Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (21)
- Part of Periodical (2)
Has Fulltext
- yes (23)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (23)
Keywords
- Disclosure (6)
- Banks (3)
- Aggregate outcomes (2)
- Auditing (2)
- Bank regulation (2)
- Business lending (2)
- Deutschland (2)
- Enforcement (2)
- Entry and exit (2)
- Fair value accounting (2)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (23) (remove)
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks’ assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.
Accounting for financial stability: Bank disclosure and loss recognition in the financial crisis
(2020)
This paper examines banks’ disclosures and loss recognition in the financial crisis and identifies several core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks’ disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks’ exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, the recognition of loan losses was relatively slow and delayed relative to prevailing market expectations. Among the possible explanations for this evidence, our analysis suggests that banks’ reporting incentives played a key role, which has important implications for bank supervision and the new expected loss model for loan accounting. We also provide evidence that shielding regulatory capital from accounting losses through prudential filters can dampen banks’ incentives for corrective actions. Overall, our analysis reveals several important challenges if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.
This paper investigates what we can learn from the financial crisis about the link between accounting and financial stability. The picture that emerges ten years after the crisis is substantially different from the picture that dominated the accounting debate during and shortly after the crisis. Widespread claims about the role of fair-value (or mark-to-market) accounting in the crisis have been debunked. However, we identify several other core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks’ disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks’ exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, banks delayed the recognition of loan losses. Banks’ incentives seem to drive this evidence, suggesting that reporting discretion and enforcement deserve careful consideration. In addition, bank regulation through its interlinkage with financial accounting may have dampened banks’ incentives for corrective actions. Our analysis illustrates that a number of serious challenges remain if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.
The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.
Economic theory suggests that a commitment by a firm to increased levels of disclosure should lower the information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of capital. But whi le the theory is compelling, so far empirical results relating increased levels of disclosure to measurable economic benefits have been mixed. One explanation for the mixed results among studies using data from firms publicly registered in the US is that, under current US reporting standards, the disclosure environment is already rich. In this paper, we study German firms that have switched from the German to an international reporting regime (IAS or US -GAAP), thereby committing themselves to increased le vels of disclosure. We show that proxies for the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital for the switching firms, namely the bid-ask spread and trading volume, behave in the predicted direction compared to firms employing the German reporti ng regime.
This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements over time. While cash flow statement are mandated under many GAAP regimes, its disclosure has not been mandatory in Germany until recently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of firms provides cash flow statements voluntarily. These firms are likely to be influenced by recommendations of the German accounting profession, IAS 7 as well as the respective standards of other countries. The idea of the paper is to study this influence by looking at the adoption pattern over time and the format of the cash flow statement. It documents the development of voluntary cash flow statement disclosures by German firms with respect to ”milestones” in the evolution of German professional recommendations and respective international standards. The cross-sectional determinants of voluntary and international cash flow statements are analyzed using probit regressions and factor analysis. The results are generally consistent with the idea that capital-market forces drive voluntary cash flow statements that are in line with international reporting practice.
Discretionary disclosure theory suggests that firms' incentives to provide proprietary versus nonproprietary information differ markedly. To test this conjecture, the paper investigates the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose business segment reports and cash flow statements in their annual financial reports. While the former is likely to reveal proprietary information to competitors, the latter is less proprietary in nature. Using these proxies for proprietary and non-proprietary disclosures, respectively, I find that the determinants or at least their relative magnitudes differ in a way consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. That is, cash flow statement disclosures appear to be governed primarily by capital-market considerations, whereas segment disclosures are more strongly associated with proxies for product-market and proprietary-cost considerations.
This paper investigates whether firms employing IAS or US GAAP exhibit measurable differences in proxies for information asymmetry and market liquidity. Sample firms are drawn from the "New Market" at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. All firms listed in this market segment are required to provide financial statements in accordance with either IAS or US GAAP as part of the listing agreement. The sample choice provides a market-based comparison of the two standards holding disclosure requirements and standard enforcement constant. I find that differences in the bid-ask spread and trading volume are relatively small and more likely to be driven by firm characteristics than the choice of accounting standards. In contrast, New Market firms have lower spreads and higher turnover when compared with size-matched firms in other market segments following German GAAP. The results suggests that rigid disclosure regulation of the New Market matters in terms of information asymmetry and liquidity, but that the choice between IAS and US GAAP is of second order importance.
JEL Classification: D82, G30, M41