Gewinnglättung und Steuerung dezentraler Investitionsentscheidungen bei sich gegenseitig ausschließenden Investitionsprojekten

  • This paper examines the provision of managerial investment incentives by an accounting based incentive scheme in a multiperiod agency setting in which an impatient manager has to choose between mutually exclusive investment projects. We study the properties of accounting rules that motivate an impatient manager to exert unobservable effort and to make optimal investment decisions. In this analysis, a realized cash flow constitutes a noisy signal that contains information about the unknown profitability of the investment project. By observing these signals a principal is able to revise his prior beliefs about the agent´s investment decision. The revision of the principal´s prior beliefs leads to a trade off between the provision of efficient investment incentives and intertemporalsharing of output.

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Author:Christian Gaber
Parent Title (English):Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 99
Series (Serial Number):Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (99)
Publisher:Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2002
Year of first Publication:2002
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2005/10/07
GND Keyword:Investitionsentscheidung; Gewinnglättung
Page Number:34
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht