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This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. Based on a sample of 224 announcements from the period May 1998 to April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress postannouncement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from an initial statement by management that it intends to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements. EFM classification: 330, 350
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that therefore financial patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by Mayer et al. are due to a hidden assumption underlying their methodology. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way.
This paper suggests a motive for bank mergers that goes beyond alleged and typically unverifiable scale economies: preemtive resolution of banks´ financial distress. Such "distress mergers" can be a significant motivation for mergers because they can foster reorganizations, realize diversification gains, and avoid public attention. However, since none of these potential benefits comes without a cost, the overall assessment of distress mergers is unclear. We conduct an empirical analysis to provide evidence on consequences of distress mergers. The analysis is based on comprehensive data from Germany´s savings and cooperatives banks sectors over the period 1993 to 2001. During this period both sectors faced significant structural problems and superordinate institutions (associations) presumably have engaged in coordinated actions to manage distress mergers. The data comprise 3640 banks and 1484 mergers. Our results suggest that bank mergers as a means of preemtive distress resolution have moderate costs in terms of the economic impact on performance. We do find strong evidence consistent with diversification gains. Thus, distress mergers seem to have benefits without affecting systematic stability adversely.
In this study, we develop a technique for estimating a firm’s expected cost of equity capital derived from analyst consensus forecasts and stock prices. Building on the work of Gebhardt/Lee/-Swaminathan (2001) and Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis (2002), our approach allows daily estimation, using only publicly available information at that date. We then estimate the expected cost of equity capital at the market, industry and individual firm level using historical German data from 1989-2002 and examine firm characteristics which are systematically related to these estimates. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the concept in a contemporary case study for DaimlerChrysler and the European automobile industry.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
This article presents an overview of the contemporary German insurance market, its structure, players, and development trends. First, brief information about the history of the insurance industry in Germany is provided. Second, the contemporary market is analyzed in terms of its legal and economic structure, with statistics on the number of companies, insurance density and penetration, the role of insurers in the capital markets, premiums split, and main market players and their market shares. Furthermore, the three biggest insurance lines—life, health, and property and casualty—are considered in more detail, such as product range, country specifics, and insurance and investment results. A section on regulation outlines its implementation in the insurance sector, offering information on the underlying legislative basis, supervisory body, technical procedures, expected developments, and sources of more detailed information.
Mängel bei der Abschlußprüfung : Tatsachenberichte und Analysen aus betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht
(2001)
Unternehmenskrisen, „überraschende“ zumal, standen am Anfang der gesetzlichen Normierung der Abschlußprüfung in Deutschland. Es entspricht daher einem legitimen Anliegen von Öffentlichkeit und Fachwelt, die herrschende Maßstäblichkeit der Qualität von Abschlußprüfungen und die Glaubwürdigkeit4 von Abschlußprüfern insbesondere dann in gesteigertem Maße als Problem zu begreifen, wenn den gesetzlichen Schutzzwecken und Schutznormen der etablierten Abschlußprüfung zum Trotz Unternehmen in eine Krise geraten: Denn innerhalb der institutionellen Mechanismen ihrer Früherkennung – eines funktionalen Teils des deutschen Systems von corporate governance – gilt die Pflichtprüfung mit Recht als pivotales Element. Vieles an festzustellender Kritik mag hierbei einem der Komplexität der zu verhandelnden Sachzusammenhänge unüberbrückbaren Laienverständnis geschuldet sein; manches aber ist sicherlich erklärlich durch verbesserbare gesetzliche Vorschriften, zu lösende theoretische (ökonomische und rechtswissenschaftliche) Problemstellungen und eine zu fördernde gute Berufspraxis. Jüngste fragliche Mängel der Abschlußprüfung geben den Anlaß zu vorliegenden Tatsachenberichten und betriebswirtschaftlichen Analysen. Die getroffene Auswahl der Unternehmen ist hierbei ebenso willkürlich wie die der betroffenen Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaften – nicht zufällig ist indes die Auswahl der betriebswirtschaftlichen Grundprobleme: Betreffen diese doch wesentliche Erwartungen an die Abschlußprüfung, die offenbar so regelmäßig enttäuscht wurden, daß selbst in Regierungsbegründungen von Gesetzesvorlagen nunmehr eine „sog. Erwartungslücke“5 bemüht wird. Die Erwartungslücken ergeben sich hierbei insbesondere aus der Vorstellung, daß (a) der gesetzliche Pflichtprüfer bei einer ordnungsmäßigen Prüfung zwingend doloses Handeln aufzudecken habe, daß (b) bilanzielle Wertansätze hinreichend zuverlässige Größen bilden, die über die Vermögenslage des Unternehmens berichten und schließlich (c) die Prüfung der tatsächlichen wirtschaftlichen Lage des Unternehmens und die Unterrichtung hiervon in Prüfungsbericht und Bestätigungsvermerk eine Selbstverständlichkeit der Pflichtprüfung sei. Diesen Erwartungen folgt der Gang der Untersuchung.
Intangible assets as goodwill, licenses, research and development or customer relations become in high technology and service orientated economies more and more important. But comparing the book values of listed companies and their market capitalization the financial reports seems to fail the information needs of market participants regarding the estimate of the proper firm value. Moreover, with the introduction of Anglo-American accounting systems in Europe and Asia we can observe even in the accounts of companies sited in the same jurisdiction diverging accounting practices for intangible assets caused by different accounting standards. To assess the relevance of intangible assets in Japanese and German accounts of listed companies we therefore measure certain balance sheet and profit and loss relations according to goodwill and self-developed software. We compare and analyze valuation rules for goodwill and software costs according to German GAAP, Japanese GAAP, US GAAP and IAS to determine the possible impact of diverging rules in the comparability of the accounts. Our results show that the comparability of the accounts is impaired because of different accounting practices. The recognition and valuation of goodwill and self-developed software varies significantly according to the accounting regime applied. However, for the recognition of self-developed software, the effect on the average impact on asset coefficients or profit is not that high. Moreover, an industry bias can only be found for the financial industry. In contrast, for goodwill accounting we found major differences especially between German and Japanese Blue Chips. The introduction of the new goodwill impairment only approach and the prohibition of the pooling method may have a major impact especially for Japanese companies’ accounts.
A widely recognized paper by Colin Mayer (1988) has led to a profound revision of academic thinking about financing patterns of corporations in different countries. Using flow-of-funds data instead of balance sheet data, Mayer and others who followed his lead found that internal financing is the dominant mode of financing in all countries, that financing patterns do not differ very much between countries and that those differences which still seem to exist are not at all consistent with the common conviction that financial systems can be classified as being either bank-based or capital market-based. This leads to a puzzle insofar as it calls into question the empirical foundation of the widely held belief that there is a correspondence between the financing patterns of corporations on the one side, and the structure of the financial sector and the prevailing corporate governance system in a given country on the other side. The present paper addresses this puzzle on a methodological and an empirical basis. It starts by comparing and analyzing various ways of measuring financial structure and financing patterns and by demonstrating that the surprising empirical results found by studies that relied on net flows are due to a hidden assumption. It then derives an alternative method of measuring financing patterns, which also uses flow-of-funds data, but avoids the questionable assumption. This measurement concept is then applied to patterns of corporate financing in Germany, Japan and the United States. The empirical results, which use an estimation technique for determining gross flows of funds in those cases in which empirical data are not available, are very much in line with the commonly held belief prior to Mayer’s influential contribution and indicate that the financial systems of the three countries do indeed differ from one another in a substantial way, and moreover in a way which is largely in line with the general view of the differences between the financial systems of the countries covered in the present paper.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.