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We develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which agents form expectations by continually updating their beliefs regarding the behavior of the economy and monetary policy. We explore the effects of policymakers' misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment during the late 1960s and 1970s on the formation of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We find that the combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of unemployment near its perceived natural rate and large real-time errors in estimates of the natural rate uprooted heretofore quiescent in inflation expectations and destabilized the economy. Had monetary policy reacted less aggressively to perceived unemployment gaps, in inflation expectations would have remained anchored and the stag inflation of the 1970s would have been avoided. Indeed, we find that less activist policies would have been more effective at stabilizing both in inflation and unemployment. We argue that policymakers, learning from the experience of the 1970s, eschewed activist policies in favor of policies that concentrated on the achievement of price stability, contributing to the subsequent improvements in macroeconomic performance of the U.S. economy.
The globalization of markets and companies has increased the demand for internationally comparable high quality accounting information resulting from a common set of accounting rules. Despite remarkable efforts of international harmonization for more than 25 years, accounting regulation is still the domain of national legislators or delegated standard setters. The paper starts by outlining the reasons for this state of affairs and by characterizing the different institutional backgrounds of accounting standard setting in four selected countries as well as on the international level. This is followed by a summary of important international differences in accounting rules and a summary of the empirical evidence of the impact of different rules on the resulting numbers and their relevance to users. It is argued that neither a priori theoretical reasoning nor the evidence from empirical studies provides a convincing basis for choices between accounting regimes and even less so between specific accounting rules. As there is a broad consensus that there is a need for one set of global accounting standards the final sections of the paper discuss currently existing and proposed structures of international accounting standard setting. The evolving new IASC structure is critically evaluated.
In this paper, we examine three famous episodes of deliberate deflation (or disinflation) in U.S. history, including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s. These episodes were associated with widely divergent effects on the real economy, which we attribute both to differences in the policy actions undertaken, and to the transparency and credibility of the monetary authorities. We attempt to account for the salient features of each episode within the context of a stylized DSGE model. Our model simulations indicate how a more predictable policy of gradual deflation could have helped avoid the sharp post-WWI depression. But our analysis also suggests that the strong argument for gradualism under a transparent monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the monetary authority lacks credibility; in this case, an aggressive policy stance (as under Volcker) can play a useful signalling role by making a policy shift more apparent to private agents. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E52
We show that average excess returns during the last two years of the presidential cycle are significantly higher than during the first two years: 9.8 percent over the period 1948 – 2008. This pattern in returns cannot be explained by business-cycle variables capturing time-varying risk premia, differences in risk levels, or by consumer and investor sentiment. In this paper, we formally test the presidential election cycle (PEC) hypothesis as the alternative explanation found in the literature for explaining the presidential cycle anomaly. PEC states that incumbent parties and presidents have an incentive to manipulate the economy (via budget expansions and taxes) to remain in power. We formulate eight empirically testable propositions relating to the fiscal, monetary, tax, unexpected inflation and political implications of the PEC hypothesis. We do not find statistically significant evidence confirming the PEC hypothesis as a plausible explanation for the presidential cycle effect. The existence of the presidential cycle effect in U.S. financial markets thus remains a puzzle that cannot be easily explained by politicians employing their economic influence to remain in power. JEL Classification: E32; G14; P16 Keywords: Political Economy, Market Efficiency, Anomalies, Calendar Effects
We take a simple time-series approach to modeling and forecasting daily average temperature in U.S. cities, and we inquire systematically as to whether it may prove useful from the vantage point of participants in the weather derivatives market. The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, yes. Time-series modeling reveals conditional mean dynamics, and crucially, strong conditional variance dynamics, in daily average temperature, and it reveals sharp differences between the distribution of temperature and the distribution of temperature surprises. As we argue, it also holds promise for producing the long-horizon predictive densities crucial for pricing weather derivatives, so that additional inquiry into time-series weather forecasting methods will likely prove useful in weather derivatives contexts.