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This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation, and the probability that a desired level of care is met by the audi tor if competitive liability insurance markets exist. Furthermore, our model explains the existence of insurance contracts containing obligations - a type of contract often observed in liability insurance markets.
Our article integrates the manager’s care in the literature on auditor’s liability. With unobservable efforts, we face a double moral hazard setting. It is well-known that efficient liability rules without punitive damages do not exist under these circumstances. However, we show that the problem can be solved through strict liability, contingent auditing fees, and fair insurance contracts. Neither punitive damages nor deductibles above the damages are required.