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Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa : ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität
(2001)
Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des Pensionssystems eines Landes? Weil dieser Zusammenhang wichtig sein könnte, wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht, ob es Unterschiede zwischen den Finanz- und Pensionssystemen in drei großen europäischen Ländern, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, gibt, ob sich diese Unterschiede in charakteristischer Weise entsprechen und ob sich über diese Entsprechungen hinaus auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Finanzsystem und dem Pensionssystem eines Landes nachweisen lassen.
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in einem ersten Schritt kurz die Unterschiedlichkeit der Finanz- und Pensionssysteme zwischen den drei Ländern skizziert, und es werden parallelen zwischen diesen Unterschieden nachgewiesen. Daran anschließend werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Alterssicherung und der volkswirtschaftlichen Risikoallokation sowie der Ausgestaltung der betrieblichen Alterssicherung für die Unternehmensstrategien, -finanzierung und –verfassung betrachtet. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass es sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Großbritannien eine – wenn auch vollkommen unterschiedlich ausgeprägte – Komplementarität zwischen Finanz- und Pensionssystem gibt, während sich ein solcher Zusammenhang für Frankreich nicht konstatieren lässt. Abschließend werden wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen dieses Zusammenhangs angesprochen
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.
Der folgende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, wie die Verteilung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten in Unternehmen im Rahmen der Corporate Governance ausgestaltet werden kann. Im Zentrum der Überlegungen steht die Frage, welcher der am Unternehmen beteiligten Interessengruppen diese Rechte sinnvollerweise zukommen sollten. Insbesondere die beiden polaren Systeme - das auf dem Shareholder-Value-Primat aufbauende System einer ausschließlich im Interesse der Aktionäre geführten Unternehmung auf der eine Seite - und einem Corporate Governance-System, das die Interessen aller am Unternehmen beteiligten Stakeholder berücksichtigt, auf der anderen Seite - werden geschildert und mit den Mitteln der ökonomischen Theorie bewertet. Spezifische Investitionen möglicher Stakeholder und die Institutionen und Mechanismen, die eine Absicherung der daraus entstehenden ökonomischen Renten für die jeweiligen Stakeholder erlauben, sind damit wichtige Bestimmungsparameter für die Unternehmensverfassung. Insbesondere die Existenz und Güte von Märkten innerhalb des Finanzsystems, in dem ein Unternehmen tätig ist, lassen das ein oder das andere Corporate Governance-System vorteilhafter erscheinen. Überlegungen zu anderen möglichen Mechanismen, die auf der internen Organisation von Unternehmungen basieren und dadurch eine Feinsteuerung von Entscheidungs- und Handlungsrechten - und der damit verbundenen Machtverteilung zwischen den Interessengruppen im Unternehmen - erlaubt, schließen die Arbeit ab.
Die durch jahrzehntelange Planwirtschaft geprägten Strukturen sind in Russland noch fest verwurzelt. Dementsprechend ist das Bankensystem auch zwölf Jahre nach dem Ende des kommunistischen Regimes unterentwickelt. Die markantesten Merkmale der Finanzwirtschaft sind die ungewöhnliche Größenstruktur der Banken; deren Schwierigkeiten, die rapide zunehmende Zahl kleinster, kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen mit Finanzdienstleistungen zu versorgen sowie die geringe Rolle ausländischer Banken. Überdies sind die weiterhin bestehenden Systemrisiken nicht zu unterschätzen.
The paper is a follow-up to an article published in Technique Financière et Developpement in 2000 (see the appendix to the hardcopy version), which portrayed the first results of a new strategy in the field of development finance implemented in South-East Europe. This strategy consists in creating microfinance banks as greenfield investments, that is, of building up new banks which specialise in providing credit and other financial services to micro and small enterprises, instead of transforming existing credit-granting NGOs into formal banks, which had been the dominant approach in the 1990s. The present paper shows that this strategy has, in the course of the last five years, led to the emergence of a network of microfinance banks operating in several parts of the world. After discussing why financial sector development is a crucial determinant of general social and economic development and contrasting the new strategy to former approaches in the area of development finance, the paper provides information about the shareholder composition and the investment portfolio of what is at present the world's largest and most successful network of microfinance banks. This network is a good example of a well-functioning "private public partnership". The paper then provides performance figures and discusses why the creation of such a network seems to be a particularly promising approach to the creation of financially self-sustaining financial institutions with a clear developmental objective.
We investigate the connection between corporate governance system configurations and the role of intermediaries in the respective systems from a informational perspective. Building on the economics of information we show that it is meaningful to distinguish between internalisation and externalisation as two fundamentally different ways of dealing with information in corporate governance systems. This lays the groundwork for a description of two types of corporate governance systems, i.e. insider control system and outsider control system, in which we focus on the distinctive role of intermediaries in the production and use of information. It will be argued that internalisation is the prevailing mode of information processing in insider control system while externalisation dominates in outsider control system. We also discuss shortly the interrelations between the prevailing corporate governance system and types of activities or industry structures supported.