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Improving financial conditions of individuals requires an understanding of the mechanisms through which bad financial decision-making leads to worse financial outcomes. From a theoretical point of view, a key candidate inducing mistakes in financial decision-making are so called present-biased preferences, which are one of the cornerstones of behavioral economics. According to theory, present-biased households should behave systematically different when it comes to consumption and saving decisions, as they should be more prone to spending too much and saving too little.
In this policy letter we show how high frequency financial transaction data available in digitized form allows to precisely categorize individual financial-decision making to be present-biased or not. Using this categorization, we find that one out of five individuals in our sample exhibits present-bias and that this present-biased behavior is associated with a stronger use of overdrafts. As overdrafts represent a particularly expensive way of short-term borrowing, their systematic use can be interpreted as a measure of suboptimal financial-decision making. Overall, our results indicate that the combination of economic theory and Big Data is able to generate valuable insights with applications for policy makers and businesses alike.
We develop a model that reproduces the average return and volatility spread between sin and non-sin stocks. Our investors do not necessarily boycott sin companies. Rather, they are open to invest in any company while trading off dividends against ethicalness. We show that when dividends and ethicalness are complementary goods and investors are sufficiently risk averse, the model predicts that the dividend share of sin companies exhibits a positive relation with the future return and volatility spreads. Our empirical analysis supports the model's predictions.
In the last decade, central bank interventions, flights to safety, and the shift in derivatives clearing resulted in exceptionally high demand for high quality liquid assets, such as German treasuries, in the securities lending market besides the traditional repo market activities. Despite the high demand, the realizable securities lending income has remained economically negligible for most beneficial owners. We provide empirical evidence of pricing inefficiencies in the non-transparent, oligopolistic securities lending market for German treasuries from 2006 to 2015. Consistent with Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005)’s theory, we find that the less connected market participants’ interests are underrepresented, evident in the longer maturity segment, where lenders are more likely to be conservative passive investors, such as pension funds and insurance firms. The low price elasticity in this segment hinders these beneficial owners to fully capitalize on the additional income from securities lending, giving rise to important negative welfare implications.
In this study we investigate which economic ideas were prevalent in the macroprudential discourse post-crises in order to understand the availability of ideas for reform minded agents. We base our analysis on new findings in the field of ideational shifts and regulatory science, which posit that change-agents engage with new ideas pragmatically and strategically in their effort to have their economic ideas institutionalized. We argue that in these epistemic battles over new regulation, scientific backing by academia is the key resource determining the outcome. We show that the present reforms implemented internationally follow this pattern. In our analysis we contrast the entire discourse on systemic risk and macroprudential regulation with Borio’s initial 2003 proposal for a macroprudential framework. We find that mostly cross-sectional measures targeted towards increasing the resilience of the financial system rather than inter-temporal measures dampening the financial cycle have been implemented. We provide evidence for the lacking support of new macroprudential thinking within academia and argue that this is partially responsible for the lack of anti-cyclical macroprudential regulation. Most worryingly, the financial cycle is largely absent in the academic discourse and is only tacitly assumed instead of fully fledged out in technocratic discourses, pointing to the possibility that no anti-cyclical measures will be forthcoming.
Der Beitrag analysiert die Voraussetzungen für stabiles Geld und setzt sich dabei grundlegend mit Hayeks Thesen zu alternativen Währungssystemen sowie dessen fundamentaler Kritik an der Möglichkeit zur Gestaltung der Geldpolitik auf wissenschaftlicher Basis auseinander. Er prüft Hayeks Vorschlag zur Entnationalisierung des Geldes und seine Thesen zur Überlegenheit des im privaten Wettbewerb geschaffenen Geldes. In diesem Zusammenhang schlägt der Beitrag einen Bogen zur aktuellen Diskussion über Kryptowährungen und wirft die Frage auf, ob virtuelle Währungen wie etwa Bitcoin geeignet sind, den Hayekschen Währungswettbewerb zu entfalten. Sodann wird im Gegensatz zu Hayeks Forderung nach einer Abschaffung der Zentralbanken deren entscheidende Rolle für anhaltendes Wachstum bei stabilen Preisen skizziert und die Wichtigkeit der Unabhängigkeit von Notenbanken für die dauerhafte Durchführung einer stabilitätsorientierten Geldpolitik hervorgehoben. Gleichwohl ergeht der Hinweis, dass Notenbanken mit der Überschreitung ihres Mandats auf lange Sicht gesehen selbst den Status ihrer Unabhängigkeit unterminieren können und damit die Rückübertragung der Kompetenz für zentrale geldpolitische Entscheidungen auf Regierung und Parlament provozieren. Die Gefahren der weitgehenden Unabhängigkeit einiger weniger an der Spitze der Notenbanken anerkennend wird anschließend die Bedeutung ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz ihrer Entscheidungen unterstrichen.
In the context of Brexit, changes to the regulatory architecture of CCPs that empower the European securities markets regulator are under way to prevent the threat of a regulatory race to the bottom. However, this empowerment currently leaves the national supervision of common European rules within the EU intact. This policy letter argues that supervisory arbitrage is as much a threat within the EU as outside of it, wherefore a common supervision of CCP rules in the EU is called for. The paper traces the origins of the current set-up and criticizes the current regulatory proposal by the EU Commission as too cumbersome while discussing possible ways forward to achieve European supervision. In contrast to the current proposal of the Commission, we call for a unified supervision within ESMA, combined with a European fiscal backstop.
This policy letter provides evidence for the crucial importance of the initial regulatory treatment for the further development of financial innovations by exploring the emergence and initial legal framing of off-balance-sheet leasing in Germany. Due to a missing legal framework, lease contracts occurred as an innovative social practice of off-balance-sheet financing. However, this lacking legal framing impeded the development of this financial innovation as it also created legal uncertainties. This was about to change after the initial legal framing of leasing in the 1970’s which eliminated those legal uncertainties and off-balance-sheet leasing entered into a stunning period of growth while laying the foundation of a regulatory resiliency against efforts that seek to abandon the off-balance-sheet treatment of leases. As the initial legal framing is crucial for the further development of a financial innovation, we propose the French approach for the initial vindication of new financial products in which the principles-based rules are aligned with the capabilities of regulators to intervene, even when a financial innovation complies with the letter of the law. In this way, regulators could regulate the frontier of financial innovations and weed out those which are entirely or mainly driven by regulatory arbitrage considerations while maintaining the beneficial elements of those products.
While the debate about the needs and merits of cryptocurrency regulation is ongoing, the unprecedented price hikes of cryptocurrencies towards the end of 2017 triggered a somewhat unexpected sort of regulation in the form of public statements by governments and financial supervisors. It kicked in rather quickly and turned out to be much more effective than imagined. These interventions can be identified as one of the main factors that drove asset prices down, thereby preventing destabilizing bubbles. The experience of the supervisory response to the cryptocurrency bubble of the past months keeps important insights for any prospective regulation of cryptocurrencies. First, public statements are a highly effective regulatory tool in the short term as they manage market expectations, a fact which is well-known as forward guidance in monetary policy. So far, the legal framework in the EU takes insufficient account of the regulatory role of public statements. Second, regulation needs to keep up with the incredible speed of fintech innovations. Some regulators addressed the challenge by adopting a ‘sandbox’ approach. However, the ‘sandbox’ approach clearly calls for international cooperation. To achieve a balance between safety and innovation, international cooperation should emulate the experimental character of sandboxes. One could conceive of a ‘sandbox for regulators’, an arrangement which would facilitate the exchange of information on regulatory initiatives among authorities but also the coordination of communication and forward guidance.
To estimate demand for labor, we use a combination of detailed employment data and the outcomes of procurement auctions, and compare the employment of the winner of an auction with the employment of the second ranked firm (i.e. the runner-up firm). Assuming similar ex-ante winning probabilities for both firms, we may view winning an auction as an exogenous shock to a firm’s production and its demand for labor. We utilize daily data from almost 900 construction firms and about 3,000 auctions in Austria in the time period 2006 until 2009. Our main results show that the winning firm significantly increases labor demand in the weeks following an auction but only in the years before the recent economic crisis. It employs about 80 workers more after the auction than the runner-up firm. Most of the adjustment takes place within one month after the demand shock. Winners predominantly fire fewer workers after winning than runner-up firms. In the crisis, however, firms do not employ more workers than their competitors after winning an auction. We discuss explanations like labor hoarding and productivity improvements induced by the crisis as well discuss implications for fiscal and stimulus policy in the crisis.
Departing from the principle of absolute priority, CoCo bonds are particularly exposed to bank losses despite not having ownership rights. This paper shows the link between adverse CoCo design and their yields, confirming the existence of market monitoring in designated bail-in debt. Specifically, focusing on the write-down feature as loss absorption mechanism in CoCo debt, I do find a yield premium on this feature relative to equity-conversion CoCo bonds as predicted by theoretical models. Moreover, and consistent with theories on moral hazard, I find this premium to be largest when existing incentives for opportunistic behavior are largest, while this premium is non-existent if moral hazard is perceived to be small. The findings show that write-down CoCo bonds introduce a moral hazard problem in the banks. At the same time, they support the idea of CoCo investors acting as monitors, which is a prerequisite for a meaningful role of CoCo debt in banks' regulatory capital mix.