An international relations perspective on the convergence of corporate governance: German shareholder capitalism and the European Union, 1999-2000

  • The corporate convergence debate is usually presented in terms of competing efficiency and political claims. Convergence optimists assert that an economic logic will promote convergence on the most efficient form of economic organization, usually taken to be the public corporation governed under rules designed to maximize shareholder value. Convergence skeptics counterclaim that organizational diversity is possible, even probable, because of path dependent development of institutional complementarities whose abandonment is likely to be inefficient. The skeptics also assert that existing elites will use their political and economic advantages to block reform; the optimists counterclaim that the spread of shareholding will reshape politics.

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Author:Jeffrey N. Gordon
Parent Title (German):Institut für Bankrecht (Frankfurt, Main): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 108
Series (Serial Number):Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht (108)
Publisher:Institut für Bankrecht
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2002
Year of first Publication:2002
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2005/04/11
Issue:Draft of 12/30/02
Page Number:76
Institutes:Rechtswissenschaft / Rechtswissenschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht / 340 Recht
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht