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During the last decade, there has been a significant bias towards bond financing on emerging markets, with private investors relying on a bail-out of bonds by the international community. The bias has been a main cause for recent excessive fragility of international capital markets. The paper shows how collective action clauses in bonds contracts help to involve the private sector in risk sharing. It argues that such clauses, as a market based instrument, will raise spreads for emerging market debt and so help to correct a market failure towards excessive bond finance. Recent pressure by the IMF to involve the private sector is facing a conflict between the principle to honour existing contracts and the principle of equal treatment of bondholders.
Models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks. Morris and Shin (1998) have shown that, in the context of those models, unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced. In this paper, we generalize the results of Morris and Shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show - using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies - that uniqueness will hold, even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents. We provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyse the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack. For the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals, we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks. JEL Classification F 31, D 82