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... Im Zusammenhang mit Eurobonds und Schuldentilgungsfonds werden auch immer wieder Projektbonds genannt. Hier haben die Juristen durchweg freundliche Nachrichten, nicht zuletzt, weil diese unzutreffenderweise mit Eurobonds zusammen diskutiert werden. Projektbonds, d.h. Garantien aus dem EU-Haushalt und der Europäischen Investitionsbank für projektbezogene Anleihen für Investitionen etwa in Verkehrs- und Energieprojekte, werfen vergleichsweise wenig rechtliche Probleme auf. Denn zum einen nimmt Art. 125 AEUV ausdrücklich gegenseitige finanzielle Garantien für die Durchführung eines gemeinsamen Projektes vom Bailout-Verbot aus. Zum anderen handelt es sich um genau begrenzte Garantien aus dem EU-Budget, so dass eine weitergehende Haushaltsbelastung der Mitgliedstaaten nicht zu befürchten ist. ...
... Es stellen sich auch für das Konzept eines Schuldentilgungsfonds – jedenfalls in Deutschland – verfassungsrechtliche Fragen. Zwar sollen Schuldentilgungsfonds sowie die dadurch bedingte gemeinschaftliche Haftung zeitlich und dem Umfang nach begrenzt sein und seine Errichtung parlamentarischer Zustimmung unterliegen. Das klingt zunächst einmal beruhigend. ...
... "Eurobonds" werden in den Verträgen nicht erwähnt. Hier fangen die Probleme also bereits an. Auf der Suche nach Kompetenzgrundlagen für die Einrichtung von Eurobonds wäre denkbar, Gebrauch von den dem Rat in Art. 136 AEUV übertragenen Befugnissen zu machen oder alternativ dazu Art. 352 mit Art. 133 und 136 AEUV heranzuziehen. Diese Bestimmungen sind jedenfalls vom Europäischen Parlament im Brok/Gualtieri-Bericht im März 2011 als in den Verträgen vorgesehene Möglichkeiten zur Einrichtung eines ständigen Stabilitätsmechanismus erörtert worden. ...
Die Diskussion um Eurobonds hält an. Es gibt gute Gründe gegen solche Bonds, aber auch welche dafür. Einerseits wird darauf verwiesen, dass durch die Einführung von Eurobonds der Reform- und Spardruck auf verschwenderische Fiskalpolitik zu sinken droht. Und dass zuviel Liquidität – leicht verfügbares Geld – genau das Ausgangsproblem war. Auf der anderen Seite wird daran erinnert, dass Staatsaufgaben nun einmal weiter finanziert werden müssen, und es wird bezweifelt ob ausschließliches Sparen wirklich trägt. Gemeinsame Anleihen würden für die meisten Staaten zudem günstigere Konditionen bedeuten, freilich nicht für Deutschland – wobei Deutschland unter verschiedenen Aspekten von der derzeitigen Situation profitiert. ...
Using a novel regulatory dataset of fully identified derivatives transactions, this paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the structure of the euro area interest rate swap (IRS) market after the start of the mandatory clearing obligation. Our dataset contains 1.7 million bilateral IRS transactions of banks and non-banks. Our key results are as follows:
1) The euro area IRS market is highly standardised and concentrated around the group of the G16 Dealers but also around a significant group of core “intermediaries"(and major CCPs).
2) Banks are active in all segments of the IRS euro market, whereas non-banks are often specialised.
3) When using relative net exposures as a proxy for the “flow of risk" in the IRS market, we find that risk absorption takes place in the core as well as the periphery of the network but in absolute terms the risk absorption is largely at the core.
4) Among the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios, the leverage ratio plays a key role in determining a bank's IRS trading activity.
Exploiting heterogeneity in U.S. firms' exposure to an unconventional monetary policy shock that reduced debt financing costs, I identify the impact of financing conditions on firms' toxic emissions. I find robust evidence that lower financing costs reduce toxic emissions and boost investments in emission reduction activities, especially capital-intensive pollution control activities. The effect is stronger for firms in noncompliance with environmental regulation. Examining the ability of regaining regulatory compliance by implementing pollution control activities I find that only capital-intensive activities help firms regaining compliance. These findings underscore the impact of firms' financing conditions for emissions and the environment.
We show that "quasi-dark" trading venues, i.e., markets with somewhat non-transparent trading mechanisms, are important parts of modern equity market structure alongside lit markets and dark pools. Using the European MiFID II regulation as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that dark pool bans lead to (i) volume spill-overs into quasi-dark trading mechanisms including periodic auctions and order internalization systems; (ii) little volume returning to transparent public markets; and consequently, (iii) a negligible impact on market liquidity and short-term price efficiency. These results show that quasi-dark markets serve as close substitutes for dark pools and consequently mitigate the effectiveness of dark pool regulation. Our findings highlight the need for a broader approach to transparency regulation in modern markets that takes into consideration the many alternative forms of quasi-dark trading.
We study the effects of market incompleteness on speculation, investor survival, and asset pricing moments, when investors disagree about the likelihood of jumps and have recursive preferences. We consider two models. In a model with jumps in aggregate consumption, incompleteness barely matters, since the consumption claim resembles an insurance product against jump risk and effectively reproduces approximate spanning. In a long-run risk model with jumps in the long-run growth rate, market incompleteness affects speculation, and investor survival. Jump and diffusive risks are more balanced regarding their importance and, therefore, the consumption claim cannot reproduce approximate spanning.
Decisions under ambiguity depend on both the belief regarding possible scenarios and the attitude towards ambiguity. This paper exclusively investigates the belief formation and belief updating process under ambiguity, using laboratory experiments. The results show that half of the subjects tend to adopt a simple heuristic strategy when updating beliefs, while the other half seems to partially adopt the Bayesian updates. We recover beliefs, represented by distributions of the priors/posteriors. The recoverable initial priors mostly follow a uniform distribution. We also find that subjects on average demonstrate slight pessimism in an ambiguous environment.
Do household inflation expectations affect consumption-savings decisions? We link survey data on quantitative inflation expectations to administrative data on income and wealth. We document that households with higher inflation expectations save less. Estimating panel data models with year and household fixed effects, we find that a one percentage point increase in a household's inflation expectation over time is associated with a 250-400 euro reduction in the household's change in net worth per year on average. We also document that households with higher inflation expectations are more likely to acquire a car and acquire higher-value cars. In addition, we provide a quantitative model of household-level inflation expectations.
Job loss expectations, durable consumption and household finances : evidence from linked survey data
(2019)
Job security is important for durable consumption and household savings. Using surveys, workers express a probability that they will lose their job in the next 12 months. In order to assess the empirical content of these probabilities, we link survey data to administrative data with labor market outcomes. Workers predict job loss quite well, in particular those whose job loss is followed by unemployment. Workers with higher job loss expectations acquire cheaper cars, and are less likely to buy new cars. In line with models of precautionary saving, higher job loss expectations are associated with more savings and less exposure to risky assets.