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This article discusses the potential of a historical approach to sustainability transformations. Using environmental issues and governance structures as case studies, it first describes how historical “sustainability transformations” can be conceptualized. It then suggests that 19th-century constitutional reforms can be read as attempts at reaching fiscal sustainability, whereas some social reforms can be interpreted as attempts to render the capitalist economy sustainable. In conclusion, the article highlights that the primary value of historical approaches to sustainability transformations will not lie in models, but in encouraging more creative questions.
Populists in the EU often call for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights. These calls are often demagogic and parochial. This paper aims to show what exactly is both distinct and problematic with these populist calls from a normative point of view while not necessarily reducible to demagogy and parochialism. The overall aim of the paper is not to argue that all populists call for such restrictions nor to claim that all calls for such restrictions are populist. The purpose of the paper is rather humble. It only aims to show that populist calls for restrictions on EU immigrants’ access to welfare rights are characterised by two normatively problematic arguments that target two different subsets of the citizenry: what I dub for the purpose of this paper the moralists and the immoralists. It is the way populists address these two subsets of the citizenry, as well as the fact that they could simultaneously appeal to the concerns of both groups, that makes populist approaches to welfare rights both conceptually distinct to other approaches as well as potentially politically appealing to a more diverse population of voters.
This article examines whether restrictions on access to welfare rights for EU immigrants are justifiable on grounds of reciprocity. Recently political theorists have supported some robust restrictions on the basis of fairness. They argue that if EU immigrants do not immediately contribute sufficiently to the provision of basic collective goods in the host state, restrictions on their access to the welfare state are justified. I argue that these accounts of the principle of reciprocity rely on an ambiguous conception of contribution that cannot deliver the restrictions it advocates. Several strategies open to those advocating reciprocity-based restrictions are considered and found wanting. This article defends that verdict from a number of objections.
The debate on effects of globalization on welfare states is extensive. Often couched in terms of a battle between the compensation and the efficiency thesis, the scholarly literature has provided contradictory arguments and findings. This article contributes to the scholarly debate by exploring in greater detail the micro-level foundations of compensation theory. More specifically, we distinguish between individual policy preferences for compensatory social policies (unemployment insurance) and human capital-focused social investment policies (education) and expect globalization to mainly affect demand for educational investment. A multi-level analysis of ISSP survey data provides empirical support for this hypothesis. This finding provides an important revision and extension of the classical analytical perspective of compensation theory, because it shows that citizens value the social investment function of the welfare state above and beyond simple compensation via social transfers. This might be particularly relevant in today's skill-centered knowledge economies.
The rule of law is unique establishment that had taken place in historical context, as politico-legal edifice of capitalist society. To the extent that any legal system was established in historical context, its form and functioning are cannot be channelled by reflections or professional commitments of lawyers and legal philosophers. The rule of law emerged in certain conditions that we say “classical liberalism”, of power allocation where we diversify political power and legal power in the milieu of political society, enunciated as republic or commonwealth. Contrary to earlier forms of legal order, capitalism was unique that its super structure was articulated according to the pivotal role of legal machinery. There was an actual equilibrium between legal and political domains that they moderately matched with public and private dichotomy. After monopoly capitalism, social setting of liberalism was dramatically incurred some major modifications which were firstly dislocation of liberal individual, incited by monopoly capital and secondly, political achievement of the working classes obtained political equality, as drastic consequence of mass society. Hence, the rule of law altered as depoliticsation of democratised mass society, instead of modus vivendi of liberal individuals, which demarcated the rule of law according to welfare society or sozialrechtsstaat. The neo-liberal globalisation after 1980’s, republican model of political society faded away that it has been transformed by transnational capital where markets, hierarchies, regionalism and communal settings crosscut inner equilibrium between politics and law. Finally, the newborn articulation of power structure undermined necessary basement of the rule of law.
It is theoretically clear and may be verified empirically that efficient financial markets can make it less necessary for policy to try and offset the welfare effects of labour income risk and unequal consumption dynamics. The literature has also pointed out that, since international competition exposes workers to new sources of risk at the same time as it makes it easier for individual choices to undermine collective policies, international economic integration makes insurance-oriented government policies more beneficial as well as more difficult to implement. This paper reviews the economic mechanisms underlying these insights and assesses their empirical relevance in cross-country panel data sets. Interactions between indicators of international economic integration, of government economic involvement, and of financial development are consistent with the idea that financial market development can substitute public schemes when economic integration calls for more effective household consumption smoothing. The paper’s theoretical perspective and empirical evidence suggest that to the extent that governments can foster financial market development by appropriate regulation and supervision, they should do so more urgently at times of intense and increasing internationalization of economic relationships. JEL Classification: G1, E21