Working Paper
Refine
Year of publication
- 2001 (4) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (4) (remove)
Language
- English (4) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4)
Keywords
- Europäische Union (4) (remove)
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been widely expected that the implementation of the European Single Market would lead to a rapid convergence of Europe’s financial systems. In the present paper we will show that at least in the period prior to the introduction of the common currency this expected convergence did not materialise. Our empirical studies on the significance of various institutions within the financial sectors, on the financing patterns of firms in various countries and on the predominant mechanisms of corporate governance, which are summarised and placed in a broader context in this paper, point to few, if any, signs of a convergence at a fundamental or structural level between the German, British and French financial systems. The German financial system continues to appear to be bank-dominated, while the British system still appears to be capital market-dominated. During the period covered by the research, i.e. 1980 – 1998, the French system underwent the most far-reaching changes, and today it is difficult to classify. In our opinion, these findings can be attributed to the effects of strong path dependencies, which are in turn an outgrowth of relationships of complementarity between the individual system components. Projecting what we have observed into the future, the results of our research indicate that one of two alternative paths of development is most likely to materialise: either the differences between the national financial systems will persist, or – possibly as a result of systemic crises – one financial system type will become the dominant model internationally. And if this second path emerges, the Anglo-American, capital market-dominated system could turn out to be the “winner”, because it is better able to withstand and weather crises, but not necessarily because it is more efficient.
We use consumer price data for 81 European cities (in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) to study deviations from the law-of-one-price before and during the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by analysing both aggregate and disaggregate CPI data for 7 categories of goods we find that the distance between cities explains a significant amount of the variation in the prices of similar goods in different locations. We also find that the variation of the relative price is much higher for two cities located in different countries than for two equidistant cities in the same country. Under EMU, the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility has largely reduced these border effects, but distance and border still matter for intra-European relative price volatility. JEL classification: F40, F41
The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, bank charter values, and risk taking for European banks. Utilising cross-sectional and time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance significantly reduces the risk taking of banks. This finding stands in contrast to most of the previous empirical literature. It supports the hypothesis that in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking systems have been characterised by strong implicit insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. Hence the introduction of an explicit system may imply a de facto reduction in the scope of the safety net. This finding provides a new perspective on the effects of deposit insurance on risk taking. Unless the absence of any safety net is credible, the introduction of deposit insurance serves to explicitly limit the safety net and, hence, moral hazard. We also test further hypotheses regarding the interaction between deposit insurance and monitoring, charter values and "too-big-to-fail." We find that banks with lower charter values and more subordinated debt reduce risk taking more after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, in support of the notion that charter values and subordinated debt may mitigate moral hazard. Finally, large banks (as measured in relation to the banking system as a whole) do not change their risk taking in response to the introduction of deposit insurance, which suggests that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance does not mitigate "too-big-to-fail" problems.
This paper investigates how US and European equity markets affected the US dollar-euro rate from the introduction of the euro through April 2001. More detailed the following questions are raised: First, do movements in the stock market help to explain movements in the exchange rate? Second, how large is the impact of stock market returns on the exchange rate? And third, does the exchange rate respond differently to different equity markets? The investigation was carried out using daily data within a vector-autoregression model (VAR). Surprisingly, positive returns on US equities as well as on European stock markets had a negative impact on the US dollar-euro rate. Quantitatively, the US dollar-euro rate seems to be more influenced by European stock markets compared to US stock markets. Further, there is evidence for a somewhat weaker impact of technology stock indices on the US dollar-euro rate compared with broader market indices. Finally, the long-term interest rate differential seems to contain more information about exchange rate movements than the short-term interest rate differential. This Version: August, 2001. Klassifikation: C32, F31