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Institute
The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 (DFA) was the legislative response by the US Government to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007. DFA’s rescission of Rule 436 (g) of the Securities Act of 1933 - the exemption from liability clause - was the response to the post-crisis perception that credit rating agencies were insufficiently constrained by reputational risk considerations and consistently failed to provide high quality and accurate credit ratings as a consequence of the immunity they enjoyed and the regulatory reliance placed on ratings, as well as the conflicts of interest that they faced. This paper investigates whether the market failure event that occurred in the Asset Backed Securities market immediately after DFA was signed into law on July 21, 2010 was due to real economic concerns held by rating agencies about operating under a liability regime or whether it was merely an act of brinkmanship on the part of the rating agencies. The paper also predominantly examines US case law to identify the dilution of the freedom of speech defence in state courts, the conflict of interest issues and the legal challenges faced by plaintiffs when bringing a lawsuit against credit rating agencies, and proposes a novel co-pay and capped liability model to address the concerns of both credit rating agencies and investors.
The expansion of actors and instruments in sovereign debt markets through bond financing generated a coordination problem among bondholders during the debt restructuring process. There is a risk that an individual bondholder will be passive or act against the restructuring slowing down or even precluding the process of restructuring even though it is in the general interest of bondholders as a group, not to mention the population of the country experiencing the shortage of funds for public welfare. In particular, the disruptions to sovereign debt restructuring by frivolous litigation is considered as one of the main threats.
This dissertation is the first major study devoted to sovereign bonds structured through a trust arrangement and the promising features that such a legal structure possesses for an effective and efficient sovereign debt restructuring. It provides a comprehensive inquiry into the evolution of the mechanisms to coordinate creditors, with a focus on bondholders and institutional frameworks which facilitated this coordination. It examines intriguing primary sources from League of Nations archives and provides in-depth case studies on the functionality of the trustees in sovereign bond restructurings performed by Argentina in 2016 and Ecuador in 2008.
Assessing the utility of trust arrangements to address coordination problems, this thesis is driven by the puzzle: How to better balance (i) the need for smooth sovereign debt restructurings, which by definition entails some losses for creditors, with (ii) bondholders’ legitimate interests? What approach can be used in constructing a legal and institutional framework for trustees to promote the best interest of the bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring? As a solution, it seems that incentives for bond trustees to pursue debt sustainability will achieve both goals.
In this regard, recognition of the concept of debt sustainability, being in substance the IMF and WB debt sustainability assessment, as the best interest of bondholders in sovereign debt restructuring is beneficial from multiple aspects. It enables a bond trustee to excel in its role as a guardian of bondholders by following the best interest of bondholders in exercising its discretion. Moreover, it fosters an equilibrium between the interests of private creditors and a state taking into account its socio-political aspects.