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No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.
Venture capital exit rights
(2009)
Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D80
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchangelisted firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks´ control of management goes beyond what nonbank shareholders achieve. Proxyvoting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm´s length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 160 non venture-backed, 79 venture-backed and 61 bridge financed companies going public at Germany´s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This study provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VCbacked IPOs.
This chapter analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common perception that German accounting is rather "uninformative". This characterization is appropriate from the perspective of an arm´s length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
The globalization of markets and companies has increased the demand for internationally comparable high quality accounting information resulting from a common set of accounting rules. Despite remarkable efforts of international harmonization for more than 25 years, accounting regulation is still the domain of national legislators or delegated standard setters. The paper starts by outlining the reasons for this state of affairs and by characterizing the different institutional backgrounds of accounting standard setting in four selected countries as well as on the international level. This is followed by a summary of important international differences in accounting rules and a summary of the empirical evidence of the impact of different rules on the resulting numbers and their relevance to users. It is argued that neither a priori theoretical reasoning nor the evidence from empirical studies provides a convincing basis for choices between accounting regimes and even less so between specific accounting rules. As there is a broad consensus that there is a need for one set of global accounting standards the final sections of the paper discuss currently existing and proposed structures of international accounting standard setting. The evolving new IASC structure is critically evaluated.
Financial theory creates a puzzle. Some authors argue that high-risk entrepreneurs choose debt contracts instead of equity contracts since risky but high returns are of relatively more value for a loan-financed firm. On the contrary, authors who focus explicitly on start-up finance predict that entrepreneurs are the more likely to seek equity-like venture capital contracts, the more risky their projects are. Our paper makes a first step to resolve this puzzle empirically. We present microeconometric evidence on the determinants of debt and equity financing in young and innovative SMEs. We pay special attention to the role of risk for the choice of the financing method. Since risk is not directly observable we use different indicators for financial and project risk. It turns out that our data generally confirms the hypothesis that the probability that a young high-tech firm receives equity financing is an increasing function of the financial risk. With regard to the intrinsic project risk, our results are less conclusive, as some of our indicators of a risky project are found to have a negative effect on the likelihood to be financed by private equity.
In Germany a public discussion on the "power of banks" has been going on for decades now with power having at least two meanings. On the one hand it is the power of banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy votes - this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand it is market power - due to imperfect competition in markets for financial services - that banks exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers. In the past, bank regulation has often been blamed to undermine competition and the working of market forces in the financial industry for the sake of soundness and stability of financial services firms. This chapter tries to shed some light on the historical development and current state of bank regulation in Germany. In so doing it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation into a more general industrial organisation framework. For every regulated industry, competition and regulation are deeply interrelated as most regulatory institutions - even if they do not explicitly address the competitiveness of the market - either affect market structure or conduct. This paper tries to uncover some of the specific relationships between monetary policy, government interference and bank regulation on the one hand and bank market structure and economic performance on the other. In so doing we hope to point to several areas for fruitful research in the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the questions that we raise and some of our insights might also be applicable to banking systems elsewhere. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
We characterize the response of U.S., German and British stock, bond and foreign exchange markets to real-time U.S. macroeconomic news. Our analysis is based on a unique data set of high-frequency futures returns for each of the markets. We find that news surprises produce conditional mean jumps; hence high-frequency stock, bond and exchange rate dynamics are linked to fundamentals. The details of the linkages are particularly intriguing as regards equity markets. We show that equity markets react differently to the same news depending on the state of the economy, with bad news having a positive impact during expansions and the traditionally-expected negative impact during recessions. We rationalize this by temporal variation in the competing "cash flow" and "discount rate" effects for equity valuation. This finding helps explain the time-varying correlation between stock and bond returns, and the relatively small equity market news effect when averaged across expansions and recessions. Lastly, relying on the pronounced heteroskedasticity in the high-frequency data, we document important contemporaneous linkages across all markets and countries over-and-above the direct news announcement effects. JEL Klassifikation: F3, F4, G1, C5
In this paper we analyze the relation between fund performance and market share. Using three performance measures we first establish that significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns of the funds in the sample exist. Thus, investors may react to past fund performance when making their investment decisions. We estimated a model relating past performance to changes in market share and found that past performance has a significant positive effect on market share. The results of a specification test indicate that investors react to risk-adjusted returns rather than to raw returns. This suggests that investors may be more sophisticated than is often assumed.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature. Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdeveloped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent developments. When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for block trading. Klassifikation: G 51 . Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Opting out of the great inflation: German monetary policy after the break down of Bretton Woods
(2009)
During the turbulent 1970s and 1980s the Bundesbank established an outstanding reputation in the world of central banking. Germany achieved a high degree of domestic stability and provided safe haven for investors in times of turmoil in the international financial system. Eventually the Bundesbank provided the role model for the European Central Bank. Hence, we examine an episode of lasting importance in European monetary history. The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the Bundesbank monetary policy strategy contributed to this success. We analyze the strategy as it was conceived, communicated and refined by the Bundesbank itself. We propose a theoretical framework (following Söderström, 2005) where monetary targeting is interpreted, first and foremost, as a commitment device. In our setting, a monetary target helps anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. We derive an interest rate rule and show empirically that it approximates the way the Bundesbank conducted monetary policy over the period 1975-1998. We compare the Bundesbank´s monetary policy rule with those of the FED and of the Bank of England. We find that the Bundesbank´s policy reaction function was characterized by strong persistence of policy rates as well as a strong response to deviations of inflation from target and to the activity growth gap. In contrast, the response to the level of the output gap was not significant. In our empirical analysis we use real-time data, as available to policy-makers at the time. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E41, E52, E58
In this study the firms' choice of the number of bank relationships is analyzed with respect to influential factors like borrower quality, size and the existence of a close housebank relationship. Then, the number of bank relationships is used as a proxy to examine if bank competition is reflected in loan terms. It is shown that the number of bank relationships is foremost determined by borrower size and the existence of a housebank relationship. Loan rate spreads are not effected by the number of bank relationships. However, borrowers with a small number of bank relationships provide more collateral and get more credit. These effects are amplified by a housebank relationship. Housebanks get more collateral and are ready to take a larger stake in the financing of their customers.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juni 2006]
(2006)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships have been analyzed extensively. We address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
Money-back guarantees in individual pension accounts : evidence from the German pension reform
(2002)
The German Retirement Saving Act instituted a new funded system of supplementary pensions coupled with a general reduction in the level of state pay-as-you-go old-age pensions. In order to qualify for tax relief, the providers of supplementary savings products must offer a guarantee of the nominal value at retirement of contributions paid into these saving accounts. This paper explores how this "money-back" guarantee works and evaluates alternative designs for guarantee structures, including a life cycle model (dynamic asset allocation), a plan with a pre-specified blend of equity and bond investments (static asset allocation), and some type of portfolio insurance. We use a simulation methodology to compare hedging effectiveness and hedging costs associated with the provision of the money-back guarantee. In addition, the guarantee has important implications for regulators who must find an appropriate solvency system for such saving schemes. This version June 17, 2002 . Klassifikation: G11, G23, G28