips curve relationship did not exist in Ireland prior to the 1979 exchange rate break with Sterling. It was argued that, as a small open economy, prices were determined externally. To test this relationship, we study the determination of inflation between 1926 and 2012, a longer sample period than any previously used. We find that the difference between unemployment and the NAIRU is a significant determinant of inflation both in the full sample and in the subsamples spanning the periods before and after the Sterling parity link.
Expectations of Sterling returning to Gold have been disregarded in empirical work on the US dollar – Sterling exchange rate in the early 1920s. We incorporate such considerations in a PPP model of the exchange rate, letting the probability of a return to gold follow a logistic function. We draw several conclusions: (i) the PPP model works well from spring 1919 to spring 1925; (ii) wholesale prices outperform consumer prices; (iii) allowing for a return to gold leads to a higher speed of adjustment of the exchange rate to PPP; (iv) interest rate differentials and the relative monetary base are crucial determinants of the expected return to gold; (v) the probability of a return to Gold peaked at about 72% in late 1924 and but fell to about 60% in early 1925; and (vi) our preferred model does not support the Keynes’ view that Sterling was overvalued after the return to gold.
The Treaty of Maastricht imposed the strict obligation on the European Union (EU) to establish an economic and monetary union, now Article 3(4) TEU. This economic and monetary union is, however, not designed as a separate entity but as an integral part of the EU. The single currency was to become the currency of the EU and to be the legal tender in all Member States unless an exemption was explicitly granted in the primary law of the EU, as in the case of the UK and Denmark. The newly admitted Member States are obliged to introduce the euro as their currency as soon as they fulfil the admission criteria. Technically, this has been achieved by transferring the exclusive competence for the monetary policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro on the EU, Article 3(1)(c) TFEU and by bestowing the euro with the quality of legal tender, the only legal tender in the EU, Article 128(1) sentence 3 TFEU.