Project selection, income smoothing, and Bayesian learning
- Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for efficient project selection. In order to motivate a shortsighted manager to expend unobservable effort and to make efficient investment decisions, the principal sets up an incentive scheme based on residual income (e.g. EVATM). The paper shows that income smoothing generates a trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the costs associated with the "congruity" of residual earnings.
| Author: | Christian Gaber |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-17882 |
| Parent Title (English): | Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 116 |
| Series (Serial Number): | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (116) |
| Publisher: | Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |
| Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2003 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2003 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2005/10/07 |
| Tag: | Investment Incentives; Performance Measurement; Residual Income |
| GND Keyword: | Bilanzierungsgrundsätze; Investitionsentscheidung |
| Page Number: | 40 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 203863186 |
| Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
