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Das westphälische Modell für Staatsinstitutionen, einschließlich nationaler Exekutive, Legislative und Judikative, hat sich aus den Ereignissen europäischer Geschichte heraus entwickelt. Seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges dient es als grundlegendes Paradigma für Internationale Interventionen zum Wiederaufbau von gescheiterten - oder zum Aufbau von neuen - Staaten. Für die internationale Gemeinschaft fungiert das westphälische Modell als Maß zur Beurteilung ihrer Interventionen, wie zum Beispiel in Somalia, Kambodscha oder den Balkanstaaten. In den meisten Fällen gilt eine durch sie beaufsichtigte oder gar durchgeführte ‚freie und faire’ Wahl als hauptsächliche Massnahme zur Bildung eines ‚westphälischen’ und demokratischen Staates. Die Erfolgsrate solcher internationalen Friedenseinsätze und ‚state-building operations’ ist jedoch enttäuschend. Bei näherer Betrachtung der Misserfolge des letzten Jahrzehnts wird deutlich, daß sich die lokalen Gesellschaftssysteme der betroffenen Bevölkerungen oft beträchtlich von liberaler Demokratie unterscheiden. Dies ist insbesondere der Fall in Gesellschaften deren Ordnung nicht auf Staatsinstiutionen basiert. Ihnen liegen sozio-politische Systeme zugrunde die sich oft mit dem Paradigma des westlichen Staatssystems nur schwer vereinen lassen. Um im Rahmen internationaler Friedenseinsätze erfolgreich Staatstrukturen zu etablieren, ist es daher notwendig lokale Sozialstrukturen und lokale Konzepte politischer Legitimität und Autorität zu addressieren. Erst mit solchem Verständnis ist es möglich einen Staatsapparat in den Augen der Bevölkerung zu legitimieren. Ist Letzteres nicht der Fall, so kann sich eine Regierung zwar in Übereinstimmung mit internationalen Menschenrechten befinden, oder alle wichtigen demokratischen Einrichtungen vorweisen, jedoch dennoch dem Prinzip der Partizipation durch die Bevölkerung widersprechen. Ist dies das Endresultat eines internationalen Friedenseinsatzes, so hat die internationale Gemeinschaft ihre eigenen Werte bestaetigt. Jedoch herrscht kein Vertrauen zwischen der Bevölkerung und Regierung, da letztere nicht kompatibel mit dem Versaendnis der Bürger ist. Der ‚demokratische’ Staat ist nur schwerlich funktionsfähig.Der internationale Einsatz in Osttimor illustriert dieses Problem. Hier wurden die Vereinten Nationen (VN) mit dem Wiederaufbau und der Verwaltung eines Staates betraut (UNTAET ‚Übergangsregierung der Vereinten Nationen in Osttimor’). Zum ersten mal in der Geschichte übernahm die international Gemeinschaft damit die Souveränität über ein territoriales Gebiet...
This thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. In a first step, it is argued on phenomenological grounds that consciousness is a representational state and that explaining consciousness requires a study of the brain’s representational capacities. In a second step, Bayesian cognitive science and predictive processing are introduced as the most promising attempts to understand mental representation to date. Finally, in a third step, the thesis argues that the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” can be resolved if one adopts a form of metaphysical anti-realism that can be motivated in terms of core principles of Bayesian cognitive science.
Development economists have suggested that the hopes of the poor are a relevant factor in overcoming poverty. I argue that Kant’s approach to hope provides an important complement to the economists’ perspective. A Kantian account of hope emphasizes the need for the rationality of hope and thereby guards against problematic aspects of the economists’ discourse on hope. Section 1 introduces recent work on hope in development economics. Section 2 clarifies Kant’s question “What may I hope?” and presents the outlines of his answer. Crucially, hope is rational if it is rational to trust in the structures of reality on which the realization of one’s hope depends. Section 3 argues that central tenets of Kant’s account of what makes hope rational can be applied to the context of poverty. It becomes apparent that the poor often have good reason to be hopeless since they may not trust fundamental structures that are necessary for realizing their hope. Thus, the insight that the poor need more hope must go hand in hand with a commitment to establishing trustworthy political structures, such that their hope can be rational. Section 4 highlights the relevance of the secular highest good for a better understanding of the justification and scope of our duties to the poor in a Kantian framework.
A remark on the bank cases
(2021)
Since their formulation by Keith DeRose (1992), the so-called bank cases have played a major role in the discussion about whether knowledge depends on practical factors. According to the proponents of pragmatic encroachment, the proper conclusion to be drawn from the bank cases and similar examples is that knowledge of a proposition p does not supervene on one’s evidence for or against p. In my view, this conclusion is ill-founded. The reason is that the bank cases and similar examples suffer from an ambiguity concerning the known proposition — an ambiguity that has so far been overlooked. When this ambiguity is made explicit, it becomes clear that the conclusion does not follow.
A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences.
It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.
Rational agency is of central interest to philosophy, with evolutionary accounts of the cognitive underpinnings of rational agency being much debated. Yet one building block—our ability to argue—is less studied, except Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory (Mercier and Sperber in Behav Brain Sci 34(02):57–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968 [Titel anhand dieser DOI in Citavi-Projekt übernehmen] , 2011, in The enigma of reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2017). I discuss their account and argue that it faces a lacuna: It cannot explain the origin of argumentation as a series of small steps that reveal how hominins with baseline abilities of the trait in question could turn into full-blown owners of it. This paper then provides a first sketch of the desired evolutionary trajectory. I argue that reasoning coevolves with the ability to coordinate behavior. After that, I establish a model based on niche construction theory. This model yields a story with following claims. First, argumentation came into being during the Oldowan period as a tool for justifying information ‘out of sight’. Second, argumentation enabled hominins to solve collective action problems with collaborators out of sight, which stabilized argumentative practices eventually. Archeological findings are discussed to substantiate both claims. I conclude with outlining changes resultant from my model for the concept of rational agency.
Explaining humans as rational creatures—capable of deductive reasoning—remains challenging for evolutionary naturalism. Schechter (Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1)437–464, 2011, 2013) proposes to link the evolution of this kind of reasoning with the ability to plan. His proposal, however, does neither include any elaborated theory on how logical abilities came into being within the hominin lineage nor is it sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. I present such a theory in broad outline and substantiate it with archeological findings. It is argued that the cognitive makeup of any animal is constituted by being embedded in a certain way of life. Changing ways of life thus foster appearances of new cognitive abilities. Finally, a new way of life of coordinated group behavior emerged within the hominins: anticipatory group planning involved in activities like making sophisticated spears for hunting. This gave rise to human logical cognition. It turned hominins into domain-general reasoner and adherents of intersubjective norms for reasoning. However, as I argue, it did not—and most likely could not—give rise to reason by deductive logic. More likely, deductive reasoning entered our world only a few thousand years ago: exclusively as a cultural artifact.
Kola nut (Cola cf. nitida) and Safou fruit (Dacryodes edulis) remains have been discovered in eleventh- to fourteenth-century archaeological contexts at Togu Missiri near Ségou in Mali. These remains are evidence of early trade in perishable foodstuffs from the West African forest zone into the Middle Niger region. On the basis of these finds, this paper argues that long-distance trade links were well established by the end of the first millennium AD. It thereby supports the hypothesis that dates the inception of trade between the West African forest zone and the savanna regions to the first millennium AD. The circumstances of the find are discussed, as are the implications for our understanding of the wider exchange network based on the Niger River system in the late first and early second millennium CE.
Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.
NGO brokers between local needs and global norms: trajectories of development actors in Burkina Faso
(2021)
Local NGO brokers in Africa and beyond negotiate and mediate between (inter)national donors and potential beneficiaries within their communities. They translate local needs into development projects to make them suitable for international donors. This article looks at two main conditions that influence their work: First, windows of opportunity, which open and close according to structures and institutions beyond their sphere of influence; and second, their personality and skills. Based on two case studies from Burkina Faso, this article offers insights into biographies and life stories of such brokers where engagement leads to a distinguished lifestyle that contains aspects of cosmopolitanism and distinctiveness.
The book deals with a comprehensive constellation of narrative and visual, often counterposed representations of the causes, course, and results of the assault on the Palace of Justice of Colombia by a guerrilla commando and the immediate counterattack launched by state security forces on November 6, 1985, as well as with the local memorial traditions in which the production, circulation and reproduction of these representations have taken place between 1985 and 2020. The research on which it is based was grounded in the method and perspective of classical anthropology, in as much as qualitative fieldwork and the search for the perspective of the actors involved have played a central role. Within that context, memory entrepreneurs belonging to diverse sectors, from the far-right to the human rights movement, were followed through multisited fieldwork in various locations of Colombia, as well as in various countries of America and Europe. The analyses of fieldwork data, documental sources, and visual representations that constitute the core of the argument are framed in the field of memory studies and mainly based on theoretical and methodological resources from Pierre Bourdieu’s Field Theory, Jeffrey Alexander’s theory of social trauma, and Ernst Gombrich’s characterization of iconological analysis.
The book is composed of four chapters preceded by an introduction and followed by the conclusions and documental appendices, and substantiates three main theses. The first is that the Palace of Justice events were a radio- and television-broadcasted dispersed tragedy that affected the lives of actors from different social sectors and regions of Colombia, who have launched since 1985 multiple memorial initiatives in different fields of culture, thereby contributing to the formation and intergenerational transmission of a widespread cultural trauma. The second is that the narrative and visual representations at the core of that trauma express a vast universe of local representational traditions that can be traced at least until the early 20th century, and therefore preexists the so-called Colombian “memory boom”, dated to the mid-1990s. As an example of the preexistence and longstanding impact of these traditions, the local usage of the figure of “holocaust” for representing the effects of politically motivated violence is analyzed regarding the Palace of Justice events, but also traced to other representations emerged in the decade of 1920. The third thesis is that analyzing the diverse, frequently counterposed accounts of political violence elaborated within these traditions provides an opportunity to explore a wide variety of understandings of the causes and characteristics of the longstanding Colombian social and armed conflict.
Keywords: Political violence, Cultural trauma, Collective Memory, Iconology, Holocaust, Colombia.
NGO brokers between local needs and global norms: trajectories of development actors in Burkina Faso
(2021)
Local NGO brokers in Africa and beyond negotiate and mediate between (inter)national donors and potential beneficiaries within their communities. They translate local needs into development projects to make them suitable for international donors. This article looks at two main conditions that influence their work: First, windows of opportunity, which open and close according to structures and institutions beyond their sphere of influence; and second, their personality and skills. Based on two case studies from Burkina Faso, this article offers insights into biographies and life stories of such brokers where engagement leads to a distinguished lifestyle that contains aspects of cosmopolitanism and distinctiveness.
Ever since Hegel highlighted the difference between morality and ethical life or ‘Sittlichkeit’, philosophical discourse concerning morality and law in the traditions that developed subsequently, up to and including the Frankfurt School, has oscillated between those poles. This paper opens with a short exposition of autonomy as one of the few large-scale innovations in the history of philosophy and proceeds to discuss Hegel's concept of ethical life and the objections that can be raised against it from a Kantian point of view. Political theory, however, has to move beyond pure normativism and consider actual social relations of power, as Marx disclosed. Tracing this winding trajectory from Kant to Marx provides some perspective that may be illuminating concerning present-day challenges.
The internet has often been considered a 'technology of freedom' – a nearly revolutionary tool believed to flatten social hierarchies and democratize access to media by 'giving voice' to everybody equally. Contradictory to this point of view, research has shown the existence of a 'digital divide,' the phenomenon that access to and use of the internet, as well as the outcomes derived from this use, correlate with pre-existing inequalities.
Based on ethnographic fieldwork among activists in Dakar, Senegal, this thesis analyzes how inequalities shape and are shaped by the relationships between activists and smartphones. Do smartphones indeed flatten social hierarchies, or are inequalities rather reproduced – or even reinforced – through them?
The "Suma de tratos y contratos" (1569-1571) by Tomás de Mercado is the first legal treatise on trade that explicitly takes into account the specificities of Spanish trade with the Indias. Tomás de Mercado was faced with very profound changes in trade: long distances, large convoy sizes, the need for large amounts of funding, high risk, variations in prices and the value of money...
From a theological-legal point of view, these upheavals posed new and complex questions.
Mercado, advisor to the merchants of Seville and an excellent knowledge of New Spain, analyses the sudden transformation of economic and juridical practice with finesse and realism. The 'Suma' is thus an extraordinary real-time testimony to the profound transformations taking place in 16th century commerce.
Moreover, faced with fundamental questions of moral order and juridical legitimacy, Mercado proposes legal solutions of high equilibrium in which theological imperatives are masterfully reconciled with the needs of transatlantic commercial practice.
Stanley Cavell is one of very few philosophers who systematically reflect on the impact and influence of autobiographical detail, experience, and preferences on their philosophical work. The aim of this essay is to show how Cavell’s use of autobiographical exploration is rooted in his early aesthetic theory, in particular his view of the similarities between philosophy and aesthetic criticism. Cavell argues that criticism starts by exploiting and incorporating a subjective vantage point, eventually bringing the reader to test the significance of a work on herself. In his ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, Cavell states exactly this form of appeal to the ‘We’ of author and reader as the basic move of his own version of ‘ordinary language philosophy’. It is because of the connections Cavell sees between criticism and philosophy that his aesthetic diagnosis harks back on his overall critical style of thinking.
This article discusses the potential of a historical approach to sustainability transformations. Using environmental issues and governance structures as case studies, it first describes how historical “sustainability transformations” can be conceptualized. It then suggests that 19th-century constitutional reforms can be read as attempts at reaching fiscal sustainability, whereas some social reforms can be interpreted as attempts to render the capitalist economy sustainable. In conclusion, the article highlights that the primary value of historical approaches to sustainability transformations will not lie in models, but in encouraging more creative questions.
Mistrust and social hierarchies as blind spots of ICT4D projects : lessons from Togo and Rwanda
(2019)
Information and communication technologies for development (ICT4D) are seen to have great potential for boosting democratization processes all over the world by giving people access to information and thereby empowering them to demand more accountability and transparency of authorities. Based on ethnographic research in Togo and Rwanda on an SMS-based citizen monitoring and evaluation system, this article argues that focusing on access to information is too narrow a view. We show that it is crucial to take into account the respective socio-political backgrounds, such as levels of mistrust or existing social hierarchies. In this context, mobile phone usage has rather varied and ambiguous meanings here. These dynamics can pose a challenge to the successful implementation of ICT4D projects aimed at political empowerment. By addressing these often overlooked issues, we offer explanations for the gap between ICT4D assumptions and people’s lifeworlds in Togo and Rwanda.