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This article develops a novel reading of the threefold division of modes of historicization in Nietzsche's "Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life". It argues that Nietzsche's stance is closely matched, and indirectly responds, to specific features of the argument for progress in human history that Kant presents in "Conflict of the Faculties". Kant had hit upon interest, boredom, publicity, and forgetting as systematic problems for the philosophy of history, and Nietzsche's thought on history takes up these concerns. I argue that Nietzsche's reaction to these Kantian problems prompted him to subtly dissociate historicization and historicity. This manoeuver allowed him to counter the conceptual challenges Kant had established and to align his notions on history with those on ethical normativity in lived life, embracing what he elsewhere rejected as a “"moral ontology."
The aim of this essay is to provide an analysis of Foucault's use of the notion of revolution in the reports he wrote for "Il Corriere della Sera" during his two trips to Iran in September and November 1978. Foucault critically frames the historical and philosophical concept of revolution, in order to oppose it to the spreading revolts against the Shah, which embody the simple and negative opening of the possibility of a transformation in history. Yet is it possible to reactivate the notion of revolution in a nonrestrictive sense in order to think about the role and the possibility of political revolts and freedom today?
It can hardly be disputed that the theme of popularity is central to the Enlightenment. Popularity is the sociality equivalent to the individual appeal: 'Dare to know.' Parallel to this runs the following imperative: 'Dare to encourage your neighbour and your fellow man and woman to think on their own – even though they do not belong to the erudite elite.' It is also undeniable that Romantic authors and philosophers polemically attempted to tear down the popularity project of the Enlightenment, their main criticism being its tendency towards mediocrity. It is less well known that Romantic authors and philosophers themselves, around the turn of the nineteenth century, made popularity their central concern. To quote Friedrich Schlegel in the journal Athenaeum: 'The time of popularity has come.' This article explores the Romantics' alternative conception of popularity, with especial reference to Johann Gottlieb Fichte and the Grimm Brothers. To this end, it is helpful to reconstruct the background of the Romantic attempt to create an independent concept of popularity: the debate between Immanuel Kant and the German popular philosopher Christian Garve on the necessity, possibilities, and limits of popularity.
Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky's paper 'Cinematographic Aesthetics as Subversion of Moral Reason in Pasolini's Medea' explores the 1969 film "Medea". Pasolini's Medea, masterfully played by Maria Callas, betrays her homeland and her origin, stabs both her children, sets her house on fire, and dispossesses Jason of his sons' corpses. But Deuber-Mankowsky argues that it is ultimately not these acts that render the film particularly disturbing and disconcerting, but, rather, the fact that the spectator is left behind in suspension precisely because Medea cannot be easily condemned for her acts. Pasolini's film and its cinematographic aesthetics thereby not only subvert the projection of Medea into the prehistorical world of madness and perversion, but also undermine belief in the validity of the kind of moral rationality developed and constituted in an exemplary way by Immanuel Kant in his "Critique of Practical Reason". In particular, Pasolini seems to relate conceptually to Nietzsche's artistic-philosophical transfiguration of Dionysus and to accuse belief in a world of reasons of failing to grasp the groundlessness, irrationality, or even a-rationality of reason itself.
This paper addresses an event which started to be perceived and conceived of a long time ago. A change emerged in the 18th century which resulted in the focus of attention being directed onto the interrelationship of past, present and future within the history of European thinking. From this point on, the sciences were also provided with a past characterized by its inaccessibility, and a future characterized by its openness for things to come. From this time on, it was the present that served as a reference point for everything retrieved from the past and everything anticipated from the future - things in the present were thought to have originated in the past and were expected to point forward to the future. My presentation visits this experience as a dilemma in the decades that preceded and then witnessed its emergence, within the context of contemporary natural history and anthropology. In particular the paper will focus on those writings by Johann Gottfried Herder in which specific narratives mediate the problem of a creation which has fust come to its closure while at the same time still being in process; of a progress which is not developmental; of an event which is still suspended in its temporality. The anamnesis ofthe history of science is not for its own sake: the movements preceding the birth of the modern sciences provide important lessons for the process of their present day revision.