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The paper provides novel insights on the effect of a firm’s risk management objective on the optimal design of risk transfer instruments. I analyze the interrelation between the structure of the optimal insurance contract and the firm’s objective to minimize the required equity it has to hold to accommodate losses in the presence of multiple risks and moral hazard. In contrast to the case of risk aversion and moral hazard, the optimal insurance contract involves a joint deductible on aggregate losses in the present setting.
We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters’ incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important for universal banks to enter the investment banking business; second, that cross-selling is particularly attractive for highly leveraged borrowers; third, that less-than-market rates are no prerequisite for cross-selling to benefit a bank’s clients. In our model, cross-selling reduces rents in the underwriting business.