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Institute
We analyze incentives for loan officers in a model with hidden action, limited liability and truth-telling constraints under the assumption that the principal has private information from an automatic scoring system. First we show that the truth-telling problem reduces the bank’s expected profit whenever the loan officer cannot only conceal bad types, but can also falsely report bad types. Second, we investigate whether the bank should reveal her private information to the agent. We show that this depends on the percentage of good loans in the population and on the signal’s informativeness. Though we had to define different regions for different parameters, we concluded that it might often be favorable to not reveal the signal. This contradicts current practice.
Our article integrates the manager’s care in the literature on auditor’s liability. With unobservable efforts, we face a double moral hazard setting. It is well-known that efficient liability rules without punitive damages do not exist under these circumstances. However, we show that the problem can be solved through strict liability, contingent auditing fees, and fair insurance contracts. Neither punitive damages nor deductibles above the damages are required.