What kind of minded being has language : anticipatory dynamics, arguability and agency in a normatively and transforming learning system ; part 1

  • Theories of cognition that are based on information processing and representation are reactive (Rosen, 1985) or backwards looking, not anticipatory. In a previous article (Thibault, 2005a), I looked at the reasons why humans and bonobos do not need an innate language faculty in order to be minded, languaging beings. The present article takes up some of the questions explored there, but, it asks, on the other hand, what sort of a minded agent has language and what kind of account of language and more broadly meaning do we need to explain minded, languaged agents and the activities they participate in? Following Rosen (1985), I also take up and further develop a point first raised in Thibault (2004a: 187) on language as an anticipatory system, rather than a reactively ‘representational’ one (see also Bickhard, 2005).

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Author:Paul J. Thibault
Parent Title (English):Linguistics and the human sciences
Document Type:Article
Date of Publication (online):2008/04/17
Year of first Publication:2005
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2008/04/17
Page Number:75
First Page:261
Last Page:335
Signatur: Zs 24597 HM 5: G 429
Dewey Decimal Classification:4 Sprache / 40 Sprache / 400 Sprache
Licence (German):License LogoArchivex. zur Lesesaalplatznutzung § 52b UrhG