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“Institutional Overburdening” to a large extent was a consequence of the “Great Moderation”. This term indicates that it was a period in which inflation had come down from rather high levels. Growth and employment were at least satisfying and variability of output had substantially declined. It was almost unavoidable that as a consequence expectations on future actions of central banks and their ability to control the economy reached an unprecedented peak which was hardly sustainable. Institutional overburdening has two dimensions. One is coming from exaggerated expectations on what central banks can achieve (“expectational overburdening”). The other dimension is “operational overburdening” i.e. overloading the central bank with more and more responsibilities and competences.
n a contribution prepared for the Athens Symposium on “Banking Union, Monetary Policy and Economic Growth”, Otmar Issing describes forward guidance by central banks as the culmination of the idea of guiding expectations by pure communication. In practice, he argues, forward guidance has proved a misguided idea. What is presented as state of the art monetary policy is an example of pretence of knowledge. Forward guidance tries to give the impression of a kind of rule-based monetary policy. De facto, however, it is an overambitious discretionary approach which, to be successful, would need much more (or rather better) information than is currently available. In Issing's view, communication must be clear and honest about the limits of monetary policy in a world of uncertainty.
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007, policymakers were forced to respond quickly and forcefully to a recession caused not by short-term factors, but rather by an over-accumulation of debt by sovereigns, banks, and households: a so-called “balance sheet recession.” Though the nature of the crisis was understood relatively early on, policy prescriptions for how to deal with its consequences have continued to diverge. This paper gives a short overview of the prescriptions, the remaining challenges and key lessons for monetary policy.
Spätestens seit die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) ihr Ankaufprogramm für Wertpapiere bekannt gegeben hat, ist die Diskussion über die Wirksamkeit dieser Maßnahmen auch in Europa angekommen. Wegen der besonderen institutionellen Umstände des Euroraums – Kauf von Anleihen der einzelnen Nationalstaaten und des Verbots der monetären Finanzierung – reichen die möglichen Nebenwirkungen hierzulande über den rein geldpolitischen Horizont hinaus.
This paper outlines important lessons for monetary policy. In particular, the role of inflation targeting, which was much acclaimed prior to the financial crisis and since then has not lost much of its endorsement, is critically reviewed. Ignoring the relation between monetary policy and asset prices, as is the case in this monetary policy approach, can lead to financial instability. In contrast, giving, inter alia, monetary factors a role in central banks’ policy decisions, as is done in the ECB’s encompassing approach, helps prevent these potentially harmful side effects and thus allows for fostering financial stability. Finally, this paper makes a case against increasing the central banks’ inflation target. JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58 Keywords: Inflation Targeting, Asset Prices, Financial Stability, ECB
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. One of the major lessons from the current financial crisis refers to the systemic dimension of financial risk which had been almost completely neglected by bankers and supervisors in the pre-2007 years. 2. Accordingly, the most needed change in financial regulation, in order to avoid a repetition of such a crisis in the future, consists of influencing individual bank behaviour such that systemic risk is decreased. This objective is new and distinct from what Basle II was intended to achieve. 3. It is important, therefore, to evaluate proposed new regulatory instruments on the ground of whether or not they contribute to a reduction, or containment of systemic risk. We see two new regulatory measures of paramount importance: the introduction of a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), and the implementation of a transparent bank resolution regime. Both measures complement each other, thus both have to be realized to be effective. 4. We propose a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), a levy capturing the contribution of any individual bank to the overall systemic risk which is distinct from the institution’s own default risk. The SRC is set up such that the more systemic risk a bank contributes, the higher is the cost it has to bear. Therefore, the SRC serves to internalize the cost of systemic risk which, up to now, was borne by the taxpayer. 5. Major details of our SRC refer to the use of debt that may be converted into equity when systemic risk threatens the stability of the banking system. Also, the SRC raises some revenues for government. 6. The SRC has to be compared to several bank levies currently debated. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) does not directly address systemic risk and is therefore inferior to a SRC. Nevertheless, a FTT may offer the opportunity to subsidize on-exchange trading at the expense of off-exchange (over-the-counter, OTC) transactions, thereby enhancing financial market stability. The Financial Activity Tax (FAT) is similar to a VAT on financial services. It is the least adequate instrument among all instruments discussed above to limit systemic risk. 7. Bank resolution regime: No instrument to contain systemic risk can be effective unless the restructuring of bank debt, and the ensuing loss given default to creditors, is a real possibility. As the crisis has taught, bank restructuring is very difficult in light of contagion risk between major banks. We therefore need a regulatory procedure that allows winding down banks, even large banks, on short notice. Among other things, the procedure will require to distinguish systemically relevant exposures from those that are irrelevant. Only the former will be saved with government money, and it will then be the task of the supervisor to ensure a sufficient amount of nonsystemically relevant debt on the balance sheet of all banks. 8. Further issues discussed in this policy paper and its appendices refer to the necessity of a global level playing field, or the lack thereof, for these new regulatory measures; the convergence of our SRC proposal with what is expected to be long-term outcome of Basle III discussions; as well as the role of global imbalances.
Deutschland und Europa
(2018)
Otmar Issing erörtert die Reaktionen in Deutschland auf die Pläne des französischen Präsidenten Macron aus dessen viel beachteter Rede zur Zukunft Europas an der Pariser Sorbonne. Issing wertet das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche zwischen CDU/CSU und SPD als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft und mahnt an, den einheitlichen Markt und die damit verbundenen Freiheiten nicht durch überzogene Ambitionen zu gefährden und damit zunehmendes Misstrauen gegenüber Europa zu fördern.
Insbesondere in der geplanten Weiterentwicklung des ESM zu einem im Unionsrecht verankerten Europäischen Währungsfonds sieht Issing die Auslieferung der durch den Fonds zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel an eine politische Mehrheit. Zudem führe die Bestellung eines europäischen Finanzministers zur Schaffung einer die Währungsunion ergänzenden Fiskalunion und damit zur Verlagerung finanzpolitischer Kompetenz von der nationalen auf die europäische Ebene. In letzter Konsequenz bedeute dies eine Aufgabe des grundlegenden Prinzips der demokratischen Legitimierung und Kontrolle finanzpolitischer Entscheidungen.
Das Ergebnis der Sondierungsgespräche muss man als Abschied von der Vorstellung einer auf Stabilität gerichteten europäischen Gemeinschaft verstehen. Damit werden die Versprechen gebrochen, die man den Bürgern in Deutschland vor der Einführung des Euros gegeben hat.
Content A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, INCLUDING MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS B. COMPLETE REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 2. RISK MAP 2.1 Why a Risk Map is needed, and for what purpose 2.1.1 Creating a unified data base 2.1.2 Assessing systemic risk 2.1.3 Allowing for coordinated policy action 2.2 Recommendations 3. GLOBAL REGISTER FOR LOANS (CREDIT REGISTER) AND BONDS (SECURITIES REGISTER) 3.1 Objectives of a credit register 3.2 Credit registers in Europe (and beyond) 3.3 Suggestions for a supra-national Credit Register 3.4 Integrating a supra-national Securities Register 3.5 Recommendations 4. HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 4.1 What are hedge funds (activities, location, size, regulation)? 4.2 What are the risks posed by hedge funds (systematic risks, interaction with prime brokers)? 4.3 Routes to better regulation (direct, indirect) 4.4 Recommendations 5. RATING AGENCIES: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 5.1 The role of ratings in bond and structured finance markets, past and present 5.2 Elements of rating integrity (independence, compensation and incentives, transparency) 5.3 Recommendations (registration, transparency, annual report on rating performance) 6. PROCYCLICALITY: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 6.1 What is meant by “procyclicality” and why is it a problem? 6.2 The roots of procyclicality and the lessons it suggests for policymakers 6.2.1 Underpinnings of the phenomenon 6.2.2 Lessons to be learned 6.3 Characteristics of a macrofinancial stability framework 6.4 Recommendations 7. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORA, IN PARTICULAR THE IMF, BIS AND FSF 7.1 Legitimacy 7.2 Re-focusing the work 7.3 Recommendations
Content New Financial Architecture (Short Version) 1. Purpose of the paper – causes of the crisis 2. Recommendations 2.1. Incentives 2.2. Transparency 2.3. Regulation and Supervision 2.4. International Institutions 3. Concluding remarks Appendix (Full text) A 1. Causes of the crisis A 2. Improving the Framework A 2.1. Incentives A 2.2. Transparency A 2.3. Regulation and Supervision A 2.4. International Institutions A 3. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
In this paper, we provide some reflections on the development of monetary theory and monetary policy over the last 150 years. Rather than presenting an encompassing overview, which would be overambitious, we simply concentrate on a few selected aspects that we view as milestones in the development of this subject. We also try to illustrate some of the interactions with the political and financial system, academic discussion and the views and actions of central banks.
Wie in der Medizin muss der Therapie die Diagnose vorausgehen. Allzu viele Vorschläge zur Lösung der Krise gehen nicht zuletzt deshalb in die falsche Richtung, weil sie eine adäquate Ursachenanalyse vermissen lassen. Wird der Fiskalpakt Europa aus der Krise führen? Die Europäische Währungsordnung ist ein Produkt politischer Entscheidungen, gegossen in europäisches und nationales Recht. Wie glaubwürdig ist das Versprechen, durch neues Recht, härtere vertragliche Bestimmungen, Fehlverhalten in Zukunft zu verhindern, wenn das geltende Recht so gering geachtet wird?
Der Beitrag analysiert die Voraussetzungen für stabiles Geld und setzt sich dabei grundlegend mit Hayeks Thesen zu alternativen Währungssystemen sowie dessen fundamentaler Kritik an der Möglichkeit zur Gestaltung der Geldpolitik auf wissenschaftlicher Basis auseinander. Er prüft Hayeks Vorschlag zur Entnationalisierung des Geldes und seine Thesen zur Überlegenheit des im privaten Wettbewerb geschaffenen Geldes. In diesem Zusammenhang schlägt der Beitrag einen Bogen zur aktuellen Diskussion über Kryptowährungen und wirft die Frage auf, ob virtuelle Währungen wie etwa Bitcoin geeignet sind, den Hayekschen Währungswettbewerb zu entfalten. Sodann wird im Gegensatz zu Hayeks Forderung nach einer Abschaffung der Zentralbanken deren entscheidende Rolle für anhaltendes Wachstum bei stabilen Preisen skizziert und die Wichtigkeit der Unabhängigkeit von Notenbanken für die dauerhafte Durchführung einer stabilitätsorientierten Geldpolitik hervorgehoben. Gleichwohl ergeht der Hinweis, dass Notenbanken mit der Überschreitung ihres Mandats auf lange Sicht gesehen selbst den Status ihrer Unabhängigkeit unterminieren können und damit die Rückübertragung der Kompetenz für zentrale geldpolitische Entscheidungen auf Regierung und Parlament provozieren. Die Gefahren der weitgehenden Unabhängigkeit einiger weniger an der Spitze der Notenbanken anerkennend wird anschließend die Bedeutung ihrer Rechenschaftspflicht und Transparenz ihrer Entscheidungen unterstrichen.