Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability (IMFS)
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We investigate how unconventional monetary policy, via central banks’ purchases of corporate bonds, unfolds in credit-saturated markets. While this policy results in a loosening of credit market conditions as intended by policymakers, we report two unintended side effects. First, the policy impacts the allocation of credit among industries. Affected banks reallocate loans from investment-grade firms active on bond markets almost entirely to real estate asset managers. Other industries do not obtain more loans, particularly real estate developers and construction firms. We document an increase in real estate prices due to this policy, which fuels real estate overvaluation. Second, more loan write-offs arise from lending to these firms, and banks are not compensated for this risk by higher interest rates. We document a drop in bank profitability and, at the same time, a higher reliance on real estate collateral. Our findings suggest that central banks’ quantitative easing has substantial adverse effects in credit-saturated economies.
In this paper, we examine how the institutional design affects the outcome of bank bailout decisions. In the German savings bank sector, distress events can be resolved by local politicians or a state-level association. We show that decisions by local politicians with close links to the bank are distorted by personal considerations: While distress events per se are not related to the electoral cycle, the probability of local politicians injecting taxpayers’ money into a bank in distress is 30 percent lower in the year directly preceding an election. Using the electoral cycle as an instrument, we show that banks that are bailed out by local politicians experience less restructuring and perform considerably worse than banks that are supported by the savings bank association. Our findings illustrate that larger distance between banks and decision makers reduces distortions in the decision making process, which has implications for the design of bank regulation and supervision.