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Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is not too large.
Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. JEL - Klassifikation: G21 , G78 , G33
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
Schon im ersten Weltkrieg, besonders aber seit dem Ausbruch der Weltwirtschaftskrise und erst recht im zweiten Weltkrieg hat der öffentliche Kredit in finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischer Hinsicht eine Bedeutung erlangt, wie nie zuvor. Er, der ehedem fast nur ein außerordentliches Mittel zur Überwindung vorübergehender finanzieller Schwierigkeiten des Staates gewesen war, entwickelte sich in dieser Zeit zu einem wirtschaftspolitischen Faktor ersten Ranges, ohne dessen Mitwirkung eine erfolgreiche Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik heute kaum denkbar ist. Besonders die durch den zweiten Weltkrieg geschaffene Zwangslage nötigte die einzelnen Volkswirtschaften, die durch ihn gebotenen finanz- und wirtschaftspolitischen Möglichkeiten in jeder Weise bis zur Grenze des absolut Möglichen auszuprobieren. Die konjunkturaktive öffentliche Kreditpolitik jener Zeit war von Anfang an kein einheitliches Ganzes, sondern entwickelte sich zu einem geschlossenen wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen System erst allmählich aus verschiedenen wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Einzelmaßnahmen. Sinn und Zweck dieser Arbeit ist es nun, rückschauend auf diese Entwicklung das Grundsätzliche dieser Politik herauszuarbeiten. Ihr besonderer Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf der Beantwortung der Fragen, inwieweit eine staatliche konjunkturaktive Kreditpolitik ein Heilmittel ist, um einen wirtschaftlichen Schrumpfungsprozess zum Stillstand zu bringen, inwieweit ein Reizmittel, um die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung voranzutreiben und inwieweit ein Gift, das schließlich den Ruin von Marktwirtschaft und Finanzwirtschaft herbeiführt.