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THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS CALLS FOR A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF BANKING SYSTEM STABILITY. WE ANALYZE GERMAN BANKS FROM A LIQUIDITY PERSPECTIVE TO ANSWER HOW FRAGILE THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM IS AND HOW WELL IT CAN COPE WITH SUDDEN ILLIQUIDITY SHOCKS. RESULTS SHOW THAT ALTHOUGH BANKS CREATE LIQUIDITY FOR THE GERMAN ECONOMY AND THEREBY EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO ILLIQUIDITY RISK, THE AGGREGATE BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURES ARE SAFE AND STABLE.
WE STUDY WHETHER PRIVATE EQUITY (PE) FIRMS HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF THEIR GERMAN PORTFOLIO COMPANIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE IPO. OUR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IS BASED ON A UNIQUE AND LARGE DATASET OF ALL IPOS IN GERMANY BETWEEN 2000 AND 2007. WE FIND THAT PE FIRMS SELECT COMPANIES WITH BELOW AVERAGE PERFORMANCE AND THEN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE SUBSTANTIALLY UNTIL THE IPO DATE AND IN MANY CASES ALSO THEREAFTER. THIS IMPLIES THAT PE FIRMS FILL A VOID ALSO IN GERMAN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THAT THEY WILL ALSO PLAY A FUTURE ROLE IN FINANCING GERMAN ENTERPRISES.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
In the United States, on April 1, 2014, the set of rules commonly known as the "Volcker Rule", prohibiting proprietary trading activities in banks, became effective. The implementation of this rule took more than three years, as “proprietary trading” is an inherently vague concept, overlapping strongly with genuinely economically useful activities such as market-making. As a result, the final Rule is a complex and lengthy combination of prohibitions and exemptions.
In January 2014, the European Commission put forward its proposal on banking structural reform. The proposal includes a Volcker-like provision, prohibiting large, systemically relevant financial institutions from engaging in proprietary trading or hedge fund-related business. This paper offers lessons to be learned from the implementation process for the Volcker rule in the US for the European regulatory process.