Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
- 2005 (2)
Dokumenttyp
- Bericht (1)
- Arbeitspapier (1)
Sprache
- Englisch (2)
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (2) (entfernen)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- nein (2)
Schlagworte
- Asymmetrische Information (2) (entfernen)
Institut
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (2) (entfernen)
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.