Online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements
- We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (nonmonetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers’ registration decision. Finally, we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.
Author: | Florian Morath, Johannes Münster |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-429260 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595 |
ISBN: | 0025-1909 |
ISSN: | 0025-1909 |
Parent Title (English): | Management Science. Articles in Advance |
Publisher: | INFORMS |
Place of publication: | Hanover, Md |
Document Type: | Article |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2017 |
Date of first Publication: | 2017/01/05 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2017/02/28 |
Tag: | digital transformation; e-commerce; information; monopoly; platform design; price competition; privacy concerns; registration cost; security concerns |
Volume: | 74 |
Page Number: | 22 |
First Page: | 1 |
Last Page: | 21 |
Note: | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You are free to download this work and share with others, but cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work as “Management Science. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595, used under a Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.” |
HeBIS-PPN: | 451285735 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | ![]() |