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The popular Nelson-Siegel (1987) yield curve is routinely fit to cross sections of intra-country bond yields, and Diebold and Li (2006) have recently proposed a dynamized version. In this paper we extend Diebold-Li to a global context, modeling a potentially large set of country yield curves in a framework that allows for both global and country-specific factors. In an empirical analysis of term structures of government bond yields for the Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S., we find that global yield factors do indeed exist and are economically important, generally explaining significant fractions of country yield curve dynamics, with interesting differences across countries.
Measuring financial asset return and volatilty spillovers, with application to global equity markets
(2008)
We provide a simple and intuitive measure of interdependence of asset returns and/or volatilities. In particular, we formulate and examine precise and separate measures of return spillovers and volatility spillovers. Our framework facilitates study of both non-crisis and crisis episodes, including trends and bursts in spillovers, and both turn out to be empirically important. In particular, in an analysis of nineteen global equity markets from the early 1990s to the present, we find striking evidence of divergent behavior in the dynamics of return spillovers vs. volatility spillovers: Return spillovers display a gently increasing trend but no bursts, whereas volatility spillovers display no trend but clear bursts.
Research with Keynesian-style models has emphasized the importance of the output gap for policies aimed at controlling inflation while declaring monetary aggregates largely irrelevant. Critics, however, have argued that these models need to be modified to account for observed money growth and inflation trends, and that monetary trends may serve as a useful cross-check for monetary policy. We identify an important source of monetary trends in form of persistent central bank misperceptions regarding potential output. Simulations with historical output gap estimates indicate that such misperceptions may induce persistent errors in monetary policy and sustained trends in money growth and inflation. If interest rate prescriptions derived from Keynesian-style models are augmented with a cross-check against money-based estimates of trend inflation, inflation control is improved substantially.
In meinem Vortrag habe ich mich mit den eher technischen Bestimmungen des Referentenentwurfs des Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes zu den Anforderungen an die Beschlüsse der Gläubigerversammlung und vor allem mit ihrer gerichtlichen Kontrolle zu befassen. Diese technischen Fragen lassen sich freilich nicht ganz von den Fragen trennen, die Gegenstand der Referate zu den Befugnissen der Gläubigerversammlung und zu den Anleihebedingungen sind. Ich werde mir also gewisse Grenzüberschreitungen insbesondere auf die Gebiete der zu diesen Themen speziell vorgesehenen Referate zuschulden kommen lassen und bitte hierfür schon jetzt um Nachsicht. Mit Anmerkungen versehene Fassung eines Vortrags auf dem Seminar des Deutschen Aktieninstituts „Die Novellierung des Schuldverschreibungsrechts“ am 16. 9. 2008. Die Vortragsform ist beibehalten.
Increasingly, individuals are in charge of their own financial security and are confronted with ever more complex financial instruments. However, there is evidence that many individuals are not well-equipped to make sound saving decisions. This paper demonstrates widespread financial illiteracy among the U.S. population, particularly among specific demographic groups. Those with low education, women, African-Americans, and Hispanics display particularly low levels of literacy. Financial literacy impacts financial decision-making. Failure to plan for retirement, lack of participation in the stock market, and poor borrowing behavior can all be linked to ignorance of basic financial concepts. While financial education programs can result in improved saving behavior and financial decision-making, much can be done to improve these programs’ effectiveness.
Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy.
Modern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind economic actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would behave. This analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are strictly aligned. In empirical analysis a challenging complication is that consumer and income data are typically available at the household level, and individuals living in multimember households have the potential to share goods within the household. The analytical approach of modern macroeconomics would require that intra-household sharing is also strictly aligned across the rich and the poor. Here we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of intra-household sharing and find that it holds: once expenditures for basic needs are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by the remainder household incomes are the same for the rich and the poor.
Der Verkauf von Immobiliendarlehen sorgt nach wie vor für Aufregung. Die Kreditwirtschaft sieht sich mit vehementen öffentlichen Vorwürfen konfrontiert, die den Kredithandel beeinträchtigen. Die Kreditinstitute werden indes nicht müde in ihren Beteuerungen, ordnungsgemäß bediente Kredite nicht an Finanzinvestoren zu veräußern und dabei hinzunehmen, dass ihre Kreditnehmer ihrer Wohnimmobilie verlustig gehen. Die praktische Bedeutung des Kredithandels ist gerade in Deutschland immens. Exemplarisch genannt sei als eine der größten bisherigen Transaktionen der Ende 2007 erfolgte Erwerb eines 53.000 Immobiliarkredite umfassenden Portfolios im Volumen von ca. 4,3 Mrd. Euro durch die ING Diba von der Hypo Real Estate. Unter der Überschrift "Verbesserte Transparenz bei Verkäufen von Kreditforderungen" hat die Bundesregierung um die letzte Jahreswende ein Maßnahmenpaket vorgelegt, mit dem auf Missbrauchsfälle beim Verkauf von Krediten reagiert werden soll. Inzwischen ist die Diskussion fortgeschritten, weitere Reformvorschläge sind in der Welt. Dabei sind die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen von Kreditverkäufen de lege lata auch nach einer einschlägigen BGH-Entscheidung vom 27. Februar 2007 noch immer nicht abschließend geklärt. Bevor in nachfolgendem Beitrag die aktuellen Reformansätze vorgestellt und einer kurzen Bewertung unterzogen werden, seien daher die derzeitige Praxis und Rechtslage untersucht.
After the pioneering German “Aktiengesetz” of 1965 and the Brazilian “Lei das Sociedades Anónimas” of 1976, Portugal has become the third country in the world to enact a specific regulation on groups of companies. The Code of Commercial Companies (“Código das Sociedades Comerciais”, abbreviately hereinafter CSC), enacted in 1986, contains a unitary set of rules regulating the relationships between companies, in general, and the groups of companies, in particular (arts. 481° to 508°-E CSC). With this set of rules, the Portuguese legislator has dealt with one of the major topics of modern Company Law. While this branch of law is traditionally conceived as the law of the individual company, modern economic reality is characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, where parts of a whole business are allocated and insulated in several legally independent companies submitted to an unified economic direction. As Tom HADDEN put it: “Company lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual company ceased to be the most significant form of organization in the 1920s and 1930s. The commercial world is now dominated both nationally and internationally by complex groups of companies”. This trend, which is now observable in any of the largest economies in the world, holds also true for small markets such as Portugal. Although Portuguese economy is still dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises, the organizational structure of the group has always been extremely common. During the 70s, it was estimated that the seven largest groups of companies owned about 50% of the equity capital of all domestic enterprises and were alone responsible for 3/4 of the internal national product. Such a trend has continued and even highlighted in the next decades, surviving to different political and economic scenarios: during the 80s, due to the process of state nationalization of these groups, an enormous public group with more than one thousand controlled companies has been created (“IPE - Instituto de Participações do Estado”); and during the 90s until today, thanks to the reprivatisation movement and the opening of our national market, we assisted to the re-emergence of some large private groups, composed of several hundred subsidiaries each, some of which are listed in foreign stock exchange markets (e.g., in the banking sector, “BCP – Banco Comercial Português”, in the industrial area, “SONAE”, and in the media and communication area, “Portugal-Telecom”).
Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups – The Committee on Capital Market Regulation, The Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company. Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While multiple regulatory forces are targeted by each report’s call for reform, each of the reports singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the not too distant past. Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 Among the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which the court chooses from among competing petitioners a lead plaintiff for the class. The statute commands that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness to the plaintiff’s economic self interest to the suits’ prosecution. Also, by eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel which Congress believed too frequently gave rise to incomplete and insubstantially pled causes of action. The PSLRA also introduced for securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement8 as well as a bar to the plaintiff obtaining any discovery prior to the district court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. By introducing the requirement that allegations involving fraud must be plead not only with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside, albeit only for securities actions, the much lower notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of American civil procedure for decades. Substantive changes to the law were also introduced by the PSLRA. With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced by proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is capped by that defendant’s relative degree of fault. Similarly, contribution rights among co-violators are also based on proportionate fault of each defendant. Three years after the PSLRA, Congress returned to the topic again by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act;13 this provision was prompted by aggressive efforts of plaintiff lawyers to bypass the limitations, most notably the bar to discovery and higher pleading requirement, of the PSLRA by bringing suit in state court. Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are exclusively the domain of the federal court. In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums – small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendantcompany, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.” Part I of this paper sets forth the contemporary debate surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In this section, we set forth the insights advanced in three prominent reports focused on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. In Part II we first provide descriptive statistics of our extensive data set, and thenuse multivariate regression analysis to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely examine small settlements for clues to whether they reflect evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy recommendations based on our analysis of the data. Our goals in this paper are more modest than the Committee Report, the Chamber Report and the McKinsey Report, each of which called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed securities fraud settlements so as to determine whether the reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think it was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further cutbacks in private securities class action so soon after the Act was passed.